УСТРОЙСТВО ЗАЩИТЫ ОТ ВОРОВСТВА

Изобретение относится к компьютерной технике. Использование: для защиты от воровства компьютеров и (или) компьютерных компонент, и другой электронной аппаратуры, применяющей процессоры, такой как компоненты запоминающих устройств, жесткие диски, сменные платы и процессоры, позволяет получить технический результат в виде значительного затруднения несанкционированного использования украденных компьютеров или их частей. Этот результат достигается благодаря тому, что устройство содержит блокирующую схему, которая интегрируется с защищаемым компонентом, содержащую запоминающее устройство для запоминания идентифицирующего кода (ИК) для каждой блокирующей схемы, и тем, что каждая блокирующая схема содержит оконечную аппаратуру связи для ввода ключевого кода в блокирующую схему и компаратор для сравнения этого вводимого ключевого кода с ИК блокирующей схемы, при этом блокирующая схема выполнена с возможностью блокирования компонента для дальнейшего использования в случае неправильного ключевого ...

АГЕНТ МИКРОПРОГРАММНОГО ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ

Изобретение относится к области обработки данных, способу и устройству предоставления микропрограммного обеспечения. Технический результат заключается в повышении эффективности предоставления микропрограммного обеспечения устройству, чувствительному к потреблению энергии. Прибор содержит первую вычислительную среду, устройство, процессор, соединенный с устройством, предназначенный для того, чтобы поддерживать первую вычислительную среду; агент управления питанием, предназначенный для предоставления сигнала включения устройству; первое запоминающее устройство, предназначенное для сохранения микропрограммного обеспечения, связанного с устройством. Вторая вычислительная включает второе запоминающее устройство и агент микропрограммного обеспечения, обеспечивающий хранение копии микропрограммного обеспечения первого запоминающего устройства первой вычислительной среды во втором запоминающем устройстве; обнаружение сигнала включения от агента управления питанием. 4 н. и 20 з.п. ф-лы, 5 ил.

СПОСОБ ОТЛОЖЕННОГО УСТРАНЕНИЯ ВРЕДОНОСНОГО КОДА

Изобретение относится к антивирусным технологиям, а более конкретно к системам и способам отложенного устранения вредоносного кода. Технический результат настоящего изобретения заключается в обеспечении лечения вредоносных программ, которые препятствуют лечению. Настоящий технический результат достигается путем использования способа лечения обнаруженных вредоносных объектов, при котором обнаруживают вредоносные объекты на компьютере, формируют, по меньшей мере, одну задачу лечения обнаруженных вредоносных объектов, при этом задача формируется с использованием языка сценариев. Сформированную задачу лечения обнаруженных вредоносных объектов записывают в заданную ветку реестра перед перезагрузкой компьютера, проверяют целостность задачи лечения обнаруженных вредоносных объектов, перезагружают компьютер. Загружают драйвер для выполнения, по меньшей мере, одной задачи лечения обнаруженных вредоносных объектов, и драйвер операционной системы, позволяющий выполнить задачу лечения обнаруженных ...

АГЕНТ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, ФУНКЦИОНИРУЮЩИЙ НА УРОВНЕ ВСТРОЕННОГО ПРОГРАММНОГО ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ, С ПОДДЕРЖКОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ УРОВНЯ ОПЕРАЦИОННОЙ СИСТЕМЫ

Настоящее изобретение относится к системам и способам обеспечения безопасности и, более конкретно, к системам и способам обеспечения безопасности, работающим независимо от операционной системы, но выполненным с поддержкой приложения безопасности, работающего на уровне операционной системы. Технический результат настоящего изобретения заключается в повышении уровня безопасности компьютерной системы путем обеспечения безопасности компьютерной системы на этапе до запуска операционной системы. Способ обеспечения безопасности компьютерной системы на этапе до запуска операционной системы включает: а) осуществление запуска UEFI из постоянного запоминающего устройства перед запуском операционной системы; б) запуск из UEFI агента безопасности, работающего независимо от операционной системы; в) осуществление посредством агента безопасности сканирования и последующего удаления или помещения на карантин вредоносного программного обеспечения; где сканирование на наличие вредоносного программного обеспечения ...

Система и способ оптимизации антивирусной проверки неактивных операционных систем

Изобретение относится к системе и способу антивирусной проверки операционных систем (ОС), установленных на компьютере и неактивных в момент проверки. Технический результат заключается в ускорении проведения антивирусной проверки неактивной ОС и в проведении антивирусной проверки только одной неактивной ОС при наличии нескольких установленных ОС. Система содержит средство перечисления ОС, предназначенное для поиска установленных неактивных ОС, определения идентификаторов логических дисков для каждой установленной неактивной ОС; средство поиска файлов, предназначенное для определения неактивной ОС, которую необходимо проверить на наличие вредоносных файлов, и проведения антивирусной проверки файлов неактивной ОС, причем при наличии нескольких установленных неактивных ОС производится выбор неактивной ОС для антивирусной проверки, при этом сопоставляют идентификаторы логических дисков, относящиеся к неактивной ОС, с идентификаторами логических дисков, относящимися к активной ОС, где под активной ...

СПОСОБ И УСТРОЙСТВО ДЛЯ ШИФРОВАНИЯ/ДЕШИФРОВАНИЯ ДАННЫХ В ЗАПОМИНАЮЩЕМ УСТРОЙСТВЕ БОЛЬШОЙ ЕМКОСТИ

Изобретение касается способа и устройства, осуществляющих шифрование/дешифрование данных при записи или считывании из запоминающего устройства. Сущность изобретения состоит в обеспечении множества различных алгоритмов шифрования/дешифрования со взаимодействующими ключами, причем выбирают и используют один из множества различных алгоритмов шифрования/дешифрования со взаимодействующими ключами в элементе данных, подлежащих перенесению в адрес на носителе памяти или из него, причем при выборе алгоритма и взаимодействующего ключа используют, по меньшей мере, два физических адреса, определяющих верхний и нижний предел адресов адресуемой области, включающий адрес элемента данных на носителе. Технический результат, достигаемый при осуществлении изобретения, состоит в повышении защиты запоминающего устройства путем шифрования/дешифрования данных, хранящихся на адресуемых участках носителя памяти большой емкости, с помощью различных алгоритмов и ключей шифрования/дешифрования. 2 н. и 34 з.п. ф-лы ...

СЛУЧАЙНЫЙ ПАРОЛЬ, АВТОМАТИЧЕСКИ ФОРМИРУЕМЫЙ БАЗОВОЙ СИСТЕМОЙ ВВОДА-ВЫВОДА (BIOS) ДЛЯ ЗАЩИТЫ УСТРОЙСТВА ХРАНЕНИЯ ДАННЫХ

Изобретение относится к области систем обработки информации, в частности имеет отношение к защите устройства хранения данных в системе обработки информации. Техническим результатом является повышение безопасности компьютера. В способе автоматического формирования пароля для устройства хранения данных, являющегося частью компьютера, автоматически формируется набор данных безопасности. Данные безопасности сохраняются в энергонезависимой памяти. Набор данных безопасности также программируется в устройство хранения данных в качестве кода безопасности. 3 н. и 17 з.п. ф-лы, 3 ил.

ОБНОВЛЕНИЕ РАБОЧЕЙ СИСТЕМЫ ДЛЯ ЗАЩИЩЕННОГО ЭЛЕМЕНТА

Изобретение относится к области встроенных защищенных элементов, таких как смарт-карты. Технический результат заключается в обеспечении обновления рабочей системы надежным и безопасным способом. Раскрыт защищенный элемент (30), содержащий, по меньшей мере, микропроцессор (31), энергонезависимое запоминающее устройство (34) и интерфейс (36) связи, при этом защищенный элемент (30) выполнен с возможностью осуществления связи с устройством (10) обновления для обновления рабочей системы защищенного элемента через интерфейс (36) связи, энергонезависимое запоминающее устройство (34) хранит, по меньшей мере, программу (38) инициирования, а микропроцессор (31) выполнен с возможностью исполнения программы (38) инициирования при запуске защищенного элемента (30), при этом программа (38) инициирования содержит команды для осуществления: этапа запуска (Е1, Е12) для определения, содержит ли энергонезависимое запоминающее устройство (34) активную рабочую программу (35), и при положительном результате ...

Интегрированный модуль доверенной загрузки периферийного устройства

Полезная модель относится к вычислительной технике. Технический результат заключается в повышении степени защиты вычислительной системы. Интегрированный модуль доверенной загрузки периферийного устройства, в котором вычислительное ядро дополнительно соединено с блоком ввода-вывода GPIO, снабжённым третьим интерфейсом, блоком генерации случайного числа, блоком ускорителей симметричных алгоритмов шифрования, блоком ускорителей асимметричных алгоритмов шифрования, блоком однократно программируемого постоянного запоминающего устройства, блоком установки и контроля временных интервалов, блоком контроля параметров напряжения и температуры и блоком безопасного обмена данными для взаимодействия вычислительного ядра с основным вычислительным ядром микросхемы периферийного устройства через четвёртый интерфейс. 2 ил.

Способ выполнения кода в режиме гипервизора

Изобретение относится к области компьютерной безопасности. Технический результат заключается в обеспечении выполнения кода в режиме гипервизора. Предложен способ, в котором загружают в оперативную память код гипервизора до загрузки операционной системы; загружают во время загрузки операционной системы в оперативную память доверенный модуль, предназначенный для вызова выполнения кода гипервизора; совершают первый запрос к гипервизору со стороны доверенного модуля с целью получения адреса гипервизора в оперативной памяти; генерируют криптографический ключ с помощью гипервизора; сохраняют указанный ключ в памяти гипервизора; выделяют страницу оперативной памяти; записывают в выделенную страницу оперативной памяти указанный ключ и адрес гипервизора в оперативной памяти; устанавливают защиту для выделенной страницы памяти; совершают запрос к гипервизору по адресу, записанному в выделенной странице на этапе ж), со стороны доверенного модуля для вызова выполнения кода гипервизора, при этом запрос ...

Устройство защиты UEFI BIOS от несанкционированных изменений.

Изобретение относится к области вычислительной техники и предназначено для защиты кода UEFI BIOS, расположенного на микросхеме SPI Flash, от несанкционированных изменений. Техническим результатом является повышение защиты UEFI BIOS от несанкционированных изменений. Устройство защиты UEFI BIOS от несанкционированных изменений содержит микроконтроллер, расположенный на материнской плате вычислительного устройства, между центральным процессором и микросхемой SPI FLASH системы ЭВМ, причем устройство защиты подключается к блоку питания системы ЭВМ, микроконтроллер работает независимо от центрального процессора и содержит собственную оперативную память, долговременную память с загруженными базой данных прав доступа пользователей, а также программными модулями управления с реализацией всех команд работы протокола SPI FLASH и содержимым микросхемы SPI FLASH для целей ее эмуляции, а также для обработки и анализа входящих данных и команд до поступления их в микросхему SPI Flash и систему ЭВМ для ...

МОДУЛЬ ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ, ВКЛЮЧАЮЩИЙ ВТОРИЧНЫЙ АГЕНТ, ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВУЮЩИЙ С ГЛАВНЫМ АГЕНТОМ

... 1. Система для удаленного мониторинга устройства, включающая, по крайней мере, одну сеть, по крайней мере, один сетевой интерфейс устройства, связанный, с этой, по крайней мере, одной сетью, главный агент, приспособленный для работы под управлением операционной системы базового устройства, установленной на устройстве, при этом главный агент имеет доступ к, по крайней мере, одной сети через, по крайней мере, один сетевой интерфейс, центр мониторинга, подключенный к, по крайней мере, одной сети, и настроенный таким образом, чтобы иметь возможность связываться с главным агентом и (или) с вторичным агентом через, по крайней мере, один сетевой интерфейс, и вторичный агент, установленный на устройстве, при этом вторичный агент имеет доступ к, по крайней мере, одной сети, через, по крайней мере, один сетевой интерфейс независимо от операционной системы базового устройства, при этом вторичный агент и главный агент приспособлены для того, чтобы передавать в центр мониторинга сведения об атрибутах ...

СОХРАНЕНИЕ ЗАЩИЩЕННЫХ СЕКРЕТОВ ПО БЕЗОПАСНОМУ ОБНОВЛЕНИЮ ПЕРЕЗАГРУЗКИ

ПРОГРЕССИВНАЯ НАЧАЛЬНАЯ ЗАГРУЗКА ДЛЯ БЕСПРОВОДНОГО УСТРОЙСТВА

... 1. Устройство, содержащее: ! процессор, выполненный с возможностью программирования первого и второго образов кода в устройство памяти, используемое для беспроводного устройства, причем первый образ кода загружается из устройства памяти для начальной загрузки беспроводного устройства и обеспечения работоспособности беспроводного устройства, второй образ кода загружается из устройства памяти, когда беспроводное устройство является работающим, для дополнительной начальной загрузки беспроводного устройства. ! 2. Устройство по п.1, в котором процессор выполнен с возможностью генерирования первой информации безопасности на основе первого образа кода, генерирования второй информации безопасности на основе второго образа кода и программирования первой и второй информации безопасности в устройство памяти, причем первая и вторая информация безопасности используется для аутентификации первого и второго образов кода соответственно. ! 3. Устройство по п.1, в котором процессор выполнен с возможностью ...

FREISCHALTUNG DES ZUGRIFFS AUF INFORMATIONEN IN ABHÄNGIGKEIT VON DER VALIDIERUNG VON PROGRAMMCODES VIRTUELLER ENTITÄTEN

In einigen Beispielen enthält eine Verwaltungssteuerung eine Kommunikationsschnittstelle, um mit einer Rechenvorrichtung zu kommunizieren, wobei die Verwaltungssteuerung von einem Prozessor der Rechenvorrichtung getrennt ist. Die Verwaltungssteuerung enthält einen Verwaltungsprozessor, um eine Validierung von Programmcodes virtueller Entitäten der Rechenvorrichtung durchzuführen und als Reaktion auf die Validierung der Programmcodes den Zugriff auf Informationen in einem Informationsspeicher freizugeben, um den Zugriff auf die Informationen durch die Rechenvorrichtung zu ermöglichen, wobei die Informationen zur Verwendung durch die virtuellen Entitäten der Rechenvorrichtung bestimmt sind und wobei der Verwaltungsprozessor den Zugriff auf die Informationen in dem Informationsspeicher vor der Validierung sperren soll.

SYSTEM UND VERFAHREN ZUM SCHUTZ DER INTEGRITÄT VON RECHNERDATEN UND SOFTWARE

Plattform und Verfahren zum Fernattestieren einer Plattform

Eine Plattform, enthaltend: einen Prozessor (110), der entweder in einem normalen Ausführungsmodus oder in einem isolierten Ausführungsmodus arbeitet; einen Systemspeicher (140), der einen isolierten Bereich und einen nicht-isolierten Bereich enthält, wobei der Prozessor nur dann auf den isolierten Bereich zugreifen kann, wenn er in dem isolierten Ausführungsmodus arbeitet; einen Chipsatz (130, 150; 310; 400, 420) mit einer Komponente (310; 420; 400; 150), die einen geschützten Speicher (152) aufweist, der ein Prüfprotokoll (156) oder, wenn das Prüfprotokoll (156) in einem nicht-geschützten Speicher gespeichert ist, einen Gesamt-Hash-Wert des Prüfprotokolls (156) speichert, wobei das Prüfprotokoll (156) repräsentative Daten von nach dem Einschalten in der Plattform geladenen Software-Modulen enthält; wobei in dem Prozessor (110) oder in einer Komponente (400) des Chipsatzes oder in einem mit dem Chipsatz über einen Token-Bus (185) gekoppelten Token (180; 182) eine Fernattestiereinheit ( ...

Verfahren zur Bereitstellung von Systemintegrität und Legacy-Umgebungsemulation

Verfahren mit den folgenden Schritten: Implementieren eines virtuellen Maschinenmonitors (420) auf einem Computersystem (400) mit einer Native-Umgebung, die in einem physikalischen Modus ausgeführt wird, wobei das Computersystem (400) ein Extensible Firmware-Interface (EFI) mit zumindest einem zusätzlichen Codemodul aufweist; Emulieren von Legacy-Hardwarekomponenten, die nicht in der Native-Umgebung vorhanden sind, durch den virtuellen Maschinenmonitor (420), um das Booten eines Legacy-Betriebssystems zu unterstützen; und vor dem Booten des Legacy Betriebssystems, Aufrufen der Signatur-Logik (421) des virtuellen Maschinenmonitors (420), um eine im Codemodul enthaltene Hash-Signatur gegen eine in einem sicheren Speicher (422) des Virtuellen Maschinenmonitors (420) gespeicherte Hash-Signatur zu validieren, um dem Legacy-Betriebssystem vor der Übernahme der Kontrolle durch eine Attestprotokollierung zu versichern, daß dem Code des Codemoduls vertraut werden kann.

Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Überprüfung der Integrität von in einem vorbestimmten Speicherbereich eines Speichers gespeicherten Daten

Um einen sicheren Boot-Vorgang von IT-Systemen realisieren zu können, erfolgt eine Überprüfung der Integrität von in einem vorbestimmten ersten Speicherbereich (12) eines Speichers (11) gespeicherten Daten (D) einer ersten Einrichtung (10). In Abhängigkeit der Daten und einer vorbestimmten Integritätsfunktion wird ein Integritätswert (IW) berechnet. Die Überprüfung der Integrität der Daten erfolgt in Abhängigkeit des berechneten Integritätswerts (IW) durch eine zweite Einrichtung (20). Der Integritätswert (IW) wird vor oder während des Bootens der ersten Einrichtung (10) durch eine CRTM-Komponente in einem zweiten Speicherbereich (13) der ersten Einrichtung (10) berechnet. Eine die Integrität repräsentierende Integritätsinformation wird über eine Schnittstelle (15), auf die nur durch die CRTM-Komponente (CK) zugegriffen werden kann, an die zweite Einrichtung (20) übertragen. Im Ergebnis wird ein unabhängiger Low-Level-Kommunikationskanal zur Integritätsüberwachung direkt in der CRTM-Komponente ...

Sicheres elektronisches Auslieferungssiegel für ein informationsverarbeitendes System

Ein Verfahren und eine Vorrichtung zur Sicherstellung der Sicherheit einer bestimmten Konfiguration von Hardware und Software für ein informationsverarbeitendes System, das unter Verwendung eines "Fertigung auf Bestellung"-Systems zusammengesetzt ist. Die vorliegende Erfindung stellt die Sicherheit und Integrität von Daten auf einem informationsverarbeitenden System von dem Punkt der Herstellung zu dem letzten Ziel an der Einrichtung des Kunden sicher. Das informationsverarbeitende System wird dann mit dem Betriebssystem hergestellt und ein vorbestimmter Satz von Software wird darauf installiert. Eine Auflistungsdatei wird erzeugt, umfassend einen vorbestimmten Satz von Dateien und Konfigurationsinformationen. Die Auflistungsdatei wird mit wenigstens einem elektronischen Schlüssel elektronisch signiert. Wenn das informationsverarbeitende System seinen ersten Start durchführt, wird ein zweiter elektronischer Schlüssel verwendet, um Informationen von der Auflistungsdatei zu extrahieren, und ...

Eingebauter Prozessor mit direkter Verbindung von Sicherheitsvorrichtungen für verbesserte Sicherheit

Integrierte Schaltung (212), umfassend: eine Schnittstellen-Logikschaltung (216) eines ersten Busses zur Verbindung mit einem ersten externen Bus (215); eine Mikrosteuerung (320), welche geeignet konfiguriert ist, um ein Eingangssignal von einer Sicherheitsvorrichtung (720) über eine direkte Eingangsleitung (710), welche von dem ersten externen Bus (215) verschieden ist, zu empfangen, wobei die Mikrosteuerung (320) ferner geeignet konfiguriert ist, um eine Anforderung zu empfangen und die Sicherheitsvorrichtung (720) über die direkte Eingangsleitung (710) zu befragen.

Starten eines sicheren Kernels in einem Multiprozessorsystem

Eine Ausführungsform dieser Erfindung umfaßt ein Verfahren, das Überprüfen eines einleitenden logischen Prozessors von einem System; Validieren eines Trusted Agents mit dem einleitenden logischen Prozessor, wenn der einleitende logische Prozessor geprüft ist; und Starten des Trusted Agents auf mehreren Prozessoren des Systems, wenn der Trusted Agent validiert ist. Nach der Ausführung eines solchen Trusted Agents, kann dann an bestimmten Ausführungsformen ein sicherer Kernel gestartet werden. Das System kann zum Beispiel ein Multiprozessorserversystem sein, das eine teilweise oder vollständig verbundene Technologie mit beliebigen Punkt-zu-Punkt-Zwischenverbindungen hat.

Ticket authorized secure installation and boot

A method and apparatus for secure software installation to boot a device authorized by a ticket are described herein. A ticket request including a device identifier of the device is sent for the ticket which includes attributes for one or more components to boot the device into an operating state. The ticket is cryptographically validated to match the one or more components with corresponding attributes included in the ticket. If successfully matched, the one or more components are executed to boot the device.

Web-based interface to access a function of a basic input/output system

Control mechanisms for data processing devices

Device key security

COMPUTER SECURITY

Enabling an external operating system to access encrypted data units of a data storage system

Security system for a hard disk

A security system for a computer hard disk comprises a software or firmware write protect of the logical block address (LBAo) and the logical block address to which the first entry in the partition table directs BIOS during the boot cycle. The purpose of this invention is to prevent a purchaser from configuring or overwriting the operating system provided on a hard disk.

Launching a secure kernel in a multiprocessor system

System and method for securing a computer

Encapsulation of a TCPA trusted platform module functionality within a server management coprocessor subsystem

System and method of tamper-resistant control

Personal computer having security function,security method therefor,security device installation and detachment methods

Encrypting data on a computer's hard disk with a key derived from the contents of a memory

Computer hard disk security comprises encrypting data on a computer's hard disk with a cryptographic key depending partly on computer memory contents, RAM and/or BIOS memory. Memory contents changing with time are excluded. The SHA-1 algorithm cryptographically hashes the memory contents giving a hash for XORing with a user password. XORing provides a result which is used as a password for an encryption unit implementing a conventional full disk encryption technique, such as XORing the password with a hard disk block number. The key is generated with the BIOS memory configured so that the computer boots only from the hard disk. Hostile alteration of the BIOS memory contents results in failure to decrypt because the key now cannot be used to decrypt the hard disk. This defeats an attacker who alters BIOS settings in an attack with rogue computer boot media such as a floppy disk or a CD ROM.

Managing basic input/output system (BIOS) access

Example embodiments disclosed herein relate to managing basic input/output system (BIOS) access. Example embodiments include communicating with a remote directory server in response to an attempt to access a setting of a BIOS module.

Arrangements for interfacing with a user access manager

USB autorun devices

Virtual high privilege mode for a system management request

Launching a secure kernel in a multiprocessor system

Method for securely booting up a computer system, and assembly comprising a computer system and an external storage medium connected to the computer system

Bootloader verification extension method

Address layout varying process

Error information processing method and device, and storage medium

An error information processing method includes, in response to a memory error triggering an interrupt, collecting error information of the memory error that includes a first memory area where the memory error occurs, obtaining a second memory area for writing log information, determining whether the second memory area contains the first memory area, and, in response to determining that the second memory area contains the first memory area, skipping a process of writing the log information into the second memory area.

Configuration driven application persona on hand held terminals

Preboot protection for a data security system

Configuration driven application persona on hand held terminals

ANTI-THEFT PROTECTION

SAFE BOATS FOR CHIP DEVICES

DEAD NOZZLE RECONCILIATION

USE OF A HASH WHEN STARTING OF A SAFE OPERATING SYSTEM

PROCEDURE, PRODUCT AND SYSTEM FOR THE SECURITY LEVEL DEFINITION AS WELL AS PENETRATION OF THE MINIMUM SAFETY REQUIREMENT DURING THE LOSS PROTECTION OF A VIRTUAL MACHINE.

PROTECTION OF SECRET INFORMATION IN PROGRAMMED ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

ELECTRONIC CASINOSPIELSYSTEM WITH IMPROVED PLAY POSSIBILITIES, AUTHENTIFIZIERUNG AND SECURITY

PROCEDURE AND SYSTEM FOR THE GUARANTEE OF THE INSTALLATION OR EXECUTION OF A SOFTWARE UPDATE ONLY ON CERTAIN EQUIPMENT OR A CLASS OF DEVICES

PROCEDURE AND SYSTEM FOR THE SAFE INITIALIZATION OF CODE IN A COMPUTER

RELIABLE COMPUTERS PLATFORM

Überwachung des Startvorgangs einer integrierten Schaltung

The invention relates to a method for monitoring the starting operation of an integrated circuit (IC), wherein the starting operation is performed by using a starting memory (SF), which is located outside the integrated circuit and is connected to the integrated circuit by means of a starting interface (SFI) arranged in the integrated circuit. In order to reduce the risk of manipulation of the starting memory, it is provided that an unalterable time period for the starting operation is prescribed by the hardware of the integrated circuit (IC) and, if the prescribed time period is exceeded, the starting interface (SFI) is disabled.

VORURLADUNGSSCHUTZ FOR A DATA SECURITY MECHANISM

PROTECTION OF BOAT BLOCK DATA AND EXACT MESSAGE OF BOAT BLOCK CONTENTS

PROCEDURE FOR THE PROTECTION OF ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, A SAFETY SYSTEM AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

Self-contained and secured access to remote servers

PROTECTED, HIDDEN EMERGENCY BOOT DIRECTORY

Secure key self-generation

Techniques are disclosed for providing secure critical security parameter (CSP) generation in an integrated circuit (IC). Embodiments generally include determining that an ability to read the CSP externally (e.g., through a debug interface) has been disabled before the CSP is generated. Depending on the functionality of the device, embodiments can include other steps, such as determining whether software for executing a method for providing a secure CSP is being run for a first time. Among other things, the techniques provided herein for providing secure CSP generation can increase the security of the CSP and reduce manufacturing costs of the IC.

Method and systems for implementing a secure boot device using cryptographically secure communications across unsecured networks

A secure boot device, method, and system for securely connecting a client computer having a secure boot device to a remote server over a communications network are disclosed. The secure boot device includes a housing having an integrated communication interface, a controller located within the housing and operatively connected to the communication interface, and a memory communicatively connected to the programmable circuit and the communication interface. The memory securely stores program instructions including a boot module, a client terminal process module, an operating system module, and a secure communications interface module. The secure communications interface module includes program instructions for communicating split and encrypted data communicated between a computing system to which the communication interface is connected and a remote computing system.

Methods and systems for providing and controlling cryptographically secure communications across unsecured networks between a secure virtual terminal and a remote system

Methods and systems for securely connecting a client computer having a secure boot device to a remote server over a communications network are disclosed. One method includes booting a client computer from a trusted set of processing modules stored in the secure boot device, verifying the contents of the trusted set of processing modules prior to execution of these processing modules, and providing authentication information from data stored upon the secure boot device to an authentication server to establish a secure connection to the remote server. The method also includes establishing the secure connection with the remote server using encryption keys stored on the secure boot device, and transferring data between the client computer and the remote server over the secure connection to perform transactions initiated by a user of the client computer. In the disclosed method, the remote server utilizes encryption keys associated with a unique ID from the secure boot device.

Use of hashing in a secure boot loader

A storage method for a gaming machine

Public/private key biometric authentication system

A device, method, and computer readable storage medium generate a biometric public key for an individual based on both the individual's biometric data and a secret, in a manner that verifiably characterizes both while tending to prevent recovery of either by anyone other than the individual. The biometric public key may be later used to authenticate a subject purporting to be the individual, using a computing facility that need not rely on a hardware root of trust. Such biometric public keys may be distributed without compromising the individual's biometric data, and may be used to provide authentication in addition to, or in lieu of, passwords or cryptographic tokens. Various use cases are disclosed, including: enrollment, authentication, establishing and using a secure communications channel, and cryptographically signing a message.

Secured computer system

There is provided a secured computer system, comprising a processing and memory unit (PMU) operatively connected to an input peripheral and an output peripheral. The PMU comprises a system memory comprising a protected memory and a shared memory, and a processor operatively coupled to the system memory, the processor including a set of instructions for enabling secure data storage and execution via the protected memory. The PMU further comprises an operating system and a group of modules executable by the operating system, each module in the group of modules having a designated secure region to be executed within the protected memory, the group of modules is configured to create authentication and share the input data securely via the shared memory accessible thereto using a composite key, the composite key generated within the group using data sharing mechanism between the designated secure regions enabled by the set of instructions.

Preboot protection, identification and security of a computer system

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROTECTED OPERATING SYSTEM BOOT USING STATE VALIDATION

A mechanism for protected operating system boot that prevents rogue components from being loaded with the operating system, and thus prevents divulgence of the system key under inappropriate circumstances. After a portion of the machine startup procedure has occurred, the operating system loader is run, the loader is validated, and a correct machine state is either verified to exist and/or created. Once the loader has been verified to be a legitimate loader, and the machine state under which it is running is verified to be correct, the loader's future behavior is known to protect against the loading of rogue components that could cause divulgence of the system key. With the loader's behavior being known to be safe for the system key, the validator may unseal the system key and provides it to the loader.

CUSTOMIZED EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT AND OPERATING SYSTEM CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SAME

Methods and techniques for implementing a custom execution environment (CE2) a related loader, and an operating system for supporting CE2s are provided. According to one embodiment, a determination is made with respect to which system resources of a computer system, if any, are to remain under control of a resident operating system of the computer system and which of the system resources are to be placed under control of on or more CE2s. The system resources are then partitioned among the resident operating system and the one or more CE2s by associating one or more partitions of the system resources with the one or more CE2s. According to one embodiment, a CE2 includes code and data sections of an application and code and data sections of a set of system services. The set of system services has direct and full control of a set of hardware resources of a computer system containing one or more processors implementing a parallel protected architecture.

PREVENTING UNAUTHORIZED POACHING OF SET TOP BOX ASSETS

To prevent poaching of an Internet Protocol (IP) set top box (STB) asset or similar network computing device from one system operator to another, code executing in the IP STB not only authenticates downloaded software images using a public key provided in a serial-number assigned digital certificate, but also confirms that the serial number appears on a signed whitelist, or does not appear on a signed blacklist. The code exe-cuting in the STB further preferably enforces a rule that only the authority that signed the already-loaded whitelist/blacklist may replace it with a new list. Such a sticky whitelist/blacklist ensures that if the STB boots or resets in a new network, the existing authentication list will not be replaced by a list that is valid for a new or different network, and, as a result, that new software code images will not be authenticated.

INITIALIZING, MAINTAINING, UPDATING AND RECOVERING SECURE OPERATION WITHIN AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM EMPLOYING A DATA ACCESS CONTROL FUNCTION

Techniques are provided for initializing, maintaining, updating and recovering secure operation within an integrated system (200). The techniques, which employ a data access control function (240) within the integrated system (200), include authenticating by a current level of software a next level of software within an integrated system. The authenticating occurs before control is passed to the next level of software. Further, an ability of the next level of f software to modify an operational characteristic of the integrated system can be selectively limited via the data access control function (240). Techniques are also provided for initializing secure operation of the integrated system (200), for migrating data encrypted using a first key set to data encrypted using a second key set, for updating software and keys within the integrated system (200), and for recovering integrated system (200) functionality following a trigger event.

SECURE ENGINE COMMUNICATION

A method of communication, within a processing system of a gas turbine engine, between a first electronic component and a second electronic component, comprising: generating by the first electronic component, a request, comprising a digital certificate, intern comprising a first host public key and a first client public key, signed with a first host private key, to initiate a trusted communication session with a second electronic component; encrypting at the first electronic component, at least a portion of the request with a first client private key; transmitting the request to the second electronic component; the first host private key and the first host public key defining a first asymmetric keypair and the first client private key and the first client public key defining a second asymmetric keypair ...

METHOD FOR DETECTING ILLEGAL MODIFICATIONS MADE TO MANUFACTURER SOFTWARE

... ²²²Procédé permettant de détecter et/ou d'éviter des modifications illicites d'un ²logiciel constructeur au sein d'un système de type GSM, comprenant un noyau ²dur et un noyau mou, une interface locale de données, comportant au moins les ²étapes suivantes A - le signal reçu sur l'interface locale de données du ²terminal n'est pas valide, mettre le terminal GSM dans un état non ²opérationnel, B - le signal est un signal de déconnexion sur l'interface ²locale de données, ou il n'y a pas de signal, lancer une procédure de ²démarrage sécurisé, avec exécution des fonctions de contrôle Autotest du noyau ²dur, si l'autotest est OK, alors tester l'intégrité du noyau mou, si cette ²intégrité est OK, alors activer le terminal pour un fonctionnement normal, si ²l'intégrité est KO, alors mettre le terminal dans un état non opérationnel, si ²l'autotest est KO, alors mettre le terminal GSM dans un état non opérationnel. ²C - le signal reçu est un signal de démarrage valide, si le fusible est non ²claqué ...

SYSTEMS, METHODS AND APPARATUSES FOR SECURE STORAGE OF DATA USING A SECURITY-ENHANCING CHIP

A computer processor and a security enhancing chip may be provided. In one aspect, the computer processor may comprise a storage for storing an encryption key, a central processing unit (CPU) configured to execute one or more software programs, and a circuit configured to calculate a hash function to generate a hash value for data loaded into the computer processor and generate an authentication token for a request initiated by a software program running on the CPU. In another aspect, the security enhancing chip may comprise a first storage for storing an encryption key, a second storage for storing a certificate, a hash storage and circuit components configured to validate, using the first certificate, command(s) adding the encryption key to the first storage and storing a first hash to the hash storage, and to process a request if a second hash in the request is equal to the first hash.

APPARATUS AND METHOD OF READING A PROGRAM INTO A PROCESSOR

The following describes an apparatus for and method of providing a secure method of downloading a program into a processor (101) from a device (103) external to the processor (101). The program may be encrypted (207) prior to its entry into the external device (103). The program may also have authentication information added (203 and 207) to it. Authentication information may be provided on an unencrypted and/or an encrypted program. T he processor (101) decrypts (307) and/or successfully authenticates (311) the program before allowing the program to be executed by the processor (101). ...

Management of authenticated variables

Media client device authentication using hardware root of trust

During run time to the security data storage device safely write data

Generic bootstrapping architecture usage with web applications and web pages

A method includes receiving at a network application function a request related to a generic bootstrapping architecture key originated from a user equipment (1). The received request includes a network application function identifier that includes a uniform resource locator, where the network application function has a fully qualified domain name. The method further includes causing a generic bootstrapping architecture key to be generated for the user equipment based at least in part on the uniform resource locator that is part of the network application function identifier (5). Apparatus and computer programs for performing the method are also disclosed.

In the multi-processor system of the communication disabled

METHOD FOR SECURELY MANAGING THE EXECUTION OF AN APPLICATION

SECURED START FOR AN ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT

PROCESS OF LOADING Of a CODE Of AT LEAST a SOFTWARE MODULE

PROCEEDED OF OPERATION Of EQUIPMENT EMBARKS, EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATES AND AIRCRAFT INCLUDING/UNDERSTANDING SUCH a EQUIPMENT

UPDATING AN OPERATING SYSTEM FOR SECURE ELEMENT

PROCESS OF PROTECTED MANAGEMENT OF the EXECUTION Of an APPLICATION

Pour sécuriser l'exécution d'une application sur un téléphone mobile intelligent on identifie chaque application par un identifiant et on associe à chaque ressource du téléphone mobile une table de droits. Une table de droits permet d'associer à un identifiant d'application, des droits d'accès à la ressource. On gère au niveau de chaque ressource les applications pouvant invoquer cette ressource. De plus les droits associés à une ressource ne peuvent être modifiés que par le propriétaire de la ressource.

Ｍ2Ｍ 통신을 인에이블하는 방법 및 장치

... 보안 M2M 프로비져닝 및 통신을 수행하기 위한 방법 및 장치가 개시된다. 특히, M2ME를 고유하게 식별하기 위한 임시 비공개 식별자, 또는 임시 접속 식별정보(PCID)도 또한 개시된다. 또한, M2ME를 확인하고 인증하고 프로비져닝하는데 사용하기 위한 방법 및 장치가 또한 개시된다. 개시된 확인 절차는 자율, 반자율, 및 원격 확인을 포함한다. 프로비져닝 절차는 M2ME를 재프로비져닝하기 위한 방법을 포함한다. 소프트웨어를 업데이트하고, M2ME에 대한 조작을 검출하는 절차도 또한 개시된다.

보안 디바이스 데이터 기록

... 보안 디바이스 데이터 기록(DDR)들이 제공된다. 일부 실시예들에서, 보안 DDR들을 위한 시스템은 무선 네트워크을 이용한 무선 통신을 위한 무선 통신 디바이스의 프로세서와 그 프로세서에 연결되고 지시를 그 프로세서에 제공하도록 구성되는 메모리를 포함하고, 여기서 프로세서는 보안 실행 환경으로 구성되고, 그리고 보안 실행 환경은: 무선 네트워크를 이용한 무선 통신 디바이스의 서비스 사용을 모니터링하고; 무선 네트워크를 이용한 무선 통신 디바이스의 모니터링된 서비스 사용의 복수의 디바이스 데이터 기록들을 발생시키도록 구성되고, 각 디바이스 데이터 기록은 고유의 시퀀스 순서 식별자와 관련된다. 일부 실시예들에서, 보안 실행 환경은 어플리케이션 프로세서에서, 모뎀 프로세서에서, 및/또는 가입자 식별 모듈(SIM)에 위치된다.

MULTI-OS(OPERATING SYSTEM) BOOT VIA MOBILE DEVICE

... 사용자들에게 특정한 모바일 장치 기능들, 보안, 애플리케이션 등에의 신속한 액세스를 제공하도록 운영 체제(OS)의 상이한 레벨들을 용이하게 하는 시스템이 제공된다. 정책들, 선호들, 액션들, 컨텍스트 등과 잘 맞는 국면들 또는 스테이지들에서 OS가 로딩될 수 있다. 유사하게, 특정한 시나리오 또는 요건을 다루기 위해 특정한 OS 또는 OS들의 그룹이 로딩될 수 있다.

SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR SECURING NETWORK COMMUNICATIONS

EXTERNAL LOCKING MECHANISM FOR PERSONAL COMPUTER MEMORY LOCATIONS

A method and system for providing an external locking mechanism for memory locations. The memory includes a first plurality of storage locations configured with BIOS data and a second plurality of storage locations. The second plurality of storage locations includes a first plurality of blocks readable only in SMM and a second plurality of blocks readable in SMM and at least one operating mode other than SMM. The computer system includes a bus, a memory coupled to the bus, and a device coupled to access the memory over the bus. The memory includes a plurality of storage locations, divided into a plurality of memory units. The device includes one or more locks configured to control access to one or more of the plurality of memory units. © KIPO & WIPO 2009 ...

TRUSTED ENTITY BASED ANTI-CHEATING MECHANISM

IN-VEHICLE SOFTWARE UPDATE SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR CONTROLLING THE SAME

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PROTECTING OS BOOT FROM MALICIOUS COMPONENT BY USING STATE VALIDATION

PURPOSE: A system and a method for protected OS(Operating System) boot using state validation are provided to prevent leakage of a system key in an improper environment by preventing a malicious component from being booted with an OS through the state validation. CONSTITUTION: A validator(550) evaluates correctness or identity of a loader(410) for loading the OS, and evaluates a state of machine to operate the loader. The validator permits advance of OS loading depending on validation of the correctness or the identity of the loader, and changes a machine state(502) into a predetermined state before the loader is advanced. In case that the loader is advanced, the validator removes a seal of the key(204) and provides the key to the loader. © KIPO 2006 ...

PLATFORM AUTHENTICATION VIA A TRANSPARENT SECOND FACTOR

Firmware of a system is configured to allow secondary devices, such as a smart card, to be used for authentication. In an example embodiment, the secondary device is a CCID smart card in compliance with the ISO 7816 specification. The smart card is inserted into a card reader coupled to the system prior to booting the system. The firmware comprises an emulator and driver configured to allow authentication information from the smart card to be utilized to allow execution of the boot process. In an example embodiment, the smart card comprises external keys for use with BITLOCKER. The secondary device is compatible with systems implementing a BIOS and with systems implementing EFI. Authentication also can be accomplished via devices that do not provide data storage, such as a biometric device or the like.TM © KIPO & WIPO 2009 ...

Information processing apparatus, method of starting information processing apparatus and startup program

When a match of a pair of a first configuration register value obtained by a configuration register value obtainment unit and a first configuration register value related to the first configuration register value stored in a storage unit with being related to the first startup control unit, or a match of a pair of a second configuration register value obtained by the configuration register value obtainment unit and a second configuration register value related to the second configuration register value stored in the storage unit with being related to the second startup control unit, is detected, startup processing of an information processing apparatus is continued. Thereby, the startup processing can be completed even when a part of processing units is swapped with a spare processing unit having the same configuration, and the functions of the startup control units can be effectively exploited.

Pre-boot protected memory channel

Machine readable media, methods, and computing devices are disclosed which establish a protected memory channel between an operating system loader of a user partition and services of a management partition. One computing device includes protected storage, read only memory, firmware, a storage device and a processor. The storage device is to store the virtual machine monitor and an operating system having an operating system loader. The virtual machine monitor is to establish a protected memory channel between the one or more integrity services of a management partition and the operating system loader of a user partition in response to measuring and verifying the operating system loader based upon the manifest. The processor is to execute the code of the read only memory, the firmware, the virtual machine monitor, the operating system, the operating system loader, the management partition, and the user partition.

Method and apparatus for booting host

Provided are a method and a device for booting a host embodying a downloadable conditional access system (DCAS), wherein one of a plurality of pre-determined booting modes is decided as a booting mode of the host based on first information indicating whether a host can communicate with a broadcasting service provider and second information indicating whether a software-based security client providing information required for decrypting broadcasting data is installed to a hardware-based security module connected to the host, and the host is booted in the decided booting mode.

System recovery method and computing apparatus having system recovery function

A system recovery method and a computing apparatus having a system recovery function. The computing apparatus includes a first memory unit to store a general operating system (OS) in a system partition where a primary anti-virus program operates, and to store a recovery OS in a recovery partition where a secondary anti-virus program operates; a second memory unit to store firmware determining a booting partition of the computing apparatus; and a processor to control execution of the firmware to, when the system partition is infected by a virus and thus the computing apparatus does not boot to the general OS, boot the computing apparatus to the recovery OS, and to control recovery of the system partition.

Attesting a Component of a System During a Boot Process

A method, apparatus and program product for attesting a component of a system during a boot process. The method comprises the steps of: verifying that the system is in a trusted state; in response to verifying that the system is in a trusted state, requesting an enrollment of the system wherein the requesting step further comprises the step of: retrieving enrollment data associated with the system; retrieving current input data associated with the component of the system; comparing the current input data against the enrollment data in order to determine whether the system can retain its trusted state; wherein in response to the comparing step, if the current input data matches the enrollment data, the system retains its trusted state; and accepting the trusted state until receipt of a notification, from the system having a retained trusted state, of an update to the system.

Firmware update method and system for micro-controller unit in power supply unit

Disclosed is a firmware update system for a micro-controller unit in a power supply unit. The micro-controller unit includes a central processing unit and a flash memory connected to the central processing unit. The flash memory includes a boot program sector, a main program sector, and a temporary data sector, where the boot program sector contains a boot program and the main program sector contains a main program to be executed by the central processing unit under a normal operating mode, and the temporary data sector is set to contain a downloaded firmware code to be copied to the main program sector to replace the main program, thereby updating the flash memory. The downloaded firmware code contains a sector checksum value and a firmware signature for allowing the boot program to validate if the downloaded firmware code is valid and authentic, and the boot program sector and the main program sector are accessed by a virtual address.

Apparatus and method to harden computer system

In some embodiments, a processor-based system may include a processor, the processor having a processor identification, one or more electronic components coupled to the processor, at least one of the electronic components having a component identification, and a hardware security component coupled to the processor and the electronic component. The hardware security component may include a secure non-volatile memory and a controller. The controller may be configured to receive the processor identification from the processor, receive the at least one component identification from the one or more electronic components, and determine if a boot of the processor-based system is a provisioning boot of the processor-based system. If the boot is determined to be the provisioning boot, the controller may be configured to store a security code in the secure non-volatile memory, wherein the security code is based on the processor identification and the at least one component identification. Other embodiments are disclosed and claimed.

Method and system for coordinating client and host security modules

A system and methods for coordinating the operation of a client security module and a host security module on a mobile electronic device. The modules communicate with each other through a platform abstraction layer using application programming interfaces to coordinate their activities. In particular, the client security module instructs the host security module when to lock and unlock the device, and the host security module alerts the client security module to attempts by the user to lock or unlock the device.

Self regulation of the subject of attestation

Attestation by a self-regulating attestation client. The attestation client requests a credential of health from an attestation service, which includes an ordered attestation log and proof of integrity and freshness of the log. The attestation client receives the requested credential of health, which certifies the attestation client was healthy when it requested the credential of health and that the attestation service trusts the attestation client to be healthy each time the attestation client authenticates using the credential of health. The attestation client receives a request to authenticate that it is healthy using the credential of health, verifies that it is currently healthy, and performs the requested authentication.

Methods, Systems, and Apparatuses for Managing a Hard Drive Security System

Methods, systems, and apparatuses for a self-encrypting drive (SED) management system configured to be loaded in a pre-boot region of an SED-based computer, the SED of the SED-based computer having a nominal space, which may be encrypted when the SED-based computer is shut down, and the pre-boot region. The SED management system comprises a pre-boot operating system (OS); at least one pre-boot library configured to support the pre-boot OS; and an unlocking software program configured to work with the pre-boot OS to transfer control directly to an operating system of the nominal space upon a successful authentication. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Method and system for protecting a computer system during boot operation

A method for protecting a computer system from malicious network traffic is provided using a driver which inspects network packets. A security profile comprising packet inspection rules is compiled and stored on the computer system. During the startup or boot operation of an operating system, the driver loads the compiled security profile and inspects network packets using the inspection rules.

Gaming Security System

Verification of software to be run in a secure environment is performed by comparing a critical portion of the executable boot program code in an EPROM with code stored in a logic circuit. The comparison may be performed before the code to be verified is run or while it is running. in the event that the validation fails certain critical functions of the platform are inhibited to prevent fraudulent operation of the platform. The system is particularly applicable to gaming machines to avoid cheating.

Method and system for protecting against the execution of unauthorized software

In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a client device is protected against the execution of unauthorized software. The client includes a code authentication process that verifies the integrity of executable code, by generating and comparing a first hash value of the executable code with a known hash value of the original code. Furthermore, during boot-up, the client initializes a CPU exception vector table with one or more vector table entries. One or more, or all, of the vector table entries direct the CPU to execute the code authentication process prior to executing an event handler when an exception event occurs. Consequently, the code authentication process is virtually guaranteed to execute, thereby protecting against the execution of unauthorized code.

Disabling communication ports

Example embodiments disclosed herein relate to enabling or disabling a port by writing to a reset write-once register. A boot process for a device is initiated. The reset write-once register is set, during the boot process, to disable or enable the port.

Data management

In one implementation, encrypted data and a virtual machine are stored together as a virtual machine-data image, wherein the virtual machine is configured to EXERT management control over the data based on policies set by an owner of the data. In another implementation, metadata defining or tagging policies for usage of data is associated with the data. Control capabilities of service providers are mapped to the policies, wherein those service provider environments that best satisfy the controls mapped to the policies are identified.

Hardware Assisted Operating System Switch

An interoperable firmware memory containing a Basic Input Output System (BIOS) and a trusted platform module (TPSM). The BIOS includes CPU System Management Mode (SMM) firmware configured as read-only at boot. The SMM firmware configured to control switching subsequent to boot between at least: a first memory and second isolated memory; and a first and second isolated non-volatile storage device. The first memory including a first operating system and the second memory including a second operating system. The first non-volatile storage device configured to be used by the first operating system and the second non-volatile storage device configured to be used by the second operating system. The trusted platform module (TPSM) configured to check the integrity of the CPU system Management Mode (SMM) during the boot process.

Information input display device and control program thereof

An information input display device, having an input section for inputting information and a display section for displaying the information, which enables an access to protected information after being authenticated by an authentication processing executed after starting up of the information input display device, the information input display device including: an authentication processor which executes the authentication processing based on authentication information inputted by the input section; and an input display controller which, after the starting up of the information input display device and before being authenticated by the authentication processing, accepts inputting of prescribed information different from the authentication information through a screen displayed on the display section, and allows the display section to display the prescribed information on the screen.

Malware automated removal system and method

The present invention automates the operation of multiple malware removal software products using a computerized system that systematically operates the multiple selected software products. These products are operated them in a customized “Safe Mode” using a shell that is different than the computer's other shell environments. Unlike the ordinary Safe Modes shells, the Custom Safe Mode prevents malware from functioning that ties itself to the normal shell, such as the Windows Explorer shell. In addition, the Custom Safe Mode allows the automation of tasks beyond that which is available under the standard command line shell.

Bios flash attack protection and notification

A system and method for BIOS flash attack protection and notification. A processor initialization module, including initialization firmware verification module may be configured to execute first in response to a power on and/or reset and to verify initialization firmware stored in non-volatile memory in a processor package. The initialization firmware is configured to verify the BIOS. If the verification of the initialization firmware and/or the BIOS fails, the system is configured to select at least one of a plurality of responses including, but not limited to, preventing the BIOS from executing, initiating recovery, reporting the verification failure, halting, shutting down and/or allowing the BIOS to execute and an operating system (OS) to boot in a limited functionality mode.

Attestation Protocol for Securely Booting a Guest Operating System

In a cloud computing environment, a production server virtualization stack is minimized to present fewer security vulnerabilities to malicious software running within a guest virtual machine. The minimal virtualization stack includes support for those virtual devices necessary for the operation of a guest operating system, with the code base of those virtual devices further reduced. Further, a dedicated, isolated boot server provides functionality to securely boot a guest operating system. The boot server is isolated through use of an attestation protocol, by which the boot server presents a secret to a network switch to attest that the boot server is operating in a clean mode. The attestation protocol may further employ a secure co-processor to seal the secret, so that it is only accessible when the boot server is operating in the clean mode.

Attesting a Component of a System During a Boot Process

A method for attesting a component of a system during a boot process. The method comprises the steps of: verifying that the system is in a trusted state; in response to verifying that the system is in a trusted state, requesting an enrollment of the system wherein the requesting step further comprises the step of: retrieving enrollment data associated with the system; retrieving current input data associated with the component of the system; comparing the current input data against the enrollment data in order to determine whether the system can retain its trusted state; wherein in response to the comparing step, if the current input data matches the enrollment data, the system retains its trusted state; and accepting the trusted state until receipt of a notification, from the system having a retained trusted state, of an update to the system.

Accessing secure volumes

A system and method for reading data from or writing data to a secure volume of a secure peripheral device. The secure peripheral device is communicatively coupled with a first host computer. The secure peripheral device includes an unsecure first volume, a secure second volume, and a secure third volume. Data is read from or written to the secure third volume either via an operating system stored on the first host computer or via an operating system stored on the secure peripheral device.

SECURE BOOT ADMINISTRATION IN A UNIFIED EXTENSIBLE FIRMWARE INTERFACE (UEFI)-COMPLIANT COMPUTING DEVICE

Firmware in a UEFI-compliant computing device is used to administer and alter a Secure Boot process for the computing device while continuing to provide protection from unauthorized third-party code. 1. A method for administering a secure boot in a Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)-compliant computing device , comprising:receiving an interrupt command during a boot process for the UEFI-compliant computing device from a user, the boot process interrupted in response to the command;displaying to the user, following the interruption of the boot process, a listing of at least one task related to administering the boot process;receiving a selection of a listed task;invoking System Management Mode (SMM) in response to the selection of the listed task;performing the selected task in SMM using a firmware module executable only within SMM;resetting the computing device after the performance of the selected task; andre-starting the boot process for the computing device after the resetting.2. The method of wherein the performing of the selected task further comprises:enrolling a hash of an unsigned application in a system security database.3. The method of wherein the performing of the selected task further comprises:turning off a requirement to enforce the secure boot so as to allow all code to run during the boot process.4. The method of wherein the performing of the selected task further comprises:clearing a system security database of all certificates and disabling the secure boot.5. The method of wherein the performing of the selected task further comprises:restoring a system security database from a backup location or resetting the system security database to a factory setting.6. The method of wherein the interrupt command may only be received from a physically present user who is physically accessing the UEFI-compliant computing device.7. The method of wherein the interrupt command may be received from a user who is accessing the UEFI-compliant computing ...

EXTERNAL BOOT DEVICE, PROGRAM PRODUCT, EXTERNAL BOOT METHOD, AND NETWORK COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

A USB memory () includes an MBR memory (), and a distribution processing processor (). The MBR memory () stores an MBR. The MBR is set to start up with higher priority by BIOS of an information processing apparatus and reads a loader to map the loader to a startup memory region of the information processing apparatus. The MBR is a program that position-aligns a stack region in a predetermined stack relationship with an interrupt vector table set in the startup memory region of the information processing apparatus. Prior to a startup of the MBR, the distribution processing processor () segments the loader into loader segments of a predetermined number, and generates mapping information in accordance with which the loader segments are loaded to the startup memory region. In this way, the external booting controls activities of malware. 1. An external boot device mounted on an information processing apparatus including a CPU to boot up the information processing apparatus , comprising:storage means that stores MBR, the MBR being set to start up with higher priority by BIOS of the information processing apparatus, reading a loader, and mapping the loader to a startup memory region of the information processing apparatus, the MBR having a program that position-aligns a stack region in a predetermined stack relationship with an interrupt vector table set in the startup memory region of the information processing apparatus, anddistribution processing means that, prior to a startup of the MBR, segments the loader into loader segments of a predetermined number, and generates mapping information in accordance with which the loader segments are loaded to the startup memory region.22. The external boot device according to claim 1 , wherein the predetermined stack relationship aligns a base stack position of the stack region with a position of an upper bit of INT of the vector table.3. The external boot device according to claim 1 , wherein the MBR position-aligns the stack ...

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR TEMPORARY SECURE BOOT OF AN ELECTRONIC DEVICE

The invention discloses system and method of temporary secure boot process of an electronic device. The method comprises: generating a first token according to an identification data of the electronic device; sending a request along with the first token to a service provider, the request corresponding to a boot package; receiving a second token and a boot package from the service provider; verifying the second token and the boot package; and executing the boot package according to verification result. 1. A method of temporary secure boot process of an electronic device , comprising:generating a first token according to an identification data of the electronic device;sending a request along with the first token to a service provider, the request corresponding to a boot package;receiving a second token and a boot package from the service provider;verifying the second token and the boot package; andexecuting the boot package according to verification result.2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:restarting the electronic device upon completion of the execution.3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the generating of the first token comprises:generating random data; andencrypting the identification data and the random data according to a first key.4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the verifying of the second token and the boot package comprises:decrypting the second token by the first key;confirming content of the second token with the identification data; andin response to the second token being confirmed, verifying the boot package by a second key.5. The method of claim 4 , further comprises clearing the random data from the electronic device.6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the identification data is one of the following: device serial number claim 1 , IMEI number claim 1 , MAC address and IMSI number.7. The method of claim 1 , wherein the executing of boot package is executed in a secure domain of the electronic device.8. A system for temporary boot up process ...

Device using secure processing zone to establish trust for digital rights management

A DRM client on a device establishes trust with a DRM server for playback of digital content. The client executes in a secure execution environment, and the process includes (1) securely loading loader code from secure programmable memory and verifying it using a digital signature scheme and first key securely stored in the device; (2) by the verified loader code, loading DRM client code from the memory and verifying it using a digital signature scheme and second key included in the loader code; (3) by the verified DRM client code (a) obtaining a domain key from the memory; (b) encrypting the domain key with a device identifier using a DRM system key included in the DRM client code; and (c) sending the encrypted domain key and device identifier to the DRM server, whereby the device becomes registered to receive content licenses via secure communications encrypted using the domain key.

Electronic apparatus with a safe conditional access system (cas) and control method thereof

An electronic apparatus is provided, which includes a central processing unit (CPU), a first memory unit which performs communication with the CPU, and a second memory unit which stores therein conditional access system (CAS) software and platform software. According to the method of controlling the apparatus, upon booting, the CPU copies the CAS software to an internal memory area which may be within the CPU, copies the platform software to the first memory unit and executes the CAS and platform software, and executes CAS operations through communication between the CAS software and the platform software.

Method for Secure Self-Booting of an Electronic Device

The present invention relates to a method for a self-boot of an electronic device, wherein an external component is accessible through an interface of the electronic device (), the method comprising, determining a boot mode for booting the electronic device, wherein the determined boot mode is defined as a secure boot mode; disabling the interface, thereby prohibiting access to the component through the interface, thereby defining a secure state of the electronic device; loading a first code comprising a sequence of executable instructions to be executed for booting the electronic device; loading a second code, the second code being encrypted; and decrypting the second code and executing the second code, thereby enabling the interface, and switching the electronic device from the secure state to a debugging state.

Multiple System Images for Over-The-Air Updates

In one embodiment, a mobile device performs an over-the-air firmware update by writing the updated firmware to a inactive system image partition, and rebooting the device. The security of the OTA update is maintained through checking a plurality of security signatures in an OTA manifest, and the integrity of the data is maintained by checking a hash value of the downloaded system image.

Method and system for nand flash support in an autonomously loaded secure reprogrammable system

A system and method that enables secure system boot up with a restricted central processing unit (CPU). The system includes a memory, a segmenting device, and a security sub-system. The memory is a NAND flash memory with a block structure that comprises a guaranteed block and non-guaranteed blocks. The guaranteed block is guaranteed to be useable. A boot code is segmented into boot code segments and the boot code segments are stored separately in the guaranteed and non-guaranteed blocks. The security sub-system is configured to locate the boot code segments stored in the non-guaranteed blocks and validate them independently based on data in the guaranteed block. The security sub-system is further configured to assemble the boot code segments into the boot code and execute the boot code.

DYNAMIC FEATURE ENHANCEMENT IN CLIENT SERVER APPLICATIONS AND HIGH VOLUME SERVER DEPLOYMENT WITH DYNAMIC APP STORE INTEGRATION

Generally, this disclosure provides methods and systems for dynamic feature enhancement in client server applications and for high volume server deployment with dynamic app store integration and further enable the delivery of a secure server in a pre-configured turnkey state through an automated process with increased efficiency tailored to mass production. The system may include a server application module configured to receive request packets from, and send response packets to, a web based client application, the packets comprising input data, output data and control commands associated with a feature; and a script engine module coupled to the server application module, the script engine module configured to identify a plug-in application on a remote server, download the plug-in application and execute the plug-in application under control of the server application module, wherein the plug-in application implements the feature. 1. A system , comprising:a server application module configured to receive request packets from, and send response packets to, a web based client application, wherein said packets comprise input data, output data and control commands associated with a feature; anda script engine module coupled to said server application module, said script engine module configured to identify a plug-in application on a remote server, download said plug-in application and execute said plug-in application under control of said server application module, wherein said plug-in application implements said feature.2. The system of claim 1 , wherein implementing said feature comprises processing said input data and generating said output data in accordance with said control commands.3. The system of claim 1 , wherein said script engine module exposes an interface of said plug-in application to said web based client application.4. The system of claim 1 , wherein said server application module is a hypertext transport protocol (HTTP) server application.5. The system ...

Display apparatus, control method thereof, upgrade apparatus, and display system

A display apparatus including: a display device; an image processor processing an image signal received from an image source according to a preset image processing process to display an image on the display device; a connector to which an upgrade apparatus upgrades the image processing process is connected and to which a server is connected to communicate with; and a controller comparing a first pairing key with a second pairing key stored in the server and selectively allowing or blocking a booting operation according to a comparison result, the first pairing key being generated based on a pre-stored first identification of the display apparatus and a second identification of the upgrade apparatus obtained from the upgrade apparatus when the display apparatus starts booting up.

Pre-boot firmware based virus scanner

The present disclosure relates to allowing the utilization of a virus scanner and cleaner that operates primarily in the pre-boot phase of computer operation and, more particularly, to allowing the utilization of a virus scanner and cleaner that operates primarily during the loading of an operating system.

Attesting use of an interactive component during a boot process

A method for attesting use of an interactive component during a boot process, comprising the steps of: reading, in response to determining use of the interactive component, associated interactive input; determining whether the input should be trusted; and in response to determining that the input should be trusted, processing the input to create a trusted cryptographic value, further comprising: matching, in response to a subsequent interactive input being read, the subsequent interactive input with one or more of the trusted cryptographic values in order to determine whether the subsequent interactive input is trusted.

AUTHENTICATION DEVICE AND AUTHENTICATION METHOD

An authentication OS is booted from the BIOS at the power up of an information processing apparatus then executes user authentication for the information processing apparatus, by performing an authentication process using devices initialized in its own mode. When the authentication is successful, the authentication OS writes a decryption key for an operation OS in a shared memory area and reboots the BIOS, while keeping the data in the shared memory area. The BIOS retrieves the operation OS decrypted with the decryption key for the operation OS into an OS operation area, thereafter the operation OS runs in a main memory. 1. An authentication device , for running an operation OS based on a result of an authentication process that runs on an authentication OS , comprising:a main memory having an OS operation area, in which the authentication OS and the operation OS are loaded, and a shared memory area, in which a decryption key of the operation OS obtained as a result of the authentication process is stored;a disk device having both of a storage area for the authentication OS and a storage area in which the operation OS in an encrypted state is stored;a ROM that stores a BIOS being started to operate during power up of the authentication device; and 'operation OS into the main memory individually for running, and being connected to a device to be used in the authentication process,', 'a CPU that loads each of the BIOS, the authentication OS and the'}whereinthe BIOS to operate during power up executes a first initialization process to initialize the device in its mode, then loads the authentication OS into the OS operation area;the authentication OS executes a second initialization process to initialize the device in its mode, performs user authentication of the authentication device by operating the authentication process using the initialized device, writes the decryption key of the operation OS into the shared memory area when the authentication is successful, and ...

INTEGRITY PROTECTION METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR MOBILE TERMINAL

A method and apparatus for protecting the integrity of a mobile terminal are provided. The mobile terminal includes a secure world for preventing unauthorized access to resources, and a normal world other than the secure world. The integrity protection method for the mobile terminal includes sensing a power-on of the mobile terminal, verifying, by a trusted entity in the normal world, the integrity of a first subsequent entity, and sending, when an integrity breach is detected in the first subsequent entity, by the trusted entity, a modification indication signal to the secure world. 1. A method for integrity protection in a mobile terminal that has a secure world preventing unauthorized access to resources and a normal world other than the secure world , the method comprising:sensing power-on of the mobile terminal;verifying, by a trusted entity in the normal world, integrity of a first subsequent entity; andsending, when an integrity breach is detected in the first subsequent entity, by the trusted entity, a modification indication signal to the secure world.2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising verifying claim 1 , when an integrity breach is not detected in the first subsequent entity claim 1 , by the first subsequent entity claim 1 , the integrity of a second subsequent entity.3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:determining whether a preset time has expired after boot of the mobile terminal; andrepeating, when the preset time has expired after boot, an integrity check operation.4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:checking, when an execution request for an application is made, whether the modification indication signal is received; andrejecting, when the modification indication signal is received, the execution request.5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the verifying of the integrity of a first subsequent entity comprises checking whether a signature attached to the first subsequent entity is falsified.6. The method of claim 1 , ...

Processor boot security device and methods thereof

A method of securing network authentication information at a data processing device includes determining a boot source from which to boot the device and comparing the boot source to an expected source. If the boot source is not the expected source, access to the network authentication information is inhibited, such as by disabling access to the portion of memory that stores the authentication information. Further, if the boot source is the expected source, boot code authentication information is retrieved from memory and verified during the boot sequence. If the device authentication information is not authenticated, access to the network authentication information is inhibited. Accordingly, access to the network authentication information is allowed only if the data processing device is booted from an expected source, and only if the boot code is authenticated, thereby reducing the likelihood of unauthorized access to the network authentication information.

INFORMATION PROCESSING APPARATUS, METHOD, AND COMPUTER-READABLE STORAGE MEDIUM THAT ENCRYPTS AND DECRYPTS DATA USING A VALUE CALCULATED FROM OPERATING-STATE DATA

An information processing apparatus includes a main memory unit storing while on-power; an auxiliary storage unit functionable even off-power; a control unit performing hibernation of generating operating-state data indicating a state when the power is lost, storing the data in the auxiliary storage unit, and, when restored, reading the data from the auxiliary storage unit; and a security chip that including a configuration register, encrypts data, and storing the data in the auxiliary storage unit. The control unit includes: a first registration unit performing, when the data is generated, calculation based thereon to obtain a calculated value; a second registration unit performing, when the data is read from the auxiliary storage unit at the hibernation, calculation based on the data to obtain a calculated value to write it into the configuration register; and a verification unit performing verification at boot-up from the hibernation based on the value written. 1a main memory unit that retains contents stored therein only while the main memory unit is receiving electric power supply;an auxiliary storage unit that retains contents stored therein even after the electric power supply is lost; generating operating-state data that indicates an operating state of the information processing apparatus at a time when the electric power supply is lost,', 'storing the operating-state data in the auxiliary storage unit, and,', 'when electric power supply is restored, reading the operating-state data from the auxiliary storage unit to restore the information processing apparatus to the operating state; and, 'a control unit that performs hibernation of'} includes a configuration register,', 'encrypts data by using a value written into the configuration register, and', 'stores the data in the auxiliary storage unit, wherein, 'a security chip that'} a first registration unit that performs, when the control unit generates the operating-state data, calculation based on the ...

Electronic devices

A storage device ( 3 ), such as an SD card, that is coupled to a host device ( 2 ), such as a mobile phone, includes a computing environment ( 8 ). The computing environment ( 8 ) includes an application processing part ( 6 ), and a separate interface processing part ( 7 ). The application processing part ( 6 ) of the computing environment 8 is operable to execute one or more applications on the storage device ( 3 ). The interface processing part ( 7 ) of the computing environment 8 includes an interface processor that interfaces between a communications protocol used between the host device ( 2 ) and the storage device ( 3 ), and a communications protocol used by the application processor in the application processing part ( 6 ) of the storage device ( 3 ). The interface processor communicates with the application processor via interrupts and a shared memory ( 9 ).

Method for access to an operating system, removable memory medium and use of a removable memory medium

A method of accessing an operating system in a distributed computer arrangement comprising loading an auxiliary operating system from a write-protected area of a removable storage medium, executing the loaded auxiliary operating system on a first computer, setting up a data link between the first computer and a second computer via a data network under control of the auxiliary operating system, executing a main operating system on the second computer and progressively transmitting inputs from a user from the first computer via the data link to the main operating system, and progressively transmitting outputs from the main operating system via the data link to the first computer.

CLIENT AUTHENTICATION AND DATA MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Methods and systems for performing an authenticated boot (); performing a continuous data protection (); performing automatic protection and optionally a consolidation; and performing other defenses and protection of a protected computing device () (such as a computer system) are provided. The aspects include integrating security mechanisms (which may include a “call home” function (), role and rule-based policies (), validating technologies, encryption and decryption technologies, data compression technologies, protected and segmented boot technologies, and virtualization technologies. Booting and operating (either fully or in a restricted manner) are permitted only under a control of a specified role-set, rule-set, and/or a controlling supervisory process or server system(s). The methods and systems make advantageous use of hypervisors () and other virtual machine monitors or managers. 1. A system comprising:a virtual machine communicatively coupled with a computing device, the virtual machine designed with at least one of the following capabilities: (a) to cause the computing device to boot, (b) to prevent the computing device from booting, and (c) to boot the computing device but limit memory access, storage access, network access, and/or input/output capability of the computing device, the virtual machine designed to initiate at least one of (a), (b), and (c).2. The system of claim 1 , further comprising an operating system that is communicatively coupled to the computing device and the virtual machine and wherein the virtual machine is designed:with respect to (a), to cause the operating system to boot;with respect to (b), to prevent the operating system from booting; andwith respect to (c), to boot the operating system but limit memory access, storage access, network access, and/or input/output capability of the operating system.3. The system of claim 2 , further comprising a virtual machine manager communicatively coupled with the virtual machine claim 2 , ...

Methods and arrangements to launch trusted, coexisting environments

Methods and arrangements to launch trusted, distinct, co-existing environments are disclosed. Embodiments may launch trusted, distinct, co-existing environments in pre-OS space with high assurance. A hardware-enforced isolation scheme may isolate the partitions to facilitate storage and execution of code and data. In many embodiments, the system may launch a partition manager to establish embedded and main partitions. Embedded partitions may not be visible to the main OS and may host critical operations. A main partition may host a general-purpose OS and user applications, and may manage resources that are not assigned to the embedded partitions. Trustworthiness in the launch of the embedded partition is established by comparing integrity metrics for the runtime environment against integrity measurements of a trusted runtime environment for the embedded partition, e.g., by sealing a cryptographic key with the integrity metrics in a trusted platform module. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

PORTABLE DESKTOP DEVICE AND METHOD OF HOST COMPUTER SYSTEM HARDWARE RECOGNITION AND CONFIGURATION

A portable desktop device and method for host computer system hardware recognition and configuration are provided. The portable desktop device causes on a first boot, the host computer system to recognize hardware devices connected thereto, and to configure hardware configuration files of the portable desktop O/S in accordance with the recognized hardware. Once the hardware configuration files have been configured, the system is rebooted. On the second boot, the host computer determines that the portable desktop has been configured for its hardware, and initiates start-up of the portable desktop. 142-. (canceled)43. A portable desktop device having a security specification , the device comprising:hardware for coupling to a host system connected to a number of hardware devices; and a portable desktop storage block with a portable desktop operating system for execution on the host system;', 'a configuration block for execution on a first boot of the host system, wherein the host system recognizes at least one of the hardware devices and configures at least one hardware configuration file in the memory storage, in accordance with the at least one recognized hardware device; and', on the first boot, the host system sets a previously configured flag indicating that the portable desktop device is other than configured to a value indicating that the portable desktop device has been configured;', 'the host system reboots to execute the portable desktop operating system on a second boot of the host system, wherein hardware devices which meet the security specification are enabled and hardware devices which fall below the security specification are disabled, based on the at least one hardware configuration file; and', 'on the second boot of the host system, the host system resets the previously configured flag to the value indicating that the portable desktop device is other than configured., 'a boot process block for execution by the host system, wherein], 'memory storage ...

INFORMATION PROCESSING APPARATUS AND CONTROL METHOD FOR INFORMATION PROCESSING APPARATUS

An information processing apparatus includes a first storage storing an operating system program, a second storage including a boot program storage area, a first area and a second area, and a processor coupled to the first storage and the second storage. The processor writes the first path information, which is stored in the first area and used to boot up the operating system program, into the second area, upon first booting-up, compares the first path information in the first area and the second path information in the second area upon second booting-up subsequent to the first booting-up, determines whether the operating system program indicated by the first path information is to be booted up based on a result of the comparing, and writes the second path information into the first area when the operating system program indicated by the first path information is not to be booted up. 1. An information processing apparatus comprising:a first storage configured to store an operating system program; a boot program storage area that stores a boot program that boots up the operating system program,', 'a first area that stores first path information indicating a location of the operating system program in the first storage, and', 'a second area that is set to be accessible by the boot program and stores second path information indicating a location of an operating system program previously booted up; and, 'a second storage including'} write the first path information, which is stored in the first area and used to boot up the operating system program, into the second area, upon first booting-up,', 'compare, using the boot program, the first path information stored in the first area and the second path information stored in the second area upon second booting-up subsequent to the first booting-up,', 'determine whether the operating system program indicated by the first path information is to be booted up based on a result of the comparing, and', 'write the second path ...

PREVENTING ATTACKS ON DEVICES WITH MULTIPLE CPUs

Disclosed are systems and methods to utilize two different processing units (e.g., CPUs) to monitor each other. The processing units may have limited visibility and/or read only access to each other to reduce the possibility that one affected processing unit could compromise the second processing unit. Devices containing multiple processing units of different architectures could be configured so that one type of processing unit monitors another type of processing unit. When the processing units are different architectures a single piece of malicious software (malware) is unlikely to affect both processing units. Each processing unit can be configured to detect rootkits and other types of malware on the other processor(s) of the system/device.

METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR TRUSTED BOOT OPTIMIZATION

A data processing system may include a high integrity storage (HIS) device with a partition or cache that is protected from updates. The data processing system may perform a boot process in response to being reactivated. The boot process may include the operation of executing a boot object. During the boot process, before executing the boot object, the data processing system may retrieve a digest for the boot object from the protected cache of the HIS device. The digest may be a cryptographic hash value for the boot object. During the boot process, the retrieved digest may be extended into a platform configuration register in a trusted platform module of the data processing system. Other embodiments are described and claimed. 1. A method for booting a data processing system , the method comprising:in response to a data processing system being reactivated, performing a boot process for the data processing system, wherein the operation of performing the boot process comprises executing a boot object, and wherein the data processing system comprises a high integrity storage (HIS) device with a cache that is protected from updates; andduring the boot process, before executing the boot object, retrieving a digest for the boot object from the protected cache of the HIS device, wherein the digest comprises a cryptographic hash value for the boot object; during the boot process, using the retrieved digest for the boot object to extend a platform configuration register (PCR) in a trusted platform module (TPM) of the data processing system; and', 'during the boot process, before retrieving the cached digest for the boot object from the protected cache of the HIS device, automatically setting the protected cache of the HIS device to read-only mode., 'wherein the method further comprises at least one operation from the group consisting of214-. (canceled)15. At least one non-transitory machine accessible medium comprising:{'claim-ref': {'@idref': 'CLM-00001', 'claim 1'}, ' ...

UPDATING AN OPERATING SYSTEM FOR SECURE ELEMENT

A secure element includes a boot program comprises instructions for the execution a startup step to determine if a non-volatile memory stores an active operating system, and, in the affirmative, to launch execution of the operating system, an authentication step of a updater device, as a function of first authentication data determined by a secure element and second authentication data received from the updater device, and, in response to the authentication step, a storage step of a new operating system received from the update, device in the non-volatile memory and an activation step of the new operating system, when said instructions are executed by a microprocessor. 230. The secure element () as claimed in claim 1 , in which the authentication step of the updater device comprises{'b': 4', '5', '10, 'a step for sending (E) a message (M) containing a variable (RAND) to the updater device (),'}{'b': '5', 'sub': '10', 'a step fur receiving (E) the second authentication data (AUTH),'}{'b': 6', '13', '34, 'sub': '30', 'a determination step (E, E) of the first authentication data (AUTH) as a function of said variable (RAND) and a key (MKi) stored in said non-volatile memory (), and'}{'b': 7', '14, 'sub': 30', '10, 'a comparison step (E, E) of the first authentication data (AUTH) and second authentication data (AUTH).'}3303887110. The secure element () as claimed in claim 2 , in which the boot program () comprises instructions for execution of a sending step (E) of a message (M) containing an (V) encrypted datum as a function of the key (MK) and said variable (RAND) to the updater device ().4303435. The secure element () as claimed in claim 2 , in which the non-volatile memory () comprises an operating system () including instructions for execution of:{'b': 4', '5', '10, 'a sending step (F) of a message (M) containing the variable (RAND) to the updater device (),'}{'b': '5', 'sub': '10', 'a receiving step (F) of the second authentication data (AUTH).'}5303587110. The ...

PROVIDING AN IMMUTABLE ANTIVIRUS PAYLOAD FOR INTERNET READY COMPUTE NODES

In one embodiment, a method includes initializing a portion of a computing system in a pre-boot environment using a basic input/output system (BIOS) stored in a non-volatile storage of the computing system, launching a boot manager to enable a launch of an operating system (OS) payload, and if the OS payload is not successfully launched, executing an OS payload portion and an antivirus stack stored in the non-volatile storage to restore an integrity of the mass storage. Other embodiments are described and claimed. 1. An apparatus comprising:a non-volatile storage including a first volume to store a basic input/output system (BIOS) and a second volume to store an operating system (OS) payload portion including an antivirus software stack, wherein the OS payload portion is separate from and is a subset of an OS kernel stored in a different storage and the antivirus software stack is to restore an integrity of the different storage subsequent to corruption of the different storage.2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the BIOS is to pass control to a boot manager of the OS kernel stored in the different storage claim 1 , and if the OS kernel does not successfully launch in a predetermined period claim 1 , the BIOS to cause execution of the antivirus software stack to restore the integrity of the different storage claim 1 , wherein the different storage comprises a mass storage.3. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein a virus definition of the antivirus stack stored in the non-voltage storage is to be updated in a secure management mode of a computing system including the apparatus.4. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the OS payload portion comprises a lightweight kernel to validate an image of the OS kernel stored in the different storage.5. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the BIOS is to prevent launch of the OS kernel if the antivirus stack is not identified to the BIOS within a predetermined period.6. A system comprising:a processor to execute instructions;a first ...

Protecting secure software in a multi-security-cpu system

A computing system includes a first central processing unit (CPU) and a second CPU coupled with the first CPU and with a host processor. In response to a request by the host processor to boot the second CPU, the first CPU is configured to execute secure booting of the second CPU by decrypting encrypted code to generate decrypted code executable by the second CPU but that is inaccessible by the host processor.

METHOD FOR SECURE BOOTING OF A PRINTER CONTROLLER

A printing system is provided with a secure boot program and a detachable memory device with an installable secure boot program. Upon switching on the printer controller, the secure boot program will check if a detachable memory device containing the secure boot program is plugged in. If this is the case, the controller will boot from the detachable memory device, otherwise the controller will invoke the printer control program to bring the printer in its normal operational mode. 1. A method for secure booting of a printer controller , the printer controller comprising a processor , a first memory , a second memory and a receptacle for receiving a third memory , the second memory comprising a secure boot program , the method comprising the steps of , upon power on of the controller:executing an initial boot procedure;continuing booting from the second memory under control of the secure boot program;detecting if a third memory of a first type is inserted in the receptacle, where a third memory of the first type comprises a boot sector, a first identifier, an installation flag and a secure boot program suited for installation on the second memory;continuing booting from the third memory if a third memory of the first type is inserted in the receptacle; andcontinuing booting from the second memory and bringing the printer controller in a normal operational mode, if a third memory of the first type is not inserted in the receptacle.2. The method according to where the third memory of the first type further comprises an installable operating system and an installable printer control program claim 1 , and where the step of continuing booting from the third memory further comprises steps of:if the installation flag is not set, installing the operating system on the second memory, setting the installation flag and rebooting the printer controller; and if the printer control program has not yet been installed, installing the printer control program; and', 'if the printer ...

EXTENSIBLE PROTOCOL FOR LOW MEMORY AGENT

A tamper resistant servicing Agent for providing various services (e.g., data delete, firewall protection, data encryption, location tracking, message notification, and updating software) comprises multiple functional modules, including a loader module (CLM) that loads and gains control during POST, independent of the OS, an Adaptive Installer Module (AIM), and a Communications Driver Agent (CDA). Once control is handed to the CLM, it loads the AIM, which in turn locates, validates, decompresses and adapts the CDA for the detected OS environment. The CDA exists in two forms, a mini CDA that determines whether a full or current CDA is located somewhere on the device, and if not, to load the full-function CDA from a network; and a full-function CDA that is responsible for all communications between the device and the monitoring server. The servicing functions can be controlled by a remote server. 1. A persistent servicing agent disposed in an electronic device connected to a network to a remote server , to enable , support and/or provide at least one service with respect to the electronic device , comprising:a driver agent concealed in the electronic device, wherein the driver agent is configured to be persistent against external tampering, including self-healing in the event of tampering, and wherein the driver agent comprises at least one of a partial driver agent or a full function driver agent, wherein the full function driver agent is configured to communicate with the network in providing the service, and the partial driver agent is configured with a reduced set of functions compared to the full function driver agent, and to determine whether a full function driver agent is available in the electronic device; anda run module configured to automatically initiate operation of the driver agent without user initiation or user intervention.224-. (canceled) This application claims the priority of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/663,496, filed Mar. 18, 2005, U.S. ...

Computer and hardware parameter configuring method thereof

A hardware parameter configuring method operating under in an Extensible Firmware Interface-based basic input/output system mode includes reading a currently-existing hardware profile including multiple hardware parameters; reading a preloading hardware profile including multiple hardware parameters; comparing the currently-existing hardware parameters with their corresponding preloading hardware parameters to generate a comparison result; displaying the comparison result through a graphical interface; and loading the preloading hardware parameters to the hardware units to replace the currently-existing hardware parameters when receiving confirmation signal. Moreover, a computer having a central processing unit (CPU) used for implementing the steps including reading a current-existing hardware profile; reading a preloading hardware profile, comparing the currently-existing hardware parameters with their corresponding preloading hardware parameters to generate a comparison result; displaying the comparison result through a graphical interface; and loading the preloading hardware parameters to the hardware units to replace the currently-existing hardware parameters when receiving confirmation signal.

MIGRATING VIRTUAL MACHINES TO PERFORM BOOT PROCESSES

In some examples, an indication that a virtual machine is to begin a boot process is received. In response to the received indication and prior to beginning the boot process, the virtual machine is migrated from a first host to a secured host, where the secured host includes a security mechanism to provide security that is unavailable at the first host. In response to the migrating, the boot process of the virtual machine is initiated at the secured host. The virtual machine is migrated from the secured host to a host other than the secured host in response to determining that the boot process of the virtual machine at the secured host is complete. 1. A non-transitory processor-readable medium storing instructions that when executed cause a system to:receive an indication that a virtual machine is to begin a boot process;in response to the received indication and prior to beginning the boot process, migrate the virtual machine from a first host to a secured host, wherein the secured host includes a security mechanism to provide security that is unavailable at the first host;in response to the migrating, initiate the boot process of the virtual machine at the secured host;determine that the boot process of the virtual machine at the secured host is complete; andmigrate the virtual machine from the secured host to a host other than the secured host in response to the determining that the boot process of the virtual machine at the secured host is complete.2. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 1 , wherein the boot process of the virtual machine accesses cryptographic data.3. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 2 , wherein the cryptographic data includes a cryptographic key claim 2 , and the boot process of the virtual machine accesses the cryptographic key to decrypt an encrypted volume.4. The non-transitory processor-readable medium of claim 1 , further comprising instructions that when executed cause the system to:provide trusted ...

MECHANISMS TO SECURE DATA ON HARD RESET OF DEVICE

Mechanisms to secure data on a hard reset of a device are provided. A hard reset request is detected on a handheld device. Before the hard reset is permitted to process an additional security compliance check is made. Assuming, the additional security compliance check is successful and before the hard reset is processed, the data of the handheld device is backed up to a configurable location. 1. (canceled)2. A method , comprising:detecting an attempt to process an operation of the operating system,preventing the operation from processing on a device; andverifying an entered credential for the device before passing the operation to the operating system for processing on the device.3. The method of claim 2 , wherein verifying further includes preventing the operation from being handled by the operating system when the entered credential is invalid.4. The method of claim 2 , wherein verifying further includes recognizing the entered credential as input supplied by a user of the device.5. The method of claim 2 , wherein verifying further includes recognizing the entered credential as a different credential from that which is associated with logging into the device.6. The method of claim 2 , wherein verifying further includes recognizing the entered credential as a same credential as that which is associated with the logging into the device.7. The method of claim 2 , wherein verifying further includes backing up selective data of the device when the entered credential is verified and before passing the operation to the operating system for processing on the device.8. The method of claim 7 , wherein backing up further includes backing up the selective data to an external network location that is external to the device.9. The method of claim 8 , wherein backing up further includes identifying the external network location from a policy.10. The method of claim 7 , wherein backing up further includes backing up the selective data to storage located on the device.11. The ...

ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION METHODS APPLIED ON OPERATING SYSTEM

An encryption and decryption methods applied on an operating system kernel are disclosed, where a hash result is obtained from a computation between a booting program and the operating system kernel by using a definition table, the computation result is combined with the operating system kernel for encryption of the operating system kernel, and the operating system kernel may not be decrypted and thus booted whenever the booting program, the operating system kernel or the two combined are falsified or replaced, whereby the technical efficacy which the booting program and the operating system kernel are authenticated bilaterally for safety booting may be achieved. 1. An encryption method applied on an operating system kernel , being suitable for use on a device having a booting program and the operating system kernel stored therein , comprising steps of:pre-establishing a definition table in the booting program, the definition table having codes stored therein;selecting randomly a plurality of codes from the definition table by the booting program and recording the plurality of codes having been selected by the booting program when the booting program is executed at a first time;looking for at least one booting bit value set each having a plurality of booting bit values from the booting program in a storage space by the booting program according to the selected plurality of codes, and looking for at least one kernel bit value set each having a plurality of kernel bit value from the operating system kernel in the storage space by the booting program and a position of each of the plurality of kernel bit values in the kernel bit value set corresponding thereto, the booting bit value sets corresponding sequence to the kernel bit value sets;computing a reversible hash function to each of the booting bit value set and one of the kernel bit value set corresponding thereto by the booting program, to obtain a hash value corresponding thereto, respectively; andreplacing each ...

Systems and methods for detecting hardware tampering of information handling system hardware

A method comprising may include storing, in a BIOS comprising a program of instructions executable by the processor and configured to cause the processor to initialize one or more information handling resources of an information handling system, a hardware profile of the information handling system, the hardware profile comprising identifying information of one or more information handling resources of the information handling system recorded during creation of the hardware profile. The method may also include, during a boot of the information handling system in a hardware verification mode, creating a new hardware profile comprising identifying information of the one or more information handling resources, comparing the new hardware profile to the hardware profile stored in the BIOS, and if the new hardware profile differs from the hardware profile stored in the BIOS, issuing an alert indicating potential tampering with hardware of the information handling system after creation of the profile.

Rollback Resistant Security

Methods, systems, and apparatus, including computer programs encoded on a computer storage medium, for rollback resistant security are disclosed. In one aspect, a method, during a boot process of a computing device, includes the actions of obtaining a secret key derived from device-specific information for the computing device. The method further includes verifying that a signature for a software module is valid. The method further includes obtaining information indicating a current version of the software module. The method further includes using the secret key to generate a first encryption key corresponding to the current version of the software module and a second encryption key corresponding to a prior version of the software module. The method further includes preventing future access to the secret key until the computing device is rebooted. The method further includes providing the software module access to the first encryption key and the second encryption key. 1. A computing device comprising: read a file of a software module installed on the computing device;', 'determine, using the file, that a signature for the software module is not valid; and', discontinue the boot process and not load the software module; and', 'display an error on a display of the computing device., 'responsive to a determination that the signature for the software module is not valid], 'a system on a chip (SoC) configured to, during a boot process of the computing device2. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein the software module is at least part of an operating system.3. The computing device of claim 2 , wherein the SoC is further configured to claim 2 , during the boot process of the computing device:obtain a public key of the operating system; andwherein the determination that the signature for the software module is not valid comprises determine, using the file and the public key, that the signature for the operating system is not valid.4. The computing device of claim 2 , ...

PREVENTION OF EXECUTION OF UNAUTHORIZED FIRMWARE FROM UEFI FIRMWARE VOLUMES

Unauthorized code may be stored as data in a data volume of a firmware volume. To prevent or block execution of the unauthorized code, the firmware file system (FFS) file that includes the unauthorized code may be tagged, marked or deleted according to a system bios policy. These corrupted FFS files are thus blocked from execution during initialization or a boot process of a basic input/output system (BIOS) firmware as they are not published or enumerated to an execution list of the BIOS firmware. 1. A method for firmware volume mapping by a basic input/output system (BIOS) of an information handling system , comprising:receiving information associated with a firmware volume;determining based, at least in part, on the information whether the firmware volume is a data volume;identifying one or more files associated with the data volume;determining if the identified one or more files comprise an associated entry point;tagging as blocked for execution each of the identified one or more files determined to comprise an associated entry point; andblocking execution of each of the tagged files.2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:marking for deletion the one or more tagged files.3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:adding to a list of blacklist files at least one of the tagged files.4. The method of claim 3 , wherein adding to the list of blacklist files comprises adding a global unique identifier associated with the at least one of the tagged files.5. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:creating a log; andadding to the log event information associated with each of the tagged files.6. The method of claim 1 , wherein the BIOS is unified extensible firmware interface (UEFI) compatible.7. The method of claim 1 , wherein receiving information related to the firmware volume comprises enumerating each firmware volume in a firmware of the information handling system.8. An information handling system claim 1 , comprising:a memory; receive information ...

SECURE INDUSTRIAL CONTROL PLATFORM

According to some embodiments, an overall chain-of-trust may be established for an industrial control system. Secure hardware may be provided, including a hardware security module coupled to or integrated with a processor of the industrial control system to provide a hardware root-of-trust. Similarly, secure firmware associated with a secure boot mechanism such that the processor executes a trusted operating system, wherein the secure boot mechanism includes one or more of a measured boot, a trusted boot, and a protected boot. Objects may be accessed via secure data storage, and data may be exchanged via secure communications in accordance with information stored in the hardware security model. 1. A method for an overall chain-of-trust for an industrial control system , comprising:providing secure hardware, including a hardware security module coupled to or integrated with a processor of the industrial control system to provide a hardware root-of-trust;providing secure firmware associated with a secure boot mechanism such that the processor executes a trusted operating system, wherein the secure boot mechanism includes one or more of a measured boot, a trusted boot, and a protected boot;accessing objects via secure data storage; andexchanging data via secure communications in accordance with information stored in the hardware security model.2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the hardware security module comprises a trusted platform module.3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the secure boot includes an input output memory management unit and a capability to disable non-essential input output paths claim 1 , including debug ports.4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the secure data storage is associated with at least one of: (i) an encrypted store claim 1 , and (ii) private cryptographic keys stored in the hardware security module.5. The method of claim 1 , wherein private key cryptographic operations are performed in the hardware security module to facilitate device ...

SECURE BOOTING OF VIRTUALIZATION MANAGERS

A multi-phase boot operation of a virtualization manager at a virtualization host is initiated at an offload card. In a first phase of the boot, a security key stored in a tamper-resistant location of the offload card is used. In a second phase, firmware programs are measured using a security module, and a first version of a virtualization coordinator is instantiated at the offload card. The first version of the virtualization coordinator obtains a different version of the virtualization coordinator and launches the different version at the offload card. Other components of the virtualization manager (such as various hypervisor components that do not run at the offload card) are launched by the different version of the virtualization controller. 1. A method , comprising: initiating a first phase of a multi-phase boot operation of a virtualization manager of the virtualization host, wherein the first phase comprises using a first key pair to validate at least one firmware program, wherein a first key of the first key pair is stored in a tamper-resistant portion of the first offload card;', 'in response to determining that the first phase has completed successfully, initiating a second phase of the multi-phase boot operation, wherein the second phase comprises (a) measuring one or more firmware programs using a security module and (b) launching a first version of a virtualization coordinator at the first offload card;', 'utilizing a particular key, obtained from the security module by the first version of a virtualization coordinator, to obtain a different version of the virtualization coordinator from a storage device;', 'launching the different version of the virtualization coordinator at the first offload card;', 'initializing one or more other components of the virtualization manager to complete the multi-phase boot operation, including at least one component which runs at a processor which is not installed on the first offload card; and, 'performing, at one or ...

Method for Secure Operation of a Computer Unit, Software Application and Computer Unit

A method for operating a computer unit having a processor on which a software application can run comprises the steps: upon invoking the software application or upon carrying out a transaction with the software application on the computer unit the step of checking whether the computer unit has been restarted since the last invoking of the software application; carrying out a first form of authentication for starting the software application or for carrying out the transaction with the software application if the computer unit has not been restarted since the last invoking of the software application; and carrying out a second form of authentication for starting the software application or for carrying out the transaction with the software application if the computer unit has been restarted since the last invoking of the software application. Further provided are a correspondingly designed software application as well as a correspondingly designed computer unit. 111-. (canceled)12. A method for operating a computer unit having a processor on which a software application can run , wherein the method comprises the following steps:upon invoking the software application on the computer unit or upon carrying out a transaction with the software application, the step of checking whether the computer unit has been restarted since the last invoking of the software application;carrying out a first form of authentication for starting the software application or for carrying out the transaction with the software application if the computer unit has not been restarted since the last invoking of the software application; andcarrying out a second form of authentication for starting the software application or for carrying out the transaction with the software application if the computer unit has been restarted since the last invoking of the software application.13. The method according to claim 12 , wherein the second form of authentication is stronger from a security standpoint ...

Secure Boot and Software Upgrade of A Device

A method of securely resetting a first device comprising a UICC, the method comprising providing a secure reset control application to a secure element of the UICC of the first device wherein the secure reset control application is capable of commanding the UICC to provide notification indicative of a secure reset of the first device being requested if a corresponding signal is received from a remote management server; and/or communication between the secure reset control application and a remote management server cannot be established for a predetermined period of time and upon the next first device reset, determine whether a secure reset has been requested. 1. A method of securely resetting a first device comprising a UICC , the method comprising:providing a secure reset control application to a secure element of the UICC of the first device; whereinthe secure reset control application is capable of commanding the UICC to provide notification indicative of a secure reset of the first device being requested if:a corresponding signal is received from a remote management server; and/orcommunication between the secure reset control application and a remote management server cannot be established for a predetermined period of time; andupon the next first device reset, determine whether a secure reset has been requested.2. The method of wherein providing notification indicative of a secure reset of the first device being requested comprises forcing a reset of the first device.3. The method of wherein the predetermined period of time is based on the normal operation of the first device.4. The method of further comprising:if a secure reset has been requested the first device operates in a lock down mode whereby communication with other devices is restricted; and thencommunication with a software update server is established to determine whether a more recent version of first device software exists; and thenif a more recent version does exist, the more recent version is ...

SECURE BOOT WITH RESISTANCE TO DIFFERENTIAL POWER ANALYSIS AND OTHER EXTERNAL MONITORING ATTACKS

A method for device authentication comprises receiving, by processing hardware of a first device, a message from a second device to authenticate the first device. The processing hardware retrieves a secret value from secure storage hardware operatively coupled to the processing hardware. The processing hardware derives a validator from the secret value using a path through a key tree, wherein the path is based on the message, wherein deriving the validator using the path through the key tree comprises computing a plurality of successive intermediate keys starting with a value based on the secret value and leading to the validator, wherein each successive intermediate key is derived based on at least a portion of the message and a prior key. The first device then sends the validator to the second device. 1. A method for device authentication comprising:receiving, by processing hardware of a first device, a message from a second device to authenticate the first device;retrieving, by the processing hardware, a secret value from secure storage hardware operatively coupled to the processing hardware;deriving, by the processing hardware, a validator from the secret value using a path through a key tree, wherein the path is based on the message, wherein deriving the validator using the path through the key tree comprises computing a plurality of successive intermediate keys starting with a value based on the secret value and leading to the validator, wherein each successive intermediate key is derived based on at least a portion of the message and a prior key; andsending the validator to the second device.2. A method as in claim 1 , wherein the validator is exchanged between the first device and the second device as part of a challenge-response protocol.3. A method as in claim 2 , wherein the first device comprises a printer cartridge and the second device comprises a printer.4. A method as in claim 1 , wherein the path through the key tree identifies a plurality of ...

COMPUTING SYSTEMS AND METHODS

In one preferred form of the present invention shown in in FIG. there is provided a computer implemented method The method comprises: (A) providing at least one mobile electronics device, each device having a data store comprising a first area and a second area; the second area being distinct from the first area to assist with securing the first area; the first area being a system area and the second area for storing personal information; and (B) in connection with each mobile electronic device: associating personal information with computer identifying information to provide special personal information; storing the special personal information in the second area; and retrieving the personal information by: (i) reading the special personal information from the second area; and (ii) applying the computer identifying information to the special personal information. 1. A computer implemented method comprising: (A) providing at least one mobile electronics device , each device having a data store comprising a first area and a second area; the second area being distinct from the first area to assist with securing the first area; the first area being a system area and the second area for storing personal information; and (B) in connection with each mobile electronic device: associating personal information with computer identifying information to provide special personal information; storing the special personal information in the second area; and retrieving the personal information by: (i) reading the special personal information from the second area; and (ii) applying the computer identifying information to the special personal information.2. A computer implemented method as claimed in wherein the first area comprises a locked down system area; the second area comprises an authentication area and the personal information comprises authentication data.3. A computer implemented method as claimed in or wherein in connection with each mobile electronic device: the first ...

SECURITY ROLE IDENTIFIER POOLS ALLOCATION

Various systems and methods for Security Attributes of Initiator (SAI) pools allocation are described herein. A system for security attribute pool allocation includes an integrated circuit to: access a hardware block and store a security identifier in the hardware block, the security identifier being from a pool of security identifiers, the pool being one of a plurality of pools of security identifiers with each of the plurality of pools having mutually exclusive sets of security identifiers. 1. A system for security attribute pool allocation , the system comprising: access a hardware block; and', 'store a security identifier in the hardware block, the security identifier being from a pool of security identifiers, the pool being one of a plurality of pools of security identifiers with each of the plurality of pools having mutually exclusive sets of security identifiers., 'an integrated circuit to2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the hardware block comprises a processor core.3. The system of claim 1 , wherein the hardware block comprises input/output device.4. The system of claim 1 , wherein the plurality of pools of security identifiers includes a first pool and a second pool claim 1 , the first pool associated with a first type of hardware and the second pool associated with a second type of hardware claim 1 , such that security identifiers for the first type of hardware are only selected from the first pool and security identifiers for the second type of hardware are only selected from the second pool.5. The system of claim 4 , wherein the first pool and second pool are arranged to allow a system designer to use an arbitrary version of the first type of hardware with an arbitrary version of the second type of hardware without producing a security identifier conflict.6. A method of security attribute pool allocation claim 4 , the method comprising:accessing a hardware block; andstoring a security identifier in the hardware block, the security identifier being from ...

Trust Based Computing

A method, an apparatus and a computer program product for trust based computing in a network infrastructure including computing resources. In at least one secure element for attesting trust of one or more of the computing resources, is stored one or more criteria for evaluating trust of location information indicating a location of at least one computing resource. Further is obtained, by the at least one secure element, location information indicating a current location of at least one computing resource; and finally is determined, by a management software, whether the location information of the network infrastructure is secure on the basis of the information indicating the current location and the criteria. 1. A method , the method comprising:storing, in at least one secure element for attesting trust of one or more computing resources, one or more criteria for evaluating trust of location information indicating a location of at least one computing resource;obtaining, by the at least one secure element, location information indicating a current location of at least one computing resource; anddetermining, by a management software, whether the location information of a network infrastructure is reliable on the basis of the information indicating the current location and the criteria.2. A method according to claim 1 , wherein reliability of the location information is determined on the basis of location information that is internal to the security element and information indicating location from at least one external system.3. A method according to claim 1 , wherein storing one or more criteria claim 1 , in the at least one secure element claim 1 , is done during physical system installation.4. A method according to claim 1 , wherein the one or more criteria comprise a location.5. A method according to claim 4 , wherein one or more criteria further comprise at least one of: an asset tag claim 4 , a serial number claim 4 , a network address claim 4 , keys claim 4 , ...

EXECUTING ENCRYPTED BOOT LOADERS

A secure boot mechanism is described. The secure boot mechanism can operate in environments not originally designed to support such a mechanism. Downstream boot components can be executed from an encrypted boot partition. A first stage boot loader (FSBL) can load a second stage boot loader (SSBL) from an encrypted disk partition. The FSBL can decrypt and load the SSBL. The FSBL can intercept all I/O initiated by the SSBL so that the SSBL can transparently operate on an encrypted disk partition as though the encrypted disk were unencrypted. 1. A computing device comprising:at least one processor:a memory connected to the at least one processor; and intercept an I/O request to an unencrypted partition from a boot loader residing on an encrypted partition; and', 'redirect the intercepted I/O request to an encrypted partition., 'the at least one processor configured to2. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein a primary boot loader decrypts a key using a cryptographic security device claim 1 , the key used to decrypt an encrypted partition.3. The computing device of claim 2 , the at least one processor further configured to:inject the decrypted key into a block of cache memory.4. The computing device of claim 2 , the at least one processor further configured to:unseal the key using a TPM chip.5. The computing device of claim 1 , the at least one processor further configured to:decrypt a downstream boot loader residing on an encrypted partition.6. The computing device of claim 2 , wherein the decrypted key is not persisted to non-memory storage.7. The computing device of claim 1 , wherein a new primary boot loader is inserted before existing boot chain software without modifying the existing boot chain software.8. A method of executing a boot chain comprising:loading a first stage boot loader (FSBL) from an unencrypted partition;checking a certificate associated with the FSBL;in response to determining that the certificate is from a trusted source, executing the FSBL; ...

EXECUTING PROTECTED CODE

In some examples, in response to a reset of an electronic device, a method disables hardware write locking of a first region in a non-volatile memory, and executes a first boot code portion from the first region to begin a boot procedure. The executed first boot code portion checks whether an update code for the first boot code portion exists. In response to determining that no update code for the first boot code portion exists, the executed first boot code portion causes hardware write locking of the first region. After causing the hardware write locking of the first region, the boot procedure continues, the boot procedure comprising verifying an integrity of a second boot code portion. 1. A method of executing protected code , comprising:in response to a reset of an electronic device, disabling hardware write locking of a first region in a non-volatile memory, and executing a first boot code portion from the first region to begin a boot procedure;checking, by the executed first boot code portion, whether an update code for the first boot code portion exists;in response to determining that no update code for the first boot code portion exists, causing, by the executed first boot code portion, hardware write locking of the first region; andafter causing the hardware write locking of the first region, continuing the boot procedure, the boot procedure comprising verifying an integrity of a second boot code portion.2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the first boot code portion is executed on a device processor in the electronic device.3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the hardware write locking of the first region is performed by a controller of the non-volatile memory or by logic in the non-volatile memory.4. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:in response to determining that the update code for the first boot code portion exists, updating, by the executed first boot code portion using the update code, the first boot code portion in the first region.5. The ...

ASSURED COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE -VOLATILE MEMORY DESIGN AND OPERATION

A method and apparatus providing computer system cryptographic protection including a processor, a trusted platform module, trusted bus devices, a first secure memory and a second secure memory, wherein the first and second memory each have a first and second shadow copy, an external bus controller, and a system bus. The system bus contains trusted data and connects with the processor, the trusted platform module, trusted bus devices, the first and second secure memory and the external bus controller. The first and second secure memory separating code and data via physically distinct memory components. The contents of the distinct memory components being replicated into two shadow copies for each component, wherein during a write operation, simultaneously updating the shadow copies with the contents of the distinct components, and during a read operation, sending the two shadow copies and the memory component to a majority function. 1. An apparatus providing computer system cryptographic protection comprising:a processor;a trusted platform module;trusted bus devices;a first secure memory and a second secure memory, wherein the first and second memory each have a first and second shadow copy;an external bus controller; anda system bus.2. The apparatus as recited in wherein the system bus contains trusted data and connects with the processor claim 1 , the trusted platform module claim 1 , trusted bus devices claim 1 , the first and second secure memory and the external bus controller.3. The apparatus as recited in wherein the external bus controller is connected between the system bus and untrusted external devices.4. The apparatus as recited in wherein data is encrypted when not in use.5. The apparatus as recited in further comprising trust boundaries claim 1 , wherein encrypted data can be unencrypted within the trust boundary.6. The apparatus as recited in wherein the trusted platform module includes secure key generation claim 1 , secure key storage and certified ...

SECURE ENABLEMENT OF PLATFORM FEATURES WITHOUT USER INTERVENTION

Systems, apparatuses, and methods for secure enablement of platform features without user intervention are disclosed. In one embodiment, a system includes at least a motherboard and a processor. The motherboard includes at least a socket and an authentication component. The authentication component can be a chipset, expansion I/O device, or other component. The processor is installed in the socket on the motherboard. During a boot sequence, the processor retrieves a key value from the authentication component and then authenticates the key value. Next, the processor determines which one or more features to enable based on the key value. Then, the processor programs one or more feature control registers to enable the one or more features specified by the key value. Accordingly, during normal operation of the system, the one or more features will be enabled. 1. A system comprising:a processor; andan authentication component; retrieve a key from the authentication component during a boot sequence;', 'authenticate the key;', 'determine, from the key, which of one or more features of the processor to enable responsive to determining the key has been authenticated; and', 'write to one or more feature control registers to enable the one or more features., 'wherein the processor is configured to2. The system as recited in claim 1 , wherein a first feature of the one or more features is overclocking the processor.3. The system as recited in claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to:determine from the key, which of one or more features of a motherboard to enable responsive to determining the key has been authenticated; andwrite to one or more feature control registers to enable the one or more features for the motherboard.4. The system as recited in claim 1 , wherein the processor is further configured to:enable a first set of features responsive to retrieving a first key value from the authentication component; andenable a second set of features responsive to ...

CONTROLLING ACCESS TO STORAGE IN A COMPUTING DEVICE

In an embodiment, a computing device may include a control unit. The control unit may acquire a request from a central processing unit (CPU), contained in the computing device, that may be executing a basic input/output system (BIOS) associated with the computing device. The request may include a request for a value that may represent a maximum authorized storage size for a storage contained in the computing device. The control unit may generate the value and send the value to the CPU. The CPU may generate a system address map based on the value. The CPU may send the system address map to the control unit which may acquire the system address map and configure an address decoder, contained in the computing device, based on the acquired system address map. 1. A method comprising:retrieving a value that represents a maximum authorized storage size for a non-volatile storage accessible by an entity contained in a computing device;acquiring a system address map from the entity, the system address map being generated based on the value; andconfiguring an address decoder in the computing device based on the acquired system address map.2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the entity is a central processing unit (CPU) contained in the computing device.3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the entity is executing a basic input/output system (BIOS) associated with the computing device.4. The method of claim 1 , wherein generating the value further comprises:acquiring an authentication code; andgenerating the value based on the authentication code.5. The method of claim 4 , wherein the entity is executing a BIOS associated with the computing device claim 4 , andwherein the authentication code is acquired from the entity while the entity executes the BIOS.6. The method of claim 4 , wherein the computing device includes a processor claim 4 , andwherein the processor includes a control unit and a storage associated with the control unit, andwherein the value is generated by the control ...

Attesting a Component of a System During a Boot Process

A method for attesting a component of a system during a boot process. The method comprises the steps of: verifying that the system is in a trusted state; in response to verifying that the system is in a trusted state, requesting an enrollment of the system wherein the requesting step further comprises the step of: retrieving enrollment data associated with the system; retrieving current input data associated with the component of the system; comparing the current input data against the enrollment data in order to determine whether the system can retain its trusted state; wherein in response to the comparing step, if the current input data matches the enrollment data, the system retains its trusted state; and accepting the trusted state until receipt of a notification, from the system having a retained trusted state, of an update to the system. 1. A method for attesting a component of a system during a boot process , comprising steps of:verifying that the system is in a trusted state;in response to verifying that the system is in a trusted state, requesting an enrollment of the system, wherein the requesting step further comprises retrieving enrollment data associated with the system;retrieving current input data associated with the component of the system;comparing the current input data against the enrollment data in order to determine whether the system can retain its trusted state;if the current input data matches the enrollment data in response to the comparing step, the system retains its trusted state; andaccepting the trusted state until receipt of a notification, from the system having a retained trusted state, of an update to the system.2. The method of claim 1 , the method further comprising the steps of:receiving the notification from the system that the component of the system has been updated;retrieving updated current input data associated with the component in response to the notification being received; andstoring the updated current input data.3. ...

Targeted Secure Software Deployment

The techniques and systems described herein are directed to providing targeted, secure software deployment in a computing system. An identity of the computing device can be determined and verified using a trusted platform module (TPM) of the computing device, and a software update can be expressly configured to operate solely on the computing device. Further, a configuration of the computing device can be ascertained using platform configuration registers (PCRs) of the TPM to determine that the computing device has not been modified from a trusted configuration. For example, if malware or unauthorized software is operating on the computing device, the software update may be prevented from being installed. Further, the software update can be targeted for a particular computing device, such that when the software update is received at the computing device, the software update may not be duplicated and provided to an additional, unauthorized device. 1. A system comprising:one or more processors; and determining that a remote device is to receive a software update;', 'identifying a public storage root key (SRK) associated with the remote device;', 'determining a first set of platform configuration registers (PCRs) associated with a trusted operation of firmware operating on the remote device;', 'determining a second set of PCRs associated with an expected operation of at least a portion of the software update on the remote device;', 'determining a random symmetric key (RSK);', 'encrypting, as an encrypted software package, the software update using the RSK;', 'encrypting, as encrypted configuration settings, the first set of PCRs and the second set of PCRs using the RSK;', 'encrypting, as an encrypted RSK, the RSK with the public SRK of the remote device; and', 'transferring the encrypted software package, the encrypted configuration settings, and the encrypted RSK to the remote device,', 'wherein at least a portion of the encrypted software package is imported by the ...

Secure server and compute nodes

Apparatus and methods are described to provision a compute node in a plurality of compute nodes to a requestor, comprising receiving an anonymised access token from a provider of the compute nodes, requesting identities of a subset of compute nodes in the plurality of compute nodes, selecting at least one compute node in the subset of compute notes, providing the anonymised access token to a secure enclave of the selected at least one compute node, providing an anonymised identity of the requestor to the secure enclave and validating use of the anonymised identity with the access token.

Parallel Boot Execution Of Memory Devices

The present disclosure generally relates to reducing boot latency of memory devices in a dual boot system. The boot code is loaded to the data storage device controller in a flexible manner by being able to receive chunks of the boot code from two separate locations, the host memory buffer (HMB) and the memory device, which may be a NAND device. Part of the boot code may be received from the HMB and another part of the boot code may be received from the memory device. If either the HMB or the memory device can deliver the chunks faster than the other, then the controller can receive the chunks from the faster location and periodically confirm the speed of delivery to ensure the boot code latency is optimized.

TRUSTED KERNEL STARTING METHOD AND APPARATUS

A trusted kernel starting method and apparatus are provided. The method includes: starting a security boot module boot loader; invoking the boot loader to measure, according to a first security algorithm, whether a platform configuration register (PCR) partition is trusted; if the PCR partition is trusted, invoking the boot loader to read kernel code into a memory, and invoking the boot loader to measure, according to a first complete algorithm and a kernel code standard measurement value prestored in the PCR partition, whether the kernel code is trusted; initializing, if the kernel code is trusted, the kernel code to trigger an initialized kernel to measure, according to a second complete algorithm, whether the boot loader is trusted; and starting the kernel if the boot loader is trusted. Kernel starting security is improved. 1. A trusted kernel starting method , comprising:starting a security boot loader;invoking the boot loader to measure, according to a first security algorithm, whether a platform configuration register (PCR) partition is trusted;invoking, if the PCR partition is trusted, the boot loader to read kernel code into a memory, and invoking the boot loader to measure, according to a first complete algorithm and a kernel code standard measurement value prestored in the PCR partition, whether the kernel code is trusted;initializing, if the kernel code is trusted, the kernel code to trigger an initialized kernel to measure, according to a second complete algorithm, whether the boot loader is trusted; andstarting the kernel if the boot loader is trusted.2. The trusted kernel starting method according to claim 1 , further comprising:acquiring a PCR partition standard measurement value prestored in an environment (ENV) partition; andwherein the invoking the boot loader to measure, according to the first security algorithm, whether the PCR partition is trusted comprises:invoking the boot loader to calculate a PCR partition actual measurement value according ...

Secure Boot for Unsecure Processors

A method for securely booting a target processor in a target system from a secure root of trust includes computing a message authentication code from boot code to be provided to the target processor, including an obfuscated algorithm for recreating the message authentication code in the target processor, serving the boot code to the target processor, executing the boot code to recreate the message authentication code in the target processor, serving the message authentication code back to the root of trust, comparing the returned message authentication code with the message authentication code generated in the root of trust, continuing execution of the boot code data if the returned message authentication code matches the message authentication code, and applying at least one penalty to the target system if the returned message authentication code does not match the message authentication code generated in the root of trust. 1. A method for securely booting a target processor in a target system from a secure root of trust comprising:computing in the secure root of trust a message authentication code from boot code to be provided to the target processor, the boot code including an obfuscated algorithm for recreating the message authentication code in the target processor;serving the boot code to the target processor;commencing execution of the boot code in the target processor to recreate the message authentication code in the target processor using the received boot code as input;serving the recreated message authentication code from the target processor back to the root of trust;comparing in the root of trust the returned message authentication code with the message authentication code generated in the root of trust;continuing execution of the boot code in the target processor if the returned message authentication code matches the message authentication code generated in the root of trust; andapplying at least one penalty to the target system if the returned ...

Firmware verified boot

Methods and apparatus for verifying a boot process of a computing system are disclosed. An example computer-implemented method includes reading, by a computing system during a boot process, a header section of a read-write portion of firmware of the computing system. The example method further includes generating, using a first cryptographic hash algorithm, a message digest corresponding with the header. The example method also includes decrypting, using a first public-key, an encrypted signature corresponding with the header. The example method still further includes comparing the message digest corresponding with the header and the decrypted signature corresponding with the header. In the event the message digest corresponding with the header and the decrypted signature corresponding with the header match, the example method includes continuing the boot process. In the event the message digest corresponding with the header and the decrypted signature corresponding with the header do not match, the example method includes halting the boot process.

Systems and methods for secure delivery of public keys for operating system drivers

In accordance with these and other embodiments of the present disclosure, an information handling system may include a processor and a basic input/output system (BIOS) comprising a program of instructions executable by the processor and configured to cause the processor to initialize one or more information handling resources of the information handling system. The BIOS may be further configured to authenticate a signature of a BIOS driver associated with an information handling resource of the information handling system, and, in response to authenticating the signature of the BIOS driver, extracting a vendor public key from the BIOS driver and storing the vendor public key to a key database of the BIOS, wherein the vendor public key may be used by an operating system to authenticate one or more signed operating system drivers signed with a private key corresponding to the vendor public key.

VERIFYING INTEGRITY OF BACKUP FILE IN A MULTIPLE OPERATING SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT

Provided is a technique to enhance security of a computer in a multi-OS operating environment. A memory image of a primary OS is in an active state, and a memory image of a secondary OS is in a non-active state. When switching is performed from the primary OS to the secondary OS, a runtime image is created, and a digest P is calculated and encrypted (C). When switching is performed from the secondary OS to the primary OS, a digest of the stopped runtime image is calculated. Only when comparison between the decrypted digest P and the calculated digest shows agreement, is switching of the primary OS allowed. 1. A method comprising:in response to switching operation of a computer from a first operating environment to a second operating environment, encrypting a representative file enabling verification of identity of at least a portion of a first memory image, the first memory image corresponding to the first operating environment;saving the first memory image at a selected location;decrypting the encrypted representative file in response to switching operation from the second operating environment to the first operating environment; andcomparing a file representative of the saved first memory image with the decrypted representative file.2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the representative file is a digest that is created by hashing at least a portion of the first memory image3. The method of claim 1 , wherein a system firmware causes the computer to execute the encrypting claim 1 , the saving claim 1 , the decrypting and the comparing.4. The method of claim 3 , wherein the encrypting includes using an encryption key that is stored at a SMRAM area.5. The method of claim 3 , wherein the encrypting includes:creating a public key and an encrypted private key; andstoring a decrypted private key at a SMRAM area.6. The method of claim 5 , wherein encryption and decryption of the private key is performed by a security chip.7. The method of claim 3 , wherein the encrypting ...

PROTECTING OPERATING SYSTEM CONFIGURATION VALUES

In a pre-operating system environment on a device prior to loading and running an operating system on the device, a policy identifying configuration settings for the operating system is obtained. The operating system itself is prevented from changing this policy, but the policy can be changed under certain circumstances by components of the pre-operating system environment. The policy is compared to configuration values used by the operating system, and the operating system is allowed to boot with the configuration values if the configuration values satisfy the policy. However, if the configuration values do not satisfy the policy, then a responsive action is taken. 1. A method comprising:obtaining, in a pre-operating system environment on a device prior to running an operating system on the device, a policy identifying configuration settings for one or more operating systems, a component of the pre-operating system being permitted to change the policy but the operating system being prevented from changing the policy;comparing, in the pre-operating system environment, the policy to configuration values used by the operating system;allowing, in the pre-operating system environment, the operating system to boot with the configuration values if the configuration values satisfy the policy;taking, in the pre-operating system environment, a responsive action if the configuration values do not satisfy the policy, the policy identifying different responsive actions for different configuration values; andperforming the obtaining and comparing, as well as the allowing or the taking, each time the device is booted.2. A method as recited in claim 1 , the policy further identifying configuration settings that the pre-operating system environment is to satisfy in order for the operating system to be allowed to boot.3. A method as recited in claim 1 , wherein the responsive action is to stop a boot process so that the operating system is not run on the device.4. A method as ...

BOOTING USER DEVICES TO CUSTOM OPERATING SYSTEM (OS) IMAGES

Example implementations relate to custom operating system (OS) images. For example, booting a user device to a custom OS image includes presenting a user interface (UI) for creating a custom OS image for portable use, storing the custom OS image on a database for information technology (IT) management purposes, sending, based on a request, the custom OS image from the database to an secure external device, and authenticating, based on a policy, the custom OS image on the secure external device for use on a user device without an OS image or a hard drive disk (HDD). 1. A method implemented by a booting system to boot a user device to a custom operating system (OS) image , the method comprising:with the booting system of a server:presenting a user interface (UI) for creating the custom OS image for portable use;storing the custom OS image on a database for information technology (IT) management purposes;sending, based on a request, the custom OS image from the database to a secure external device; andauthenticating, based on a policy, the custom OS image on the secure external device for use on the user device without an OS image or a hard drive disk (HDD).2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising receiving the policy.3. The method of claim 1 , wherein the policy comprises a geolocation policy claim 1 , a user based policy claim 1 , a restriction policy claim 1 , a biometric policy claim 1 , a password policy claim 1 , a time policy claim 1 , a release policy claim 1 , a subscription policy claim 1 , or combinations thereof.4. The method of claim 1 , wherein the custom OS image includes at least one application claim 1 , at least one driver claim 1 , or combinations thereof.5. The method of claim 1 , wherein the IT management purposes comprise creating claim 1 , updating claim 1 , and deleting of an application or a driver of the custom OS image.6. The method of claim 1 , wherein authenticating claim 1 , based on the policy claim 1 , the custom OS image on the ...

Out of band management of basic input/output system secure boot variables

A method is provided in one example embodiment and includes storing secure boot variables in a baseboard management controller; and sending the secure boot variables to a basic input/output system (BIOS) during a power on self-test, where the BIOS utilizes the secure boot variables during runtime to authenticate drivers and an operating system loader execution. In particular embodiments, the secure boot variables may be included in a white list, a black list, or a key list and, further, stored in erasable programmable read only memory.

Secure configuration data storage

A machine-implemented method for controlling a configuration data item in a storage-equipped device having at least two security domains, comprising receiving, by one of the security domains, a configuration data item; storing the configuration data item; providing a security indication for the configuration data item; and when an event indicates untrustworthiness of the data item, invalidating a configuration effect of the stored configuration data item. Further provided is a machine-implemented method for controlling a storage-equipped device as a node in a network of devices, comprising receiving information that a data source or type of a configuration data item is untrusted; analysing metadata for the data source and the configuration data item; populating a knowledge base with analysed metadata; and responsive to the analysed metadata, transmitting security information to the network of devices. A corresponding device and computer program product are also described.

Method and device for ensuring security of firmware of pos machine

The present application is applicable to the technical field of terminals and provides a method and device for ensuring security of a firmware of a POS machine. The method includes: according to a CPU type, presetting a loading mode corresponding to the CPU type; and selecting, according to the loading mode, an embedded multi media card (eMMC) boot medium to load first-level boot firmware. Through the method, the loading from another boot medium that can be connected externally can be avoided, and the replacement or tampering of firmware in a POS machine through the boot medium is prevented, to ensure that the POS machine meets the security requirement.

APPARATUS AND METHOD FOR COLLECTING AUDIT TRAIL IN VIRTUAL MACHINE BOOT PROCESS

An apparatus and method for collecting an audit trail in a virtual machine boot process, the audit-trail-collecting apparatus including an event detection unit for detecting a software interrupt event, a register state information extraction unit for extracting state information of a CPU register corresponding to a detection time of the software interrupt event, a monitoring unit for monitoring a change in a vector value corresponding to the software interrupt event in an interrupt vector table, a threat occurrence detection unit for detecting a threat occurrence in a virtual machine boot process based on at least one of the CPU register state information and a monitored result, and an audit trail collection unit for storing an audit trail corresponding to at least one of the CPU register state information and the monitored result when the threat occurrence is detected in the virtual machine boot process. 1. An apparatus for collecting an audit trail in a virtual machine boot process , comprising:an event detection unit for detecting a software interrupt event;a register state information extraction unit for extracting state information of a central processing unit (CPU) register, corresponding to a detection time of the software interrupt event;a monitoring unit for monitoring a change in a vector value corresponding to the software interrupt event in an interrupt vector table;a threat occurrence detection unit for detecting a threat occurrence in a virtual machine boot process based on at least one of the CPU register state information and a monitored result; andan audit trail collection unit for storing an audit trail corresponding to at least one of the CPU register state information and the monitored result when the threat occurrence is detected in the virtual machine boot process.2. The apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the register state information extraction unit extracts the CPU register state information comprising at least one of an access target sector ...

DETECTING TAMPERING OF MEMORY CONTENTS IN AN INFORMATION HANDLING SYSTEM

A method, an information handling system (IHS) and a detection system for detecting tampering of memory contents. The method includes retrieving, via a board management controller (BMC), from a first memory device, a first hash associated with current first data such as a firmware image stored on the first memory device and retrieving, from a second memory device, a previously stored second hash associated with initial first data. The method further includes determining if the first hash and the second hash match. In response to the first hash and the second hash not matching, an error message is generated which indicates that the current first data of the first memory device has been tampered with. The error message is stored to an error log. The error message identifies the specific current first data and/or firmware image that has been tampered with. The method repeats periodically during runtime. 1. A computer implemented method for detecting tampering of memory contents in an information handling system (IHS) , the method comprising:retrieving, via a board management controller (BMC), from a first memory device, a first hash associated with current first data;retrieving, from a second memory device, a previously stored second hash associated with initial first data;determining if the first hash and the second hash match; and generating an error message which indicates that the current first data of the first memory device has been tampered with; and', 'storing the error message to an error log., 'in response to the first hash and the second hash not matching2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:identifying within the current first data, a first firmware image associated with a system component of the IHS; andsending a notice to a system administrator that the current first data is not the corresponding initial first data and that the first firmware image has been altered.3. The method of claim 1 , further comprising receiving a second hash during an ...

AUTHENTICATED BOOT TO PROTECT STORAGE SYSTEM DATA BY RESTRICTING IMAGE DEPLOYMENT

A boot image is modified to require authentication based on stable system values that are uniquely associated with a storage array. The stable system values may be used as a key to decrypt a password. The modified boot image will not allow booting to proceed without the decrypted password. The password cannot be decrypted based on different stable system values such as the stable system values of other storage arrays. 1. An apparatus comprising:a storage array comprising a plurality of interconnected computing nodes that manage access to a plurality of data storage drives; anda boot image generator that creates a modified boot image for the storage array, the modified boot image comprising authentication code that performs authentication on an attempted boot using a value that is uniquely associated with the storage array.2. The apparatus of wherein the value comprises a combination of stable system values.3. The apparatus of wherein each of the stable system values is selected from the group comprising: a UUID (universally unique identifier) claim 2 , storage array serial number claim 2 , MAC address claim 2 , and guest container name.4. The apparatus of wherein the stable system values are persistently stored by the storage array claim 2 , do not change claim 2 , and claim 2 , either alone or in combination claim 2 , are uniquely associated with the storage array.5. The apparatus of wherein the stable system values are combined via concatenation.6. The apparatus of wherein concatenated stable system values are hashed.7. The apparatus of wherein a portion of the hash is used as a key.8. The apparatus of wherein the key provides access to a password.9. The apparatus of wherein the modified boot image uses the stable system values to generate the key to obtain the password.10. The apparatus of wherein the modified boot image performs authentication based on the password.11. A method comprising: retrieving a value that is uniquely associated with the storage array; ...

BLACKBOX SECURITY FOR CONTAINERS

Techniques facilitating security hardening systems that host containers are provided. In one example, a system comprises: a memory that stores computer executable components; and a processor that executes computer executable components stored in the memory. The computer executable components comprise: a boot component performs a portion of a trusted boot sequence to securely boot the system to a defined secure state wherein one or more types of administrative access to a container memory are deactivated. The computer executable components also comprise: a core service component started as a part of the trusted boot sequence and that securely obtains one or more decryption keys for use with the container memory; and a runtime decryption component that uses the one or more decryption keys to perform runtime decryption of one or more files accessed by a container associated with the container memory. 1. A system , comprising:a memory that stores computer executable components; a boot component that performs at least a portion of a trusted boot sequence to securely boot the system to a defined secure state wherein one or more types of administrative access to a container memory are deactivated;', 'a core service component started as a part of the trusted boot sequence and that securely obtains one or more decryption keys for use with the container memory; and', 'a runtime decryption component that uses the one or more decryption keys to perform runtime decryption of one or more files accessed by an entrypoint process of a container associated with the container memory or a descendant of the entrypoint process., 'a processor that executes computer executable components stored in the memory, wherein the computer executable components comprise2. The system of claim 1 , wherein the one or more types of administrative access to the container memory which are deactivated include one or more of:administrative access to the container memory through booting from a modified ...

Automated Access, Key, Certificate, and Credential Management

Certain embodiments provide means for managing automated access to computers, e.g., using SSH user keys and other kinds of trust relationships. Certain embodiments also provide for managing certificates, Kerberos credentials, and cryptographic keys. Certain embodiments provide for remediating legacy SSII key problems and for automating configuration of SSH keys, as well as for continuous monitoring.

PROTECTING COMPUTING DEVICES FROM UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

Methods and systems for performing an authenticated boot; performing a continuous data protection; performing automatic protection and optionally a consolidation; and performing other defenses and protection of a protected computing device (such as a computer system) are provided. The aspects include integrating security mechanisms (which may include a “call home” function, role and rule-based policies, validating technologies, encryption and decryption technologies, data compression technologies, protected and segmented boot technologies, and virtualization technologies. Booting and operating (either fully or in a restricted manner) are permitted only under a control of a specified role-set, rule-set, and/or a controlling supervisory process or server system(s). The methods and systems make advantageous use of hypervisors and other virtual machine monitors or managers. 110-. (canceled)11. A mobile device comprising:a central processing unit (CPU);a basic input/output system (BIOS) executable by the CPU;an operating system that provides a user environment for the mobile device to support at least one software application;a memory partition configured to store protected data comprising at least a portion of the operating system;a digital signature used by the mobile device to verify the authenticity of the operating system prior to the operating system being securely booted from the memory partition;a hypervisor configured to perform periodic data protection of the protected data by monitoring for a change in the protected data while the operating system is executed.12. The mobile device of claim 11 , wherein the operating system is prevented from booting in response to the authenticity being unverified.13. The mobile device of claim 11 , wherein memory partition is encrypted and wherein the memory partition is decrypted prior to launching the operating system.14. The mobile device of claim 11 , further comprising a storage controller claim 11 , wherein the ...

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR RESPONDING TO AN UNAUTHORIZED ACTION ON A MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICE

In a method and system for responding to an unauthorized action on a mobile communications device, a cryptographic key is destroyed. The destruction of the cryptographic key is followed by initiating a boot sequence at the mobile communications device where the device is booted into a kernel that restricts operation of the mobile communications device to communications with a server. 1. A method comprising:determining, by an autonomous security component of a mobile communications device, that the mobile communications device is in a first state, the first state being an indication that an unauthorized action has been attempted on the mobile communications device, wherein the autonomous security component is preloaded on a system partition of an internal memory of a mobile communications device where an operating system is stored, wherein the autonomous security component is configured to persist after a factory reset of the mobile communications device, and wherein the autonomous security component is separate from the operating system;in response to the determination that the mobile communications device is in the first state, initiating and causing, by the autonomous security component, a destruction of a cryptographic key of a bootloader from a key store on the mobile communications device;upon initiating and causing the destruction of the cryptographic key of the bootloader, initiating, by the autonomous security component, a boot sequence at the mobile communications device; andduring the boot sequence at the mobile communications device after the destruction of the cryptographic key, booting the mobile communications device into a kernel that restricts operation of the mobile communications device so that the mobile communications device can only communicate with a single server:(i) to report at least one selected from the group of: a mobile communications device location, and mobile communications device contextual information; and(ii) to receive a re- ...

Arrangement for selective enabling of a debugging interface

An arrangement for disabling a configuration of a first programmable hardware component, having the first programmable hardware component, a second programmable hardware component, and a switching element. The first programmable hardware component has a configuration interface for configuring a logic of the first programmable hardware component, a data interface for communication of the logic with the second programmable hardware component, a debugging interface for debugging and configuring the logic, and a configuration monitoring interface for signaling a configuration process of the logic. The switching element is designed and connected to the debugging interface such that access to the debugging interface during a configuration process of the logic can be disabled.

RECOVERY FROM LOST CREDENTIALS FOR PRE-BOOT AUTHENTICATION

A digital processing system receives, in a pre-boot duration, an indication from a user to retrieve a credential required for booting the digital processing system. The digital processing system connects, in the pre-boot duration, to a user device and retrieves, in the pre-boot duration, the credential from an external server using the user device. Booting is thereafter continued. In an embodiment, a BIOS (basic input/output system) software performs the receiving, the connecting, the retrieving, and completes the booting upon initialization of the digital processing system. 1. A method performed in a digital processing system , said method comprising:receiving, in a pre-boot duration, an indication from a user to retrieve a credential required for booting said digital processing system;connecting, in said pre-boot duration, to a user device;retrieving, in said pre-boot duration, said credential from an external server using said user device; andcontinuing with a booting process after receipt of said credential.2. The method of claim 1 , wherein software instructions representing an operating system are stored in an encrypted format as a first cipher data on a secondary storage claim 1 , said method further comprising:decrypting said first cipher data utilizing said credential to generate said software instructions; andexecuting said decrypted software instructions to have operating system be operational in said digital processing system.3. The method of claim 2 , wherein upon initialization of said digital processing system a BIOS (basic input/output system) software performs said receiving claim 2 , said connecting claim 2 , said retrieving claim 2 , said decrypting of said first cipher data claim 2 , and completes said booting to cause said operating system to be operational.4. The method of claim 3 , wherein said credential is a rescue password claim 3 , further comprising:encrypting said software instructions using a first key as encryption key;encrypting said ...

Autonomous driving system with dual secure boot

An autonomous driving system having dual secure boot is provided. The autonomous driving system includes: a control system, a host, and a baseboard management controller (BMC). The control system includes a microcontroller, a first flash memory, and a second flash memory. The first flash memory stores first embedded-controller firmware and a first application image file. The second flash memory stores second embedded-controller firmware and a second application image file. When the autonomous driving system is turned on, the microcontroller executes a dual secure boot procedure to execute the first embedded-controller firmware or the second embedded-controller firmware. In response to the microcontroller successfully executing the first embedded-controller firmware or the second embedded-controller firmware, the microcontroller authenticates the first application image file or the second application image file. In response to the BMC executing the authenticated first application image file or second application image file, the host executes a boot procedure.

Method and device for protecting a computing apparatus against manipulation

A method for protecting a computing apparatus against manipulation, which computing apparatus includes a plurality of components, which are designed to execute software and which have associated access rights is provided. The method includes the following steps: withdrawing a number of the access rights to the components during a starting process of the computing apparatus and specifying a subset of the access rights to the components on the basis of the withdrawn access rights, which subset cannot be changed during the execution of the software. By withdrawing access rights, the integrity protection is improved for the computing apparatus, because, in the event of a successful attack, the manipulations that can be performed by the manipulated software are limited. The disclosed further relates to a computer program product and to a device for protecting a computing apparatus against manipulation.

Trusted Boot of a Virtual Machine

A method, system and program product for performing a trusted boot of a virtual machine comprises the steps of executing, in turn, a series of components of the trusted boot, performing a function on each component prior to the execution of the respective component, storing the output of the functions in a virtual trusted platform module, detecting that the virtual trusted platform module has not responded to the storing of the output of a function in the virtual trusted platform module, and generating a request that the virtual trusted platform module be disabled.

VERIFICATION METHOD FOR SYSTEM EXECUTION ENVIRONMENT

The present invention provides a verification method for system execution environment. According to the present invention, at least an algorithm is used for operating a basic input/output system (BIOS) and loaded program check information, a first characteristic code and operation system check information, a second characteristic code and file system check information, a third characteristic system library check information, and a fourth characteristic code and application program check information for acquiring the first to fifth characteristic codes. After verifying the first to fourth characteristic codes, unlocking a storage, loading an operational system, loading a file system, and loading a system library are executed. After all characteristic codes have passed verification, the application program is executed. Thereby, whether the execution environment for the system or program is reliable can be confirmed. 1. A verification method for system execution environment , executed after booting a host , an operation unit unlocking a storage , loading an operational system , and producing a second characteristic code , and comprising steps of:producing a third characteristic code according to said second characteristic code, and said operational unit loading a file system after verifying said third characteristic code according a third verification code;producing a fourth characteristic code according to said third characteristic code, and said operational unit loading a system library after verifying said fourth characteristic code according a fourth verification code;producing a fifth characteristic code according to said fourth characteristic code, and verifying said fifth characteristic code according a fifth verification code; andconfirming that all verification codes are identical to all characteristic codes, respectively, and said operational unit executing an application program;where said third characteristic code, said fourth characteristic code, and said ...

SECURE DOWNLOAD AND SECURITY FUNCTION EXECUTION METHOD AND APPARATUS

A method and electronic device for executing secure download and security function is provided. The method includes storing a unique identifier (ID) of the electronic device, receiving a binary update request, determining whether the stored unique ID matches a unique ID signed to the binary, and downloading the binary depending on whether the unique IDs match. 1. A method of executing secure download for an electronic device , the method comprising the steps ofstoring a unique identifier (ID) of the electronic device;receiving a binary update request;determining whether the stored unique ID matches a unique ID signed to the binary; anddownloading the binary depending on whether the unique IDs match.2. The method of claim 1 , wherein storing the unique ID of the electronic device comprises storing the unique ID corresponding to at least one of a business user claim 1 , a personal user claim 1 , and a manufacturer.322. The method of claim 1 , wherein receiving the binary update request comprises receiving one of a request for switching a trust root of the electronic device manufactured to operate in Business-to-Customer (BC) mode to Business-to-Business (BB) mode and a request for new binary download.4. The method of claim 1 , wherein downloading the binary comprises blocking binary download claim 1 , when the unique IDs do not match.5. The method of claim 1 , wherein downloading the binary comprises flashing the binary from a flashing tool connected outside of the electronic device to a memory of the electronic device.6. The method of claim 1 , wherein downloading the binary comprises downloading the binary from an external device of the electronic device through least one of a Universal Serial Bus (USB) connection interface claim 1 , an Ethernet connection interface claim 1 , and a wireless network connection interface.7. A method for executing a binary function claim 1 , the method comprising the steps of:sequentially authenticating and executing at least one boot ...

SYSTEM, METHOD, AND COMPUTER PROGRAM PRODUCT FOR MOUNTING AN IMAGE OF A COMPUTER SYSTEM IN A PRE-BOOT ENVIRONMENT FOR VALIDATING THE COMPUTER SYSTEM

A system, method, and computer program product are provided for mounting an image of a computer system in a pre-boot environment for validating the computer system. An image of an operating system is mounted in a pre-boot environment of the programmable device. An untrusted component of the operating system is identified that is registered to be automatically loaded or loaded during a boot-up stage of the operating system that is predetermined to be early. The untrusted component is rescheduled to be initiated after loading of at least a portion of a security system on the programmable device. 1. A computer readable medium comprising instructions stored thereon that when executed cause a programmable device to:mount an image of an operating system in a pre-boot environment of the programmable device;identify an untrusted component of the operating system registered to be automatically loaded or loaded during a boot-up stage of the operating system that is predetermined to be early; andreschedule the untrusted component to be initiated after loading of at least a portion of a security system on the programmable device.2. The computer readable medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions stored thereon that when executed cause the programmable device to reschedule the untrusted component to be initiated after loading of at least a portion of a security system on the programmable device comprise instructions that when executed cause the programmable device to:reschedule the untrusted component to be initiated after loading predetermined components of the security system.3. The computer readable medium of claim 1 , wherein the instructions stored thereon that when executed cause the programmable device to identify an untrusted component of the operating system comprise instructions that when executed cause the programmable device to:verify a digital signature associated with components of the operating system registered to be automatically loaded or loaded during a boot ...