RFID TAG WITH ANTI-TAMPER ASSEMBLY

A radio frequency identification (RFID) transponder may include a substrate and a device. The substrate may be in communication with a controller and an antenna, and the antenna is arranged to receive radio frequency signals. A first side surface of the substrate may include a capacitor. The device may be detachably coupled with the substrate via a conductive member positioned between the structure and the capacitor of the substrate, and the conductive member may be within a desired proximity of the capacitor. The structure may be attached to an attachment surface so that an attachment strength between the structure and the attachment surface may be greater than a force required to decouple the structure from the substrate. When the structure is decoupled from the substrate, the conductive member separates from the capacitor, disabling the transponder. 1. A radio frequency identification (RFID) transponder , comprising:a substrate coupled to a housing;a capacitor coupled with the substrate;a structure configured to be detachably coupled with the housing and to be coupled to an attachment surface of an object; anda conductor positioned between the structure and the capacitor, such that the conductor is configured to separate from the capacitor, thereby disabling the transponder in response to a force being applied to the structure to decouple the structure from the housing.2. The RFID transponder of claim 1 , wherein a capacitance change is measured when the conductor separates from the capacitor.3. The RFID transponder of claim 2 , wherein a determination is made as to whether the capacitance change exceeds a predetermined threshold.4. The RFID transponder of claim 3 , wherein the transponder is disabled when the capacitance change is determined to have exceeded the predetermined threshold.5. The RFID transponder of claim 1 , wherein to disable the transponder claim 1 , a controller of the RFID transponder is scrambled so that the transponder is scrambled until the ...

TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD AND METHOD OF PROVIDING A TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD

A dynamic transaction card that is manufactured using conductive plastic jumpers that will dissolve when in contact with a solvent used to tamper with the dynamic transaction card. Internal components of a dynamic transaction card may be manufactured using a synthetic or semi-synthetic organic material, such as, for example, plastics. These materials may be conductive to provide functionality to a dynamic transaction card, such as a connection between an integrated circuit and other card components such that when the materials dissolve, the connections are broken and the dynamic transaction card may be inactive due to the loss of various connections. 123-. (canceled)24. A dynamic transaction card comprising:an outer layer comprising a plastic material;electrical components; the connector is constructed from a conductive, dissolvable material;', 'the connector is arranged in a sequence, wherein the dynamic transaction card will look for the sequence to activate the card; and', 'upon dissolving the outer layer using a solvent, the at least one connector is dissolved to break the connection between the electrical components and erase memory of the dynamic transaction card., 'at least one connector between the electrical components, wherein25. The dynamic transaction card of claim 24 , wherein the electrical components comprise an integrated circuit claim 24 , power supply claim 24 , power management component claim 24 , microprocessor claim 24 , microcontroller claim 24 , and/or a EuroPay-MasterCard-Visa (EMV) chip.26. The dynamic transaction card of claim 25 , wherein the connector connects the integrated circuit to the power supply and/or power management component.27. The dynamic transaction card of claim 25 , wherein the connector connects the microprocessor and/or microcontroller to the power supply and/or power management component.28. The dynamic transaction card of claim 24 , wherein the plastic material comprises polyethylene terephthalate claim 24 , ...

METHOD FOR REALIZING ULTRA-THIN SENSORS AND ELECTRONICS WITH ENHANCED FRAGILILTY

A method of fabricating ultra-thin semiconductor devices includes forming an array of semiconductor dielets mechanically suspended on a frame with at least one tether connecting each semiconductor dielet of the array of semiconductor dielets to the frame. 1. A method of fabricating ultra-thin semiconductor devices , the method comprising:forming an array of semiconductor dielets mechanically suspended on a frame with at least one tether connecting each semiconductor dielet of the array of semiconductor dielets to the frame.2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising forming fragility enhancing features in the semiconductor dielets.3. The method of claim 2 , wherein forming the fragility enhancing features in the semiconductor dielets includes forming etchings in the semiconductor dielets.4. The method of claim 2 , wherein the fragility enhancing features are configured to cause the semiconductor dielets to fracture under influence of an external force.5. The method of claim 2 , wherein the fragility enhancing features are configured to cause the semiconductor dielets to deform and become strained in a manner that degrades electrical performance under influence of an external force.6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the fragility enhancing features are configured to cause the semiconductor dielets to deform and become strained in a manner that alters carrier mobility in transistors of the semiconductor dielets under the influence of the external force.7. The method of claim 5 , wherein the external force exacerbates pre-existing inherent strain that exists in fabricated active devices of the semiconductor dielets caused by the oxide and/or interlayer dielectric (ILD) and metal routing layers to achieve a strain that causes failure of the semiconductor dielets.8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising etching a notch in the at least one tether.9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:bonding a device wafer including active areas to a carrier wafer, the ...

TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD AND METHOD OF PROVIDING A TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD

A dynamic transaction card that is manufactured using conductive plastic jumpers that will dissolve when in contact with a solvent used to tamper with the dynamic transaction card. Internal components of a dynamic transaction card may be manufactured using a synthetic or semi-synthetic organic material, such as, for example, plastics. These materials may be conductive to provide functionality to a dynamic transaction card, such as a connection between an integrated circuit and other card components such that when the materials dissolve, the connections are broken and the dynamic transaction card may be inactive due to the loss of various connections. 1. A dynamic transaction card comprising:an integrated circuit;a power supply; anda first connector, comprising a first dissolvable material, positioned between the integrated circuit and the power supply to provide a first electrical connection between the integrated circuit and the power supply;wherein, when the first connector is dissolved with a solvent, the first electrical connection between the integrated circuit and the power supply is interrupted and the dynamic transaction card is deactivated.2. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the first dissolvable material is an irreversibly cured polymer injected into a mold to form the first connector.3. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the first connector is manufactured using reaction injection molding.4. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the irreversibly cured polymer comprises a fiber or mica reinforcing agent.5. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the first dissolvable material comprises polyethylene terephthalate claim 1 , polyethylene claim 1 , high-density polyethylene claim 1 , polyvinyl chloride claim 1 , polyvinylidene chloride claim 1 , low-density polyethylene claim 1 , polypropylene claim 1 , polystyrene claim 1 , high impact polystyrene claim 1 , polyamides claim 1 , acrylonitrile butadiene ...

METHOD FOR REALIZING ULTRA-THIN SENSORS AND ELECTRONICS WITH ENHANCED FRAGILITY

A method of fabricating ultra-thin semiconductor devices includes forming an array of semiconductor dielets mechanically suspended on a frame with at least one tether connecting each semiconductor dielet of the array of semiconductor dielets to the frame. 1. A method of fabricating ultra-thin semiconductor devices , the method comprising:forming an array of semiconductor dielets mechanically suspended on a frame with at least one tether connecting each semiconductor dielet of the array of semiconductor dielets to the frame.2. The method of claim 1 , further comprising forming fragility enhancing features in the semiconductor dielets.3. The method of claim 2 , wherein forming the fragility enhancing features in the semiconductor dielets includes forming etchings in the semiconductor dielets.4. The method of claim 2 , wherein the fragility enhancing features are configured to cause the semiconductor dielets to fracture under influence of an external force.5. The method of claim 2 , wherein the fragility enhancing features are configured to cause the semiconductor dielets to deform and become strained in a manner that degrades electrical performance under influence of an external force.6. The method of claim 5 , wherein the fragility enhancing features are configured to cause the semiconductor dielets to deform and become strained in a manner that alters carrier mobility in transistors of the semiconductor dielets under the influence of the external force.7. The method of claim 5 , wherein the external force exacerbates pre-existing inherent strain that exists in fabricated active devices of the semiconductor dielets caused by the oxide and/or interlayer dielectric (ILD) and metal routing layers to achieve a strain that causes failure of the semiconductor dielets.8. The method of claim 1 , further comprising etching a notch in the at least one tether.9. The method of claim 1 , further comprising:bonding a device wafer including active areas to a carrier wafer, the ...

SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR SECURE FIRMWRE VALIDATION

An electronic device, such as a dynamic transaction card having an EMV chip, that acts as a TPM having a memory, an applet, and a cryptographic coprocessor performs secure firmware and/or software updates, and performs firmware and/or software validation for firmware and/or software that is stored on the electronic device. Validation may compare a calculated checksum with a checksum stored in EMV chip memory. If a checksum calculated for firmware and/or a software application matches a checksum stored in EMV chip memory of the transaction card, the transaction card may operate normally. If a checksum calculated for firmware and/or a software application does not match a checksum stored in EMV chip memory of the transaction card, the transaction card may freeze all capabilities, erase the memory of the transaction card, display data indicative of a fraudulent or inactive transaction card, and/or the like. 130-. (canceled)31. A dynamic transaction card comprising:an antenna;a cryptographic coprocessor, and connect to a firmware provider system;', 'receive a first portion of an updated firmware program from the firmware provider system;', 'connect, via the antenna, to a user device;', 'receive, via the antenna, a second portion of the updated firmware program from the user device;', 'receive a first checksum with a portion of the updated firmware program;', 'calculate, with the cryptographic coprocessor, a second checksum for the first portion and the second portion;', 'determine, with the cryptographic coprocessor, whether the first checksum matches the second checksum; and', 'validate, with the cryptographic coprocessor, the updated firmware program when the first checksum matches the second checksum., 'memory in communication with the cryptographic coprocessor and storing an existing firmware program, version data associated with the existing firmware program, and instructions that, when executed by the cryptographic coprocessor, cause the dynamic transaction card ...

SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR SECURE FIRMWARE VALIDATION

An electronic device, such as a dynamic transaction card having a chip, an applet, and a cryptographic coprocessor performs secure firmware and/or software updates, and performs firmware and/or software validation for firmware and/or software that is stored on the electronic device. Validation may compare a calculated checksum with a checksum stored in the device. If a checksum calculated for a firmware and/or a software application matches a stored checksum, the transaction card may operate normally. If a checksum calculated for a firmware and/or a software application does not match the stored checksum, the transaction card may freeze all capabilities, erase the memory of the transaction card, display data indicative of fraud, and/or the like. 1. A method for validating a firmware program , the method comprising:storing, in memory of a transaction card, the firmware program;receiving, at a processor of the transaction card, one or more rules to initiate a checksum validation via an applet;reading, via the applet, the firmware program stored on the transaction card;calculating, via a cryptographic processor of the transaction card, a first checksum for the firmware program;receiving, at the processor, data triggering the one or more rules;reading, via a secure element, the memory including the firmware program to identify memory data in response to receiving the data triggering the one or more rules;transmitting, via the secure element, the memory data to the cryptographic processor;calculating, via the cryptographic processor, a second checksum for the firmware program;comparing, using the processor, the first checksum and the second checksum to determine if the first checksum and the second checksum match; and validating the firmware program in response to determining that the first checksum and the second checksum match;', 'or', 'deleting at least a portion of data in the memory in response to determining that the first checksum and the second checksum do not ...

Stored value card systems with tamper evident activation indicia

Systems and methods for indicating tampering of a stored value card. The systems generally include a stored value card having a first activation indicia, and a removable label having a second activation indicia and covering the first activation indicia. To activate the stored value card, the first and second activation indicia are scanned. The removable label is configured to render the second activation indicia unreadable and/or to provide visual evidence of tampering such that activation is not recommended.

TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD AND METHOD OF PROVIDING A TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD

A dynamic transaction card that is manufactured using conductive plastic jumpers that will dissolve when in contact with a solvent used to tamper with the dynamic transaction card. Internal components of a dynamic transaction card may be manufactured using a synthetic or semi-synthetic organic material, such as, for example, plastics. These materials may be conductive to provide functionality to a dynamic transaction card, such as a connection between an integrated circuit and other card components such that when the materials dissolve, the connections are broken and the dynamic transaction card may be inactive due to the loss of various connections. 1. A dynamic transaction card comprising:an outer layer comprising a plastic material;electrical components; the connector is constructed from a conductive, dissolvable material;', 'the connector is arranged in a sequence, wherein the dynamic transaction card will look for the sequence to activate the card; and', 'upon dissolving the outer layer using a solvent, the at least one connector is dissolved to break the connection between the electrical components and the sequence deactivate the dynamic transaction card., 'at least one connector between the electrical components, wherein2. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the electrical components comprise an integrated circuit claim 1 , power supply claim 1 , power management component claim 1 , microprocessor claim 1 , microcontroller claim 1 , and/or a EuroPay-MasterCard-Visa (EMV) chip.3. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the connector connects the integrated circuit to the power supply and/or power management component.4. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the connector connects the microprocessor and/or microcontroller to the power supply and/or power management component.5. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the plastic material comprises polyethylene terephthalate claim 1 , polyethylene claim 1 , high- ...

INTEGRATED CIRCUITS WITH PERSISTENT DATA STORAGE

The circuitry introduced in this invention selectively slows down the functioning of an electronic circuit maintaining a particular state for a prolonged period of time. This circuitry is used not only to achieve the desired effect in maintaining security from electronic thieves trying to circumvent codes but also in other applications such as enabling a circuit to continue to function in the event of a brief loss of power. For example, in an RFID system, if a reader is frequency hopping, a tag loses power for as long as about 400 milliseconds when the reader changes to other frequencies. In a preferred embodiment, the disclosed circuitry is used in conjunction with a destruct sequence. 1receiving a first code transmitted by an RFID reader, the first code generated by an XOR calculation;comparing a second code within the tag to the first code;if the first code and second code do not match, muting by the tag; andif the first code and second code match, transmitting by the tag a third code to the RFID reader.. A method for a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag comprising: This application is a continuation of and claims priority from co-pending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/900,296, filed on May 22, 2013, which is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 13/276,222, filed Oct. 18, 2011, which issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,464,957 on Jun. 18, 2013, which is a continuation of and claims priority from Ser. No. 12/111,140, filed Apr. 28, 2008, which issued as U.S. Pat. No. 8,056,818 on Nov. 15, 2011, which is a continuation of and claims priority from U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/264,573, filed Oct. 31, 2005, which issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,377,445 on May 27, 2008, which is a continuation of and claims priority from U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/153,030 filed on Jun. 14, 2005, which issued as U.S. Pat. No. 7,364,084 on Apr. 29, 2008, which is a divisional application of and claims priority from U.S. patent application Ser. No. 10/140,589 ...

LABELING SET FOR MARKING A PHARMACEUTICAL VESSEL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PACKAGING UNIT

A labeling set for marking a pharmaceutical vessel including a body having a peripheral surface and a removable closure includes: a three-dimensional molded attachment, a label for sticking on the outer vessel circumference to be marked, and an RFID transponder for electronic identification of the vessel and/or contents. The attachment is mountable and/or positionable on the vessel in a predefined relative position and has a circumferential wall with an outer circumferential surface which is intended as an additional labelable and/or electronically identifiable outer wall and/or outer surface and whose radius, outer circumference and/or wall course is selected in accordance with the radius, outer circumference and/or wall course of the vessel circumferential surface. The label and/or the RFID transponder sticks over and/or covers both a circumferential surface, formed in accordance with the vessel body outer circumference, and the attachment circumferential surface at least in regions and/or to secure the vessel attachment to the vessel. 11303132. A labeling set () for marking a pharmaceutical vessel () comprising a vessel body () having an outer periphery and a removable vessel closure () ,{'b': '1', 'claim-text': [{'b': 10', '100, 'a vessel attachment () formed as a three-dimensional molded part (),'}, {'b': '20', 'a label () for sticking on the outer circumference of a pharmaceutical vessel to be marked, and'}, {'b': '5', 'an RFID transponder () for electronic identification of a pharmaceutical vessel and/or its contents,'}, {'b': 10', '12', '10, 'i': 'a', 'wherein the vessel attachment () can be mounted and/or positioned on the vessel in a predefined relative position and has a circumferential wall () with an outer circumferential surface () which is intended as an additional labelable and/or electronically identifiable outer wall and/or outer surface and whose radius, outer circumference and/or wall profile is selected in accordance with the radius, outer ...

Methods and apparatus for anti-tampering system

An anti-tampering device for an RFID tag according to various aspects of the present technology may include a flexible circuit card and an anti-tamper sticker. The anti-tamper sticker may be configured to include a circuit printed on a surface of the anti-tamper sticker that is electrically coupled to the circuit card. The printed circuit may be comprised of conductive ink extending between a pair of vias that are connected to vias on the circuit card when the anti-tamper sticker is positioned over the circuit card. Any attempt to remove the anti-tamper sticker causes the printed ink to disrupt the electrical connection between the two vias breaking a circuit with the circuit card. The circuit card may be configured to respond to the disruption to indicate that the RFID tag has been compromised.

High-Frequency-NFC-Based Product Traceability and Anti-Counterfeiting Tag

The NFC-based tag includes a substrate, a first and second coils formed on the substrate and an NFC chip fixed on the substrate. A status code whose default value is 0 is stored in memory of the NFC chip. The first coil is connected to the NFC chip and serves as an antenna thereof. The NFC chip communicates with an NFC reader through the first coil. The NFC reader can read or write the status code through the first coil. The NFC chip has an IO contact and a grounding contact. The IO contact connects to the grounding contact via the second coil. The second coil serves as an EAS coil. The IO contact is connected to the grounding contact through the second coil to form a closed loop. The NFC reader rewrites the status code to be irreversibly when the second coil is broken or has finished checkout. 1. A high-frequency-NFC-based product traceability and anti-counterfeiting tag comprising:a substrate;a first coil formed on the substrate;a second coil formed on the substrate; andan NFC chip fixed on the substrate;wherein a digital signature, product information and a status code whose default value is zero (0) are stored in memory of the NFC chip, the first coil is electrically connected to the NFC chip, the first coil serves as an antenna of the NFC chip, the NFC chip communicates with an NFC reader through the first coil, the NFC reader is capable of reading or writing the status code of the NFC chip through the first coil, the NFC chip has an IO contact and a grounding contact, the IO contact is electrically connected to the grounding contact via the second coil to form a closed loop, the status code keeps at zero (0) when the second coil is not broken to maintain a closed loop, the reader rewrites the status code to be one (1) by way of communication with the NFC chip when the second coil is broken or becomes an open loop, and the status code becomes unwritable after the status code has been rewritten to be one (1),wherein the NFC reader sends a command to the NFC chip ...

RFID-BASED INDICATOR FOR USE WITH FASTENING SUBSTRATES AND RELATED METHODS

An RFID apparatus for securing an object includes a security indication means having a breakable portion and an RFID transponder connected to the security indication means. The RFID transponder has at least one antenna, a collection of transistors, at least one conductive loop, and at least one RFID chip in electrical communication with a write-once circuit. At least a portion of the at least one conductive loop is positioned within the breakable portion of the security indication means. Breaking the at least one conductive loop causes the write-once circuit to change a signal state of the at least one RFID chip. 1. An RFID apparatus for securing an object , comprising:a security indication means having a breakable portion; andan RFID transponder connected to the security indication means, the RFID transponder having at least one antenna, a collection of transistors, at least one conductive loop, and at least one RFID chip in electrical communication with a write-once circuit,wherein at least a portion of the at least one conductive loop is positioned within the breakable portion of the security indication means, and wherein breaking the at least one conductive loop causes the write-once circuit to change a signal state of the at least one RFID chip.2. The RFID apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the security indication means is selected from the group consisting of a tying device claim 1 , a tape claim 1 , a sticker claim 1 , a lock claim 1 , a wrapping material claim 1 , an adhesive substrate claim 1 , and an embedded electronic device.3. The RFID apparatus of claim 1 , wherein the at least one RFID chip further comprises a first RFID chip to control a base signal state of the RFID transponder and a second RFID chip to control a changed signal state of the RFID transponder.4. The RFID apparatus of claim 3 , wherein the base signal state of the RFID transponder indicates a secure status of the object claim 3 , and wherein the changed signal state of the RFID transponder ...

TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD AND METHOD OF PROVIDING A TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD

A dynamic transaction card that is manufactured using conductive plastic jumpers that will dissolve when in contact with a solvent used to tamper with the dynamic transaction card. Internal components of a dynamic transaction card may be manufactured using a synthetic or semi-synthetic organic material, such as, for example, plastics. These materials may be conductive to provide functionality to a dynamic transaction card, such as a connection between an integrated circuit and other card components such that when the materials dissolve, the connections are broken and the dynamic transaction card may be inactive due to the loss of various connections. 1. A dynamic transaction card comprising:a microprocessor;a EuroPay-MasterCard-Visa (EMV) chip; anda first connector, comprising a first dissolvable material, positioned between the microprocessor and the EMV chip to provide a first electrical connection between the microprocessor and the EMV chip,wherein, when the first connector is dissolved with a solvent, the first electrical connection between the microprocessor and the EMV chip is interrupted and the dynamic transaction card is deactivated.2. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the first dissolvable material is an irreversibly cured polymer injected into a mold to form the first connector.3. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the first connector is manufactured using reaction injection molding.4. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the irreversibly cured polymer comprises a fiber or mica reinforcing agent.5. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the first dissolvable material comprises polyethylene terephthalate claim 1 , polyethylene claim 1 , high-density polyethylene claim 1 , polyvinyl chloride claim 1 , polyvinylidene chloride claim 1 , low-density polyethylene claim 1 , polypropylene claim 1 , polystyrene claim 1 , high impact polystyrene claim 1 , polyamides claim 1 , acrylonitrile butadiene styrene ...

ANTI-SKIMMING PAYMENT CARD

A payment card may include a read sensor configured to detect a reading of the payment card by a card reader. In particular, the payment card may include a controller or a processor configured to count a number of times the payment card is read by other card readers. The payment card may implement card security measures based on the number of reads detected by the read sensor. The payment card may further include a magnetic stripe emulator configured to emulate signal patterns of a magnetic stripe when the magnetic stripe is read by a card reader. The controller may disable the magnetic stripe emulator when the number of reads detected by the read sensor exceeds a predetermined number. 1. A payment device comprising:a read sensor configured to detect a reading of the payment device by a card reader;a visual indicator on the payment device and configured to display visual content to a user; and count a number of readings detected by the read sensor; and', displaying, by the visual indicator, information identifying the number of readings to the user; and', 'authenticating the user to enable payment from the payment device, responsive to a determination that the number of readings exceeds a predefined limit., 'implement security settings based on the number of readings including], 'a controller configured to, without communication to a remote server2. The payment device of claim 1 , wherein the read sensor comprises a magnetic field sensor configured to detect a presence or a movement of a magnetic head of the card reader when the payment device is read at the card reader.3. The payment device of claim 2 , wherein the magnetic field sensor of the read sensor comprises one or more of a solenoid and a Hall effect sensor.4. The payment device of claim 1 , wherein the visual indicator comprises a Light Emitting Diode (LED) lighting device configured to indicate that the number of readings exceeds a limit.5. The payment device of further comprising a communication device ...

RFID Tag and Method for Protecting an RFID Tag

An RFID tag for a product includes an RFID chip configured for processing data, an antenna configured for transmitting the data, and a security part. The security part is configured to destroy the RFID chip in case of a predetermined use of the product. Therefore, the RFID tag is reliably protected against illegal further use. A product having such an RFID tag and a method for safeguarding an RFID tag against inadmissible use of the RFID tag are described.

DUAL-MODE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TAG

An NFC tag includes a foldable substrate in the form of a tape; an antenna located at a first end of the tape; a capacitor connected to the antenna, located at the first end of the tape; an impedance, in particular a capacitor, located at a second end of the tape; and conductive tracks running along the tape to connect the impedance to the antenna. 1. An NFC device comprising:a foldable substrate in the form of a tape;an antenna located at a first end of the tape;a capacitor connected to the antenna, located at the first end of the tape;an impedance located at a second end of the tape; andconductive tracks running along the tape to connect the impedance to the antenna.2. The NFC device of claim 1 , wherein the impedance defines with the antenna and the capacitor a nominal tuning frequency claim 1 , the device further comprising a control microcircuit connected to be power-supplied from the antenna claim 1 , a value of the capacitor being chosen so that claim 1 , in the absence of the impedance claim 1 , the microcircuit power supply is insufficient to provide a full functionality claim 1 , but sufficient to provide a limited functionality claim 1 , when the device is powered by a field at the nominal frequency.3. The NFC device of claim 2 , wherein the full functionality of the microcircuit includes information reading functions and cryptographic functions claim 2 , and the limited functionality of the microcircuit is devoid of the cryptographic functions.4. The device of claim 3 , wherein the tape includes breaking points in a central part of the tape.5. The device of claim 3 , wherein the conductive connecting the impedance and the antenna are located on either side of the tape claim 3 , and are configured as a twisted pair.6. A container comprising:a closure member;a tape placed across the closure element and glued to the container, the tape surface area bonded to the container being chosen so that the rupture strength of the bonding is greater than the rupture ...

ANTI-COUNTERFEITING LABEL PRESERVING FUNCTIONALITY AFTER USE

A near field magnetically coupled anti-counterfeiting tag comprises a control microcircuit configured to implement a basic function and a cryptographic function; a sacrificial conductive track located across a sacrificial area of the tag; and a circuit for detecting continuity of the sacrificial track, cooperating with the microcircuit to implement the basic function without implementing the cryptographic function when the sacrificial track is broken. 1. A near field magnetically coupled contactless tag , comprising:a control chip for implementing a basic function and a cryptographic function (CCP);a sacrificial conductive track located across a sacrificial area of the tag; anda circuit for detecting continuity of the sacrificial track, cooperating with the microcircuit to implement the basic function without implementing the cryptographic function when the sacrificial track is broken.2. The tag according to claim 1 , wherein the microcircuit is a standard microcircuit comprising a programmable digital input/output pin (IO) claim 1 , the sacrificial track being connected between the input/output pin and a power supply pin (GND) of the microcircuit claim 1 , the microcircuit being programmed to test the state of the input/output pin to determine the implementation of the cryptographic function.3. The tag according to claim 1 , comprising an antenna circuit configured to ensure a continuity detection function claim 1 , the sacrificial track being connected to the antenna circuit so that its rupture shifts the frequency tuning of the antenna circuit claim 1 , the offset in the tuning frequency being selected such that the supply power received by the microcircuit is lowered to a level insufficient for implementing the cryptographic function claim 1 , yet sufficient for implementing the basic function.4. The tag according to claim 3 , comprising:a foldable substrate in the form of a tape;an antenna included in the antenna circuit;{'b': '1', 'a capacitor (C) connected to ...

TRANSACTION CARD MODE RELATED TO LOCATING A TRANSACTION CARD

A transaction card may determine to initiate a mode associated with the transaction card. The mode may be related to locating the transaction card. The mode may be associated with outputting a first signal. The transaction card may determine a manner in which to configure the mode based on a set of parameters. The set of parameters may include a power level of the transaction card, or a strength of a second signal associated with a connection between the transaction card and a device associated with the transaction card. The transaction card may initiate the mode after configuring the mode. The transaction card may determine to terminate the mode based on an indication that the transaction card has been located. 1. A method , comprising: 'the transaction card and the device acting in a pairing mode to establish a pairing connection;', 'receiving, by a transaction card, information related to a proximity of the transaction card and a device,'} [ an interval,', 'a threshold period of time, or', 'at a threshold power level;, 'the beacon mode being associated with the transaction card outputting a signal for at least one of, 'providing, by the transaction card in the beacon mode, the signal;, 'determining, by the transaction card, to initiate a beacon mode associated with the transaction card to locate the transaction card,'}receiving, by the transaction card and from the device, instructions to terminate the beacon mode based on an indication that the transaction card has been located; anddetermining, by the transaction card, to terminate the beacon mode based on the indication that the transaction card has been located.2. The method of claim 1 , where the beacon mode is initiated when the transaction card loses the pairing connection with the device.3. The method of claim 1 , where the beacon mode is initiated based on a frequency of use of the transaction card.4. The method of claim 1 , where the beacon mode is initiated based on an amount of time elapsed since a ...

Ic tag label

An IC tag label includes: an IC chip; a communication antenna element having a first end and a second end, the first end being electrically connected to the IC chip, the communication antenna element including a planar coil extending on a first surface and having a shape suitable for positioning on a bottle mouth; and a bridge wiring including a wiring element which is located in an opposed region on a second surface which is opposed to the first surface, the bridge wiring electrically connecting the second end to the IC chip. The communication antenna element has an air core section which includes a center of the planar coil, and the wiring element is a single wire including a plurality of bent sections and having a folded line shape which traverses the air core section a plurality of times in plan view perpendicular to the first surface.

Electronic Chip Architecture

In some embodiments, an electronic chip includes a doped semiconductor substrate of a first conductivity type, and wells of the second conductivity type on the side of the front face of the chip, in and on which wells circuit elements are formed. One or more slabs of a second conductivity type are buried under the wells and are separated from the wells. The electronic chip also includes, for each buried slab, a biasable section of the second conductivity type, which extends from the front face of the substrate to the buried slab. A first MOS transistor with a channel of the first conductivity type is disposed in the upper portion of each section, where the first transistor is an element of a flip-flop. A circuit is used for detecting a change in the logic level of one of the flip-flops. 1. An electronic chip comprising:a doped semiconductor substrate of a first conductivity type, the doped semiconductor substrate having a first surface;a plurality of wells of a second conductivity type disposed on the first surface of the doped semiconductor substrate, wherein the second conductivity type is opposite the first conductivity type;a plurality of slabs of the second conductivity type buried under the wells and separated from the wells to form a plurality of buried slabsa plurality of biasable sections of the second conductivity type extending from the first surface of the doped semiconductor substrate to the respective buried slab;a plurality of flip-flops, each flip-flop of the plurality of flip-flops having a first metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS) transistor, each first MOS transistor having a channel of the first conductivity type and disposed in a first portion of the respective biasable section of the plurality of biasable sections; anda detector configured to detect a change in a logic level of one of the plurality of flip-flops.2. The electronic chip of claim 1 , wherein the detector is configured to initialize the plurality of flip-flops to a first logic level ...

STORED VALUE CARD AND CARRIER ASSEMBLY WITH TAMPER EVIDENT LABEL

A stored value card and carrier assembly including a carrier formed from one or more panels, at least one stored value card sandwiched and sealed within the carrier, and a label removably adhered or coupled to the card and adhered or coupled to an interior of the carrier such that the bond to the carrier or card is greater than the bond to the other of the card or carrier. The label includes at least a portion of activation indicia, such as a barcode, either printed or otherwise applied thereon. Upon removal of the card from the carrier, the label remains coupled to one of the carrier or the card, whichever bond is greater, rending any remaining activation indicia on the other of the stored value card or carrier unreadable. 1a carrier;a stored value card; anda tamper evident label, a first surface of the label being adhered to the stored value card, and a second opposite surface being adhered to the carrier,wherein the label includes at least a portion of activation indicia, the activation indicia being readable to activate the stored value card, andwherein removal of the stored value card from the carrier causes the label to remain coupled to one of the carrier or the card, rendering any remaining activation indicia on the other of the stored value card or carrier unreadable.. A stored value card and carrier assembly, the assembly comprising: This is application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 15/585,953 filed May 3, 2017, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/331,016 filed May 3, 2016, each of which is hereby incorporated herein in its entirety by reference.This application relates generally to stored value cards, and more particularly relates to a assembly used for securing activation data within a secure package for stored value cards, the assembly being configured to destroy a portion of the activation barcode should a stored value card be removed from the package for fraudulent purposes.Stored value cards, which may ...

TAMPER RESISTANT TAG

The present invention concerns a smart tag for attachment to an object. The smart tag comprises an electronic system for contactless communication, a support to which at least part of the electronic system is fixed and at least one destruction component means configured to act on at least one element of the electronic system, when the smart tag is removed from said object, to demolish said at least one element of the electronic system. In at least one embodiment, the destruction component may be a demolisher movably mounted to pass through said support from a first position on one side of the support to a second position on the other side of the support. 1. A smart tag for attachment to an object , the smart tag comprising:an electronic system for contactless communication;a support to which at least part of the electronic system is fixed; anddestruction means configured to act on at least one element of the electronic system, when the smart tag is removed from said object, to demolish said at least one element of the electronic system;the smart tag being characterised in that the destruction means includes a demolisher movably mounted to pass through said support from a first position on one side of the support to a second position on the other side of the support.2. The smart tag according to claim 1 , further including a lid fixedly attached to said support to define a housing enclosing the electronic system to limit accessibility to the electronic system from the outside.3. The smart tag according to claim 2 , wherein the lid is fixedly attached to said support using ultrasonic welding claim 2 , gluing claim 2 , injection or clipping to prevent opening of the housing.4. The smart tag according to claim 2 , wherein the demolisher is located inside said housing when the demolisher is in said first position claim 2 , and located outside said housing when the demolisher is in said second position.5. The smart tag according to claim 1 , further including a demolisher ...

Tamper-resistant dynamic transaction card and method of providing a tamper-resistant dynamic transaction card

A dynamic transaction card that is manufactured using conductive plastic jumpers that will dissolve when in contact with a solvent used to tamper with the dynamic transaction card. Internal components of a dynamic transaction card may be manufactured using a synthetic or semi-synthetic organic material, such as, for example, plastics. These materials may be conductive to provide functionality to a dynamic transaction card, such as a connection between an integrated circuit and other card components such that when the materials dissolve, the connections are broken and the dynamic transaction card may be inactive due to the loss of various connections. 1. A dynamic transaction card comprising:an outer layer comprising a plastic material;electrical components;at least one connector between the electrical components, wherein the connector is constructed from conductive, dissolvable material, wherein upon dissolving the outer layer using a solvent, the at least one connector is dissolved to break the connection between the electrical components and deactivate the dynamic transaction card.2. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the electrical components comprise an integrated circuit claim 1 , power supply claim 1 , power management component claim 1 , microprocessor claim 1 , microcontroller claim 1 , and/or a EuroPay-MasterCard-Visa (EMV) chip.3. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the connector connects the integrated circuit to the power supply and/or power management component.4. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the connector connects the microprocessor and/or microcontroller to the power supply and/or power management component.5. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the plastic material comprises polyethylene terephthalate claim 1 , polyethylene claim 1 , high-density polyethylene claim 1 , polyvinyl chloride claim 1 , polyvinylidene chloride claim 1 , low-density polyethylene claim 1 , polypropylene claim 1 ...

BANKING MACHINE CONTROLLED RESPONSIVE TO DATA READ FROM DATA BEARING RECORDS

A banking system operates responsive to data read from data bearing records. The system includes an automated banking machine comprising a card reader. The card reader includes a movable read head that can read card data along a magnetic stripe of a card that was inserted long-edge first. The card reader includes a card entry gate. The gate is opened for a card that is determined to be properly oriented for data reading. The card reader can encrypt card data, including account data. The card data is usable by the machine to authorize a user to carry out a financial transfer involving the account. 1. An apparatus , comprising:a card reader for receiving a rectangular card having a magnetic stripe, a long edge and a short edge; a read head,', 'an analog-to-digital converter, and', 'an encrypting device located adjacent to the analog to digital converter, and', 'a secure housing that encloses the read head, the circuitry, and the encrypting device;, 'a movable read head assembly positioned to read the magnetic stripe when the card is inserted into the card reader long edge first, the read head assembly compriseswherein the secure housing is operable to detect a breach of the secure housing; andwherein the secure housing is operable to erase keying data responsive to detecting a breach.2. The apparatus set forth in claim 1 , further comprising a plurality of movable magnetic read heads;wherein the plurality of read heads include a first vertically positioned, upward reading, movable read head that is operable to read a magnetic stripe that faces downward in a wide slot.3. The apparatus set forth in claim 2 , wherein the plurality of read heads includes a second vertically positioned claim 2 , downward reading claim 2 , movable read that is operable to read a magnetic stripe that faces upward in the wide slot.4. The apparatus set forth in claim 3 , further comprising a magnetic sensor located adjacent to a read of the slot that can detect when a magnetic stripe is in ...

TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD AND METHOD OF PROVIDING A TAMPER-RESISTANT TRANSACTION CARD

A dynamic transaction card that is manufactured using conductive plastic jumpers that will dissolve when in contact with a solvent used to tamper with the dynamic transaction card. Internal components of a dynamic transaction card may be manufactured using a synthetic or semi-synthetic organic material, such as, for example, plastics. These materials may be conductive to provide functionality to a dynamic transaction card, such as a connection between an integrated circuit and other card components such that when the materials dissolve, the connections are broken and the dynamic transaction card may be inactive due to the loss of various connections. 1. A dynamic transaction card comprising:an outer layer comprising a plastic material;electrical components; the connector is constructed from a conductive, dissolvable material;', 'the connector is arranged in a sequence, wherein the dynamic transaction card will look for the sequence to activate the card; and', 'upon dissolving the outer layer using a solvent, the at least one connector is dissolved to break the connection between the electrical components and the sequence deactivate the dynamic transaction card., 'at least one connector between the electrical components, wherein2. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the electrical components comprise an integrated circuit claim 1 , power supply claim 1 , power management component claim 1 , microprocessor claim 1 , microcontroller claim 1 , and/or a EuroPay-MasterCard-Visa (EMV) chip.3. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the connector connects the integrated circuit to the power supply and/or power management component.4. The dynamic transaction card of claim 2 , wherein the connector connects the microprocessor and/or microcontroller to the power supply and/or power management component.5. The dynamic transaction card of claim 1 , wherein the plastic material comprises polyethylene terephthalate claim 1 , polyethylene claim 1 , high- ...

Stored value card and carrier assembly with tamper evident label

A stored value card and carrier assembly including a carrier formed from one or more panels, at least one stored value card sandwiched and sealed within the carrier, and a label removably adhered or coupled to the card and adhered or coupled to an interior of the carrier such that the bond to the carrier or card is greater than the bond to the other of the card or carrier. The label includes at least a portion of activation indicia, such as a barcode, either printed or otherwise applied thereon. Upon removal of the card from the carrier, the label remains coupled to one of the carrier or the card, whichever bond is greater, rending any remaining activation indicia on the other of the stored value card or carrier unreadable. 1a carrier;a stored value card; anda tamper evident label, a first surface of the label being adhered to the stored value card, and a second opposite surface being adhered to the carrier,wherein the label includes at least a portion of activation indicia, the activation indicia being readable to activate the stored value card, andwherein removal of the stored value card from the carrier causes the label to remain coupled to one of the carrier or the card, rendering any remaining activation indicia on the other of the stored value card or carrier unreadable.. A stored value card and carrier assembly, the assembly comprising: The present application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62/331,016 filed May 3, 2016, which is hereby incorporated herein in its entirety by reference.This application relates generally to stored value cards, and more particularly relates to a assembly used for securing activation data within a secure package for stored value cards, the assembly being configured to destroy a portion of the activation barcode should a stored value card be removed from the package for fraudulent purposes.Stored value cards, which may also be known as gift cards, prepaid cards, shopping cards or fare cards, prepaid ...

Anti-Skimming Payment Card

A payment card may include a read sensor configured to detect a reading of the payment card by a card reader. In particular, the payment card may include a controller or a processor configured to count a number of times the payment card is read by other card readers. The payment card may implement card security measures based on the number of reads detected by the read sensor. The payment card may further include a magnetic stripe emulator configured to emulate signal patterns of a magnetic stripe when the magnetic stripe is read by a card reader. The controller may disable the magnetic stripe emulator when the number of reads detected by the read sensor exceeds a predetermined number. 1. A card device , comprising:a sensor; and determining a previous authenticated transaction with the card device;', 'detecting, using the sensor, a reading of the card device by a scanner for a transaction;', 'determining a number of readings of the card device from the previous authenticated transaction to the card device being read by the scanner for the transaction;', 'authenticating the reading of the card device by the scanner for the transaction based at least on the determined number of readings of the card device; and', 'enabling the card device to make the transaction based at least on the authenticating., 'one or more controllers configured to perform operations comprising2. The card device of claim 1 , wherein the operations further comprise:determining a time period from the prior authenticated transaction to the card device being read by the scanner, andwherein the authenticating is further based on the determined number of readings being below a predetermined number of readings allowed within the time period.3. The card device of claim 1 , wherein the operations further comprise:detecting, using the sensor, the card device is read by a second scanner;determining a second number of readings of the card device from the prior authenticated transaction to the card device ...

Techniques for access control using wearable devices

Various embodiments are generally directed to techniques for using little or no electric power to monitor whether a wearable device continues to be worn by a person such that it may continue to be used to access a secured item. An apparatus may include a processor component; a storage to store an access credential; a presentation component to wirelessly transmit the access credential to an access device to enable a grant of access to a secured item; a power source; and a clasp coupled to a wearable portion to prevent removal of the wearable portion unless the clasp is operated to change state from a clasped state to an unclasped state, the clasp to cause loss of electric power from the power source to the processor component and the storage when in the unclasped state to nullify the access credential. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Transaction card mode related to locating a transaction card

A transaction card may determine to initiate a mode associated with the transaction card. The mode may be related to locating the transaction card. The mode may be associated with outputting a first signal. The transaction card may determine a manner in which to configure the mode based on a set of parameters. The set of parameters may include a power level of the transaction card, or a strength of a second signal associated with a connection between the transaction card and a device associated with the transaction card. The transaction card may initiate the mode after configuring the mode. The transaction card may determine to terminate the mode based on an indication that the transaction card has been located.

Secured identification document

A secured identification document has at least two flexible layers embedding an electronic module. The electronic module includes a flexible substrate on which are positioned an antenna and a radiofrequency microcontroller storing identification data. The radiofrequency microcontroller is electrically connected to said antenna. The secured identification document has the at least two flexible layers locally joined together by means of a chemically and mechanically tamper proof material that is applied in cavities that are distributed in each of said at least two flexible layers that surround the electronic module in order to make the electronic module interdependent with the at least two flexible layers.

Device and method for non-volatile storage of a status value

조건이 있었음을 나타내는 상태 값의 비휘발성 저장 장치(100)는, 비휘발성 저장 수단(110), 공급 전압을 인가할 때 에너지를 저장하는 에너지 저장 수단(130, 140), 및 상기 조건이 발생하면 상기 에너지 저장 수단(130, 140)을 상기 비휘발성 저장 수단(110)에 연결시켜 상기 상태 값을 기록하도록 설계된 스위칭 수단(120, 150)을 포함한다. The nonvolatile storage device 100 having a state value indicating that a condition exists includes the nonvolatile storage means 110, the energy storage means 130 and 140 for storing energy when the supply voltage is applied, and the condition occurs. And switching means (120, 150) designed to connect the energy storage means (130, 140) to the nonvolatile storage means (110) to record the state value.

Destruction metal attached rfid tag

본 발명은 파괴형 금속부착 RFID 태그에 관한 것으로, 특히 금속재질의 평판 혹은 금속봉 형상의 취부수단에 대응하여 부착 사용되는 파괴형 금속부착 RFID 태그에 있어서, RFID 안테나 패턴과 RFID 칩을 포함하는 필름형태의 Wet-Inlay 태그; 상기 Wet-Inlay 태그를 중간에 매개하여 상하로 설치되는 파손부재; 상기 Wet-Inlay 태그와 파손부재를 수용하는 플라스틱 재질의 상부 케이스; 및 상기 Wet-Inlay 태그와 파손부재를 수용하는 플라스틱 재질의 상부 케이스와 체결되며, 상기 파손부재의 일부를 수용하는 금속재질의 하부 케이스;를 포함하며, 상기 파괴형 금속부착 RFID 태그를 취부수단에 부착한 상태에서 임의 분리 착탈이 시도되는 경우, 상기 파손부재의 훼손에 의하여 파손부재 사이에 매개된 Wet-Inlay 태그의 베이스 시트의 찢어짐으로 인해 안테나 패턴의 절단 및 RFID 칩 파손에 의한 RFID 태그의 기능이 영구 상실되도록 하는 구조를 가지는 파괴형 금속부착 RFID 태그를 개시한다.

Anti-counterfeiting system

一种用于验证物品的真实性和检测物品的篡改的方法和装置被公开。RFID应答器包括天线谐振电路，当集成电路位于邻近天线谐振电路时，该天线谐振电路耦合到相关的集成电路上，从而该集成电路接收和响应射频查询信号。该天线谐振电路可以与封壳成一整体或者为其他形状的可移动包装，使得当包装移去或者篡改发生时，其会遭到破坏。

An identification tag comprising protective features and a method for manufacturing the identification tag

The invention relates to an identification tag (1) attachable to an item (5) comprising an integrated circuit (10) in connection with an antenna (20), the integrated circuit (10) and the antenna (20) being supported by a substantially transparent or translucent substrate (30). The identification tag (1) further comprises a protective dot (15) placed locally over the integrated circuit (10) for protecting the integrated circuit (10) from environmental effects. The present invention also relates to a method for manufacturing such an identification tag (1).

Packaging closures integrated with disposable RFID devices

A packaging system ( 20 ), has a container ( 22 ) which delimits a container volume which can hold at least one unit-measure or unit-quantity of a selected commodity or article ( 24 ). The container includes at least one access portion ( 26 ) that can provide a selective closed arrangement and a selective open arrangement. An electronic data mechanism ( 28 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ), and can be operatively configured to electronically transpond or otherwise transmit data to a reader mechanism ( 30 ). A deactivation mechanism ( 32 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ) and to the electronic data mechanism ( 28 ), and can be operatively configured to selectively disable the electronic data mechanism.

Integrated circuits with persistent data storage

The circuitry introduced in this invention selectively slows down the functioning of an electronic circuit by maintaining a particular state for a prolonged period of time. This circuitry is used not only to achieve the desired effect in maintaining security from electronic thieves trying to circumvent codes but also in other applications such as enabling a circuit to continue to function in the event of a brief loss of power. For example, in an RFID system, if a reader is frequency hopping, a tag loses power for as long as about 400 milliseconds when the reader changes to other frequencies. In a preferred embodiment, the disclosed circuitry is used in conjunction with a destruct sequence.

Packaging closures integrated with disposable RFID devices

A packaging system ( 20 ), has a container ( 22 ) which delimits a container volume which can hold at least one unit-measure or unit-quantity of a selected commodity or article ( 24 ). The container includes at least one access portion ( 26 ) that can provide a selective closed arrangement and a selective open arrangement. An electronic data mechanism ( 28 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ), and can be operatively configured to electronically transpond or otherwise transmit data to a reader mechanism ( 30 ). A deactivation mechanism ( 32 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ) and to the electronic data mechanism ( 28 ), and can be operatively configured to selectively disable the electronic data mechanism.

Packaging closures integrated with disposable rfid devices

A packaging system ( 20 ), has a container ( 22 ) which delimits a container volume which can hold at least one unit-measure or unit-quantity of a selected commodity or article ( 24 ). The container includes at least one access portion ( 26 ) that can provide a selective closed arrangement and a selective open arrangement. An electronic data mechanism ( 28 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ), and can be operatively configured to electronically transpond or otherwise transmit data to a reader mechanism ( 30 ). A deactivation mechanism ( 32 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ) and to the electronic data mechanism ( 28 ), and can be operatively configured to selectively disable the electronic data mechanism.

Packaging closures integrated with disposable RFID devices

A packaging system ( 20 ), has a container ( 22 ) which delimits a container volume which can hold at least one unit-measure or unit-quantity of a selected commodity or article ( 24 ). The container includes at least one access portion ( 26 ) that can provide a selective closed arrangement and a selective open arrangement. An electronic data mechanism ( 28 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ), and can be operatively configured to electronically transpond or otherwise transmit data to a reader mechanism ( 30 ). A deactivation mechanism ( 32 ) can be operatively connected to the container ( 22 ) and to the electronic data mechanism ( 28 ), and can be operatively configured to selectively disable the electronic data mechanism.

ANTI-CONTRACTION SYSTEM

1. Система для верификации аутентичности предмета, содержащая: ! антенный резонансный контур, сконфигурированный резонировать в ответ на радиочастотный сигнал запроса, для создания индуцированного тока; ! интегральную схему, ассоциированную с прдеметом, имеющую интегральный резонансный контур, связанный с антенным резонансным контуром, так что ток в антенном резонансном контуре индуцирует сигнал в интегральном резонансном контуре, когда интегральный резонансный контур позиционирован вблизи антенного резонансного контура; ! посредством чего сигнал в интегральном резонансном контуре не индуцируется, когда интегральный резонансный контур находится в положении, которые не является близким к антенному резонансному контуру; ! цифровую память в интегральной схеме, содержащую код защиты; ! радиочастотный сигнал верификации, содержащий код защиты, генерируемый интегральной схемой в ответ на сигнал, индуцированный в интегральном резонансном контуре; ! посредством чего может быть верифицирована аутентичность предмета посредством анализа кода защиты. ! 2. Система по п.1, в которой предметом является контейнер для напитка, причем система дополнительно содержит: укупорочное средство контейнера, имеющее наружный конец, к которому прикреплена интегральная схема; и ! колпачок укупорочного средства, к которому прикреплен антенный резонансный контур. ! 3. Система по п.2, в которой цифровая память интегральной схемы дополнительно сконфигурирована хранить информацию о продукте, описывающей предмет; и ! радиочастотный сигнал верификации содержит сигнал передающий сохраненную информацию о продукте. ! 4. Система по п.1 РОССИЙСКАЯ ФЕДЕРАЦИЯ (19) RU (11) 2010 147 940 (13) A (51) МПК G08B 13/14 (2006.01) ФЕДЕРАЛЬНАЯ СЛУЖБА ПО ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЬНОЙ СОБСТВЕННОСТИ (12) ЗАЯВКА НА ИЗОБРЕТЕНИЕ (71) Заявитель(и): КЛОУЖЕР СИСТЕМЗ ИНТЕРНЭШНЛ, ИНК. (US) (21)(22) Заявка: 2010147940/08, 20.04.2009 Приоритет(ы): (30) Конвенционный приоритет: 25.04.2008 US 61/125,519 (85) Дата начала рассмотрения заявки PCT на ...

Tamper evident labelling system with embedded storage device

A labeling system combines an indelibly inscribed visually readable serial number with an embedded electronically readable one-time programmable read-only storage device. The integration of the two in one labeling system ensures that the visually readable identification information is consistent with the electronically readable information. The labeling system is tamper evident visually and electronically. Electronic tamper evidence is provided by the construction of the label system which is designed to ensure the breaking of various internal and peripheral electrical connections associated with the embedded read-only storage device during any attempt to remove the label once it is affixed to the computer or subassembly thus identified. The integration of visual and electronic identification information eliminates the need to manually or electronically enter the identification information into the electronic storage device during a separate manufacturing process. The labeling system may be affixed to computer system enclosures, subassemblies, adapter cards, and even components mounted on such subassemblies and adapter cards.

Tamper resistant smart card and method of protecting data in a smart card

A method of protecting data in a smart card from unauthorized access, the method comprising providing a housing defined by first and second housing portions; employing a volatile memory in the smart card for storing the data, and supporting the volatile memory from the first housing portion; providing a power supply in the housing, the power supply maintaining the data in the volatile memory while the power supply is connected to the volatile memory; and connecting the power supply to the volatile memory using a conductor supported by and movable with the second housing portion. A smart card comprising a housing including two opposing major portions that are connected together; an integrated circuit supported in the housing, the integrated circuit including a microprocessor and a random access memory, the random access memory being used to store data; a battery supported in the housing and having first and second terminals, the first terminal being coupled to the integrated circuit; and a conductor coupling the second terminal of the battery to the integrated circuit to complete a circuit, the conductor being supported by the housing such that separation of one of the portions of the housing from the other portion opens the circuit and breaks connection of the battery to the microprocessor so that data held in the random access memory is erased.

DOUBLE MODE ANTI-COUNTERFACON LABEL

L'invention est relative à un dispositif sans contact comprenant un circuit d'antenne (12, C1, C1s) accordé sur une fréquence nominale ; un microcircuit de commande (14) connecté pour être alimenté par le circuit d'antenne, et incluant des fonctions de transmission d'informations (CPU) et des fonctions cryptographiques (CCP) ; et une impédance sacrificielle (C1s) configurée pour contribuer à l'accord du circuit d'antenne sur la fréquence nominale, les paramètres d'accord du circuit d'antenne étant choisis pour que le court-circuit ou la suppression de l'impédance sacrificielle abaisse la puissance d'alimentation reçue par le microcircuit à un niveau insuffisant pour alimenter les fonctions cryptographiques, mais à un niveau encore suffisant pour alimenter les fonctions de transmission. The invention relates to a contactless device comprising an antenna circuit (12, C1, C1s) tuned to a nominal frequency; a control microcircuit (14) connected to be powered by the antenna circuit, and including information transmission functions (CPU) and cryptographic functions (CCP); and a sacrificial impedance (C1s) configured to aid in tuning the antenna circuit to the nominal frequency, the tuning parameters of the antenna circuit being chosen such that shorting or removing the sacrificial impedance lowers the supply power received by the microcircuit to a level insufficient to power the cryptographic functions, but to a level still sufficient to power the transmission functions.

MICROCIRCUIT CARD (S) WITH COUNTER-MEASURE FOR LIGHTNING MISMATCH ATTACKS

Electronic document module comprising a chip and a contact interface with an antenna connected to an I/O port of the chip, electronic document comprising such a module and method for verifying a connection between the module and a corresponding antenna

La présente demande concerne un module de document électronique comportant un support (31) présentant une face dite interne (34) munie d’au moins deux interfaces de contact (L1a, L2b), chacune des interfaces de contact (L1a, L2b) de la face interne du support étant configurée pour être en contact avec une plage de connexion (L1, L2) d’une antenne (L) d’un corps (20) de document électronique (10), et d’une puce (38) comportant au moins un port I/O, et l’une des deux interfaces de contact (L1a, L2b) de la face interne (34) du support étant connectée au port I/O de la puce (38). Elle concerne aussi un document électronique comportant un tel module et un procédé de vérification d’une connexion entre le module et une antenne correspondant. Figure pour l’abrégé : Fig. 3

METHOD FOR DETECTING A THINNING OF THE SUBSTRATE OF AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT THROUGH ITS REAR SIDE, AND ASSOCIATED INTEGRATED CIRCUIT

Circuit électronique intégré comportant un substrat semi-conducteur (1) comprenant un caisson semi-conducteur (2) isolé du reste du substrat (1) par au moins une région semi-conductrice (3) réalisée au moins en partie sous le caisson semi-conducteur (2), et comprenant un dispositif (DIS) de détection d'un amincissement du substrat (1) par sa face arrière comportant un transistor vertical (TR2), des moyens de polarisation du transistor vertical, et des moyens de comparaison (5) couplés au transistor vertical (TR2) et configurés pour générer un signal (RST) ayant une première valeur si la valeur du courant traversant le transistor vertical (TR2) est supérieure ou égale à une valeur seuil, et une deuxième valeur si la valeur du courant traversant le transistor vertical (TR2) est inférieure à la valeur seuil. Integrated electronic circuit comprising a semiconductor substrate (1) comprising a semiconductor well (2) isolated from the rest of the substrate (1) by at least one semiconductor region (3) produced at least partially under the semiconductor well conductor (2), and comprising a device (DIS) for detecting a thinning of the substrate (1) by its rear face comprising a vertical transistor (TR2), means for biasing the vertical transistor, and comparison means (5 ) coupled to the vertical transistor (TR2) and configured to generate a signal (RST) having a first value if the value of the current passing through the vertical transistor (TR2) is greater than or equal to a threshold value, and a second value if the value of current flowing through the vertical transistor (TR2) is less than the threshold value.

PROTECTED INTEGRATED CIRCUIT.

SECURITY METHOD FOR DATA PROTECTION

CONTACTLESS LABEL FOR DETECTING THE ALTERATION OF A PLUG

SUPPORT FOR AN ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT, COMPRISING ANTI-PULLING MEANS

Radio frequency label comprising a means of destruction and associated method

Etiquette radiofréquence comprenant un moyen de destruction de l’étiquette et procédé associé Etiquette radiofréquence destructible (1) comprenant au moins une puce électronique (11) et une antenne radiofréquence (12) reliés par au moins un lien électronique (13), ladite étiquette radiofréquence (1) étant caractérisée en ce qu’elle comprend au moins un moyen de destruction manuelle (14,15,16,17) : de la puce électronique (11) de l’étiquette radiofréquence (1) et/ou d’au moins une partie d’au moins un lien électronique (13) reliant l’antenne radiofréquence (12) et la puce électronique (11) de façon qu’au moins un lien électronique (13) ne relie plus l’antenne radiofréquence (12) et la puce électronique (11) et que l’étiquette radiofréquence (1) ne puisse plus émettre. Figure à publier avec l’abrégé : Figure 11 Radio frequency tag comprising means for destroying the tag and associated method Destructible radio frequency tag (1) comprising at least one electronic chip (11) and one radio frequency antenna (12) connected by at least one electronic link (13), said radio frequency tag (1) being characterized in that it comprises at least one manual destruction means (14,15,16,17): of the electronic chip (11) of the radiofrequency tag (1) and / or at least a part of at least one electronic link (13) connecting the radiofrequency antenna (12) and the electronic chip (11) so that at least one electronic link (13) no longer connects the radiofrequency antenna (12) and the electronic chip (11) and that the radiofrequency tag (1) can no longer transmit. Figure to be published with the abstract: Figure 11

DOUBLE MODE ANTI-COUNTERFACON LABEL

L'invention est relative à une étiquette NFC comprenant un substrat pliable en forme de ruban (10) ; une antenne (12) agencée à une première extrémité du ruban ; un condensateur (C1a) connecté aux bornes de l'antenne, agencé à la première extrémité du ruban ; une impédance (C1b), notamment un condensateur, agencée à la deuxième extrémité du ruban ; et des pistes conductrices (40, 42) agencées dans la longueur du ruban pour connecter l'impédance aux bornes de l'antenne. The invention relates to an NFC tag comprising a foldable ribbon-shaped substrate (10); an antenna (12) arranged at a first end of the ribbon; a capacitor (C1a) connected to the terminals of the antenna, arranged at the first end of the ribbon; an impedance (C1b), in particular a capacitor, arranged at the second end of the ribbon; and conductive tracks (40, 42) arranged in the length of the ribbon for connecting the impedance across the antenna.

System and methods for secure firmware validation

An electronic device, such as a dynamic transaction card having an EMV chip, that acts as a TPM having a memory, an applet, and a cryptographic coprocessor performs secure firmware and/or software updates, and performs firmware and/or software validation for firmware and/or software that is stored on the electronic device. Validation may compare a calculated checksum with a checksum stored in EMV chip memory. If a checksum calculated for firmware and/or a software application matches a checksum stored in EMV chip memory of the transaction card, the transaction card may operate normally. If a checksum calculated for firmware and/or a software application does not match a checksum stored in EMV chip memory of the transaction card, the transaction card may freeze all capabilities, erase the memory of the transaction card, display data indicative of a fraudulent or inactive transaction card, and/or the like.

Security device holding information within electronic IC memory

The security device containing secret information comprises a memory zone of an integrated circuit which hold the information. This is protected by a cover which is formed integrally with the integrated circuit.The protective cover comprises a second integrated circuit (2), with an interactive connection (9, 9') formed between the two integrated circuits. Provision is made to destroy the secret information within the first integrated circuit memory in the event that the interactive connection is perturbed or broken.

Asset seal device and method

A device and method of sealing a container comprises a mechanical bolt ( 201 ′) with a circuit disposed thereon. The circuit includes RFID function. When a captivating device ( 203 ) is joined with one end of the bolt ( 201 ′) the RFID circuit changes state and operates to transmit symbolic data. When the bolt is severed or cut off the RFID circuit again changes state and operates to transmit other symbolic data.

RFID tag

本发明涉及一种RFID标签，其用于通过将RFID层粘附到容器或器材的表面上来标记容器或器材，容器或器材优选地在实验室环境中并且特别是包括柱状瓶、小瓶、注射器等。RFID标签具有平坦的柔性支承材料基底(11)、包括在平坦支承材料基底(11)中的至少一个RFID微电子器件(5c)、以及与至少一个RFID微电子器件(5c)连接并且包括在平坦支承材料基底(11)中的至少一个天线(5a，5b)。平坦支承材料基底(11)具有围绕其外周界分布的多个预定切口(8)和/或至少一个RFID微电子器件(5c)包括篡改检测功能并且与RFID微电子器件(5c)的篡改检测功能端子连接的导电环(5d)被包括在平坦支承材料基底(11)中。

Rfid tag

The present invention relates to an RFID tag and is provided with a function of detecting peeling while maintaining a good antenna characteristic. A first conductive pattern (12) includes two extending sections (121, 122) extending from an IC chip, each end of which is connected to the IC chip, and a correction pattern (123) for antenna characteristic correction which bypasses the IC chip and connects the two extending sections, and a peeling detection pattern (16) is formed in an area enclosed by the two extending sections and the correction pattern.

Information recording tag

BLOCKING A MICROCIRCUIT CARD BY COMBINING BETWEEN A CONTROL SIGNAL AND A SIGNAL ESSENTIAL TO THE OPERATION OF THIS CARD

Secure electronic device

The invention relates to a secure electronic device comprising: at least one electronic circuit (10) containing information that is to be protected; an energy source (11); at least one sensor (12, 13, 14) for measuring a physical variable and for providing a value which is representative of said variable; means (15, 16, 17) for comparing each value to at least one predetermined threshold (ref1, ref2, ref3) delivering result signals; a device (20) for protecting information, comprising means for controlling the destruction of at least one part of the circuit by pyrotechnical means (27); a logical, decision-taking device (21) which can activate the protection device in the light of the result signals; igniting means (31) for activating a local or total pyrotechnic micro-charge (30), with the aid of the electrical energy stocked in the energy source, in a permanent manner.

RFID tag and method for securing an RFID tag

Es wird ein RFID-Tag für ein Produkt vorgeschlagen, welches einen RFID-Chip zum Verarbeiten von Daten, eine Antenne zum Übertragen der Daten und ein Sicherungsmittel aufweist. Das Sicherungsmittel ist dazu eingerichtet, den RFID-Chip bei einem vorbestimmten Gebrauch des Produktes zu zerstören. Somit wird der RFID-Tag auf zuverlässige Weise vor einer illegalen Weiterbenutzung geschützt. Ferner werden ein Produkt mit einem solchen RFID-Tag sowie ein Verfahren zum Sichern eines RFID-Tags gegen unzulässigen Gebrauch des RFID-Tags vorgeschlagen.

SECURITY METHOD FOR DATA PROTECTION

Procédé et dispositif de sécurisation de données comprenant une carte de circuit imprimé 30 et un circuit intégré ayant chacun une couche de tracé conducteur protégée par une couche de bouclier électrique. Toute manipulation illicite de n'importe quel côté du dispositif provoque la perturbation d'un courant traversant une couche de tracé conducteur utilisée en tant que bouclier électrique. Cela amène un circuit de sécurité à effacer les données stockées dans le circuit intégré et à arrêter le flux de données entre la carte de circuit imprimé et le circuit intégré. A method and device for securing data comprising a printed circuit board 30 and an integrated circuit each having a conductive trace layer protected by an electric shield layer. Any unlawful manipulation of any side of the device causes the disturbance of a current flowing through a conductive pattern layer used as an electrical shield. This causes a security circuit to erase the data stored in the integrated circuit and to stop the flow of data between the printed circuit board and the integrated circuit.

Anti-counterfeiting tag maintaining a functionality after use

Secured identification document

The invention relates to secured identification documents and method for making them. The problem to be solved by the invention is to develop a secured identification document, comprising at least two flexible layers (32-37) embedding an electronic module (21), said electronic module including a flexible substrate (30) on which are positioned an antenna and a radiofrequency microcontroller storing identification data, said microcontroller being electrically connected to said antenna, said identification document being physically resistant against all type of attacks, in order to avoid a fraudulent person pulling out the module from the identification document by delamination of the constitution layers. The solution to this problem is achieved by the fact that the electronic module is strongly embedded and made interdependent with the stack of said at least two layers (32-37) by means of a chemically and mechanically tamper proof material .

Identification kit for identifying a pharmaceutical vessel, and pharmaceutical packaging unit

An identification kit (1) for identifying a pharmaceutical vessel comprising a vessel body with a circumferential surface and a removable vessel closure is proposed, wherein the identification kit (1) comprises at least the following: - a vessel cap (10) in the form of a three-dimensional moulded part (100), - a label for sticking to the outer circumference of a pharmaceutical vessel needing to be identified, and - an RFID transponder for electronically identifying a pharmaceutical vessel and/or the content thereof, - wherein the vessel cap (10) is installable and/or positionable in a predefined relative position on the vessel and has a circumferential wall (12) with an exterior circumferential surface (10a), which is intended as an additional labellable and/or electronically identifiable outer wall and/or outer surface and the radius, outer circumference and/or wall profile of which is chosen in accordance with the radius, outer circumference and/or wall profile of the circumferential surface of a vessel needing to be identified, and - wherein the label and/or the RFID transponder is/are intended and configured to be stuck over and/or to cover at least regions of both a circumferential surface (30a), formed in accordance with the outer circumference, of the vessel body (30) and the circumferential surface (10a) of the vessel cap (10) and/or to secure the vessel cap (10) on the pharmaceutical vessel (30).

Microcircuit card, has control unit generating control signal at high level during normal operation and at low level when attack is detected, and combining unit combining control signal and vital signal to generate secure vital signal

The microcircuit card (200) has a detecting unit for detecting an attack on the card, and a control unit (130) for generating a control signal (SC) at a high level during normal operation and at a low level when an attack is detected. A combining unit combines the control signal and a vital signal (SIV) of the card to generate a secure vital signal (SIVS). A capacitor (140) is provided for blowing a fuse (250) when the attack is detected, where an inverting gate (260) is connected in series to the fuse.

Tamper resistant smart card and method of protecting data in a smart card

A method of protecting data in a smart card from unauthorized access, the method comprising providing a housing defined by first and second housing portions; employing a volatile memory in the smart card for storing the data, and supporting the volatile memory from the first housing portion; providing a power supply in the housing, the power supply maintaining the data in the volatile memory while the power supply is connected to the volatile memory; and connecting the power supply to the volatile memory using a conductor supported by and movable with the second housing portion. A smart card comprising a housing including two opposing major portions that are connected together; an integrated circuit supported in the housing, the integrated circuit including a microprocessor and a random access memory, the random access memory being used to store data; a battery supported in the housing and having first and second terminals, the first terminal being coupled to the integrated circuit; and a conductor coupling the second terminal of the battery to the integrated circuit to complete a circuit, the conductor being supported by the housing such that separation of one of the portions of the housing from the other portion opens the circuit and breaks connection of the battery to the microprocessor so that data held in the random access memory is erased.

Smart card module

Chipkartenmodul mit- einem Substrat (3) mit einer ersten Seite (31) und einer gegenüber liegenden zweiten Seite (32), wobei auf der ersten Seite (31) Kontaktflächen (4) aufgebracht sind, und auf der zweiten Seite (32) eine erste Leiterstruktur (11) von einem Kontaktbereich (71) zu einem anderen Kontaktbereich(75) und/oder zu einer zweiten Leiterstruktur (72), die über eine Durchkontaktierung (9) im Substrat (3) mit den Kontaktflächen (4) verbunden ist, geführt ist, so dass die erste Leiterstruktur (11) zumindest zum Teil in einem zentralen Bereich (25) verläuft, und- einem Chip (5) mit Anschlüssen (6), der über dem zentralen Bereich (25) auf der zweiten Seite (32) des Substrats (3) angeordnet ist, wobei einer der Anschlüsse (6) mit dem Kontaktbereich (71) verbunden ist, und der Chip (5) eine Einrichtung zum Generieren und eine Einrichtung zum Detektieren von Testsignalen aufweist, wobei über den einen der Anschlüsse ein generiertes Testsignal an die erste Leiterstruktur (11) anlegbar ist, welches über einen anderen der Anschlüsse, der mit dem anderen Kontaktbereich (75) verbunden ist, detektierbar ist, wobei ein beim Vergleichen des detektierten Testsignals mit dem angelegten Testsignal detektierter Unterschied als ein Angriff interpretiert wird.

Device and method for non-volatile storage of a status value

조건이 있었음을 나타내는 상태 값의 비휘발성 저장 장치(100)는, 비휘발성 저장 수단(110), 공급 전압을 인가할 때 에너지를 저장하는 에너지 저장 수단(130, 140), 및 상기 조건이 발생하면 상기 에너지 저장 수단(130, 140)을 상기 비휘발성 저장 수단(110)에 연결시켜 상기 상태 값을 기록하도록 구성된 스위칭 수단(120, 150)을 포함한다. The nonvolatile storage device 100 having a state value indicating that a condition exists includes the nonvolatile storage means 110, the energy storage means 130 and 140 for storing energy when the supply voltage is applied, and the condition occurs. And switching means (120, 150) configured to connect the energy storage means (130, 140) to the nonvolatile storage means (110) to record the state value.

Tamper resistant smart card and method of protecting data in a smart card

A method of protecting data in a smart card from unauthorized access, the method comprising providing a housing defined by first and second housing portions; employing a volatile memory in the smart card for storing the data, and supporting the volatile memory from the first housing portion; providing a power supply in the housing, the power supply maintaining the data in the volatile memory while the power supply is connected to the volatile memory; and connecting the power supply to the volatile memory using a conductor supported by and movable with the second housing portion. A smart card comprising a housing including two opposing major portions that are connected together; an integrated circuit supported in the housing, the integrated circuit including a microprocessor and a random access memory, the random access memory being used to store data; a battery supported in the housing and having first and second terminals, the first terminal being coupled to the integrated circuit; and a conductor coupling the second terminal of the battery to the integrated circuit to complete a circuit, the conductor being supported by the housing such that separation of one of the portions of the housing from the other portion opens the circuit and breaks connection of the battery to the microprocessor so that data held in the random access memory is erased.

IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE

Method and device for monitoring containers

The device (2) has a sealing (4) i.e. electronic sealing, designed for varying conditions during opening a container (1). A computing unit (3) receives the sealing condition and communicates the sealing condition using communication units. The computing unit is designed to store a container status displaying certificate in a memory. A wireless read and write device is designed for communicating with the device. Independent claims are also included for the following: (1) a method for monitoring a container (2) a computer-readable data medium having set of instructions for monitoring a container.

DOUBLE MODE ANTI-COUNTERFACON LABEL

Tamper-resistant RFID disabling apparatus

A tamper-resistant RFID identification apparatus that includes a mechanism for storing an excess portion of the apparatus when engaged. The apparatus includes a substrate including a series of holes along a length thereof and a slot distal from the series of holes, a tamper-resistant locking mechanism for securing the apparatus to an object, an RFID circuit disposed on the substrate and an electrically conductive loop disposed on the substrate and electrically coupled to the RFID circuit, that is arranged to disable the RFID circuit when cut. The slot receives a tail portion of the substrate when the apparatus is secured.

Secure RFID tag or sensor with self-destruction mechanism upon tampering

A circuit board anti-tamper mechanism comprises a circuit board having a frangible portion, a trigger having a trigger spring, a trigger arming mechanism actuated by the trigger wherein the trigger arming mechanism is initially non-actuated, a force producing mechanism, a latch providing mechanical communication between the trigger arming mechanism and the force producing mechanism, wherein the latch initially retains the force producing mechanism in a refracted position. Arming pressure applied to the trigger sufficient to overcome the trigger spring force will actuate the trigger arming mechanism, causing the anti-tamper mechanism to be armed. Subsequent tampering with the anti-tamper mechanism results in a decrease of pressure on the trigger below the trigger spring force, thereby causing the trigger arming mechanism to actuate the latch, thereby releasing the force producing mechanism to apply force to the frangible portion of the circuit board, thereby breaking the circuit board.

Invisible electronic markers for safety bags, marking method and detection method

Structure for implementing secure multichip modules for encryption applications

A tamper resistant, integrated circuit (IC) module includes a ceramic-based chip carrier; one or more integrated circuit chips attached to a top surface of the chip carrier; a ceramic-based cap structure attached to the top surface of the chip carrier, and covering the one or more integrated circuit chips; and a conductive grid structure embedded within the chip carrier and the cap structure, the conductive grid structure having a plurality of meandering lines disposed in an x-direction, a y-direction, and a z-direction; wherein the conductive grid structure is configured so as to detect an attempt to penetrate the IC module.

ELECTRONIC CHIP ARCHITECTURE

L'invention concerne une puce électronique comprenant : un substrat semiconducteur (102) dopé d'un premier type de conductivité ; des caissons (104) du deuxième type de conductivité du côté de la face avant de la puce, dans et sur lesquels sont formés des éléments de circuits ; une ou plusieurs dalles (110) d'un deuxième type de conductivité enterrées sous les caissons et séparées des caissons ; pour chaque dalle enterrée, un puits (114) du deuxième type de conductivité, polarisable, qui s'étend de la face avant du substrat à la dalle enterrée ; en partie supérieure de chaque puits, un premier transistor MOS à canal du premier type de conductivité, le premier transistor étant un élément d'une bascule ; et un circuit de détection d'un changement de niveau logique d'une des bascules.

Rfid label

The invention concerns a RFID label for marking containers or equipment, preferably in a laboratory environment and including in particular cylindrical bottles, vials, syringes, etc., by adhering the RFID layer to a surface thereof. The RFID label has a flat flexible support material base (11), at least one RFID microelectronic device (5c) included in the flat support material base (11), and at least one antenna (5a,5b) connected with the at least one RFID microelectronic device (5c) and included in the flat support material base (11). The flat support material base (11) has a number of predefined cuts (8) distributed about its outer periphery and/or the at least one RFID microelectronic device (5c) includes a tamper detection function and a conductive loop (5d) connected with tamper detection function terminals of the RFID microelectronic device (5c) is included in the flat support material base (11).

capsule have Radio Frequency Identification tag

본 발명의 목적은 위조방지용 RFID 태그를 규격화 한 캡슐에 내장하고, 그 캡슐을 병마개에 설치하는 것에 의해 병마개의 최초 개방과정에서 캡슐에 내장된 RFID 태그가 파기되게 함으로서 주류 등의 위조를 근본적으로 방지할 수 있게 함과 아울러 상기 RFID태그의 파기를 위한 구조를 병마개에 별도로 설계하지 않아도 됨으로 병마개의 구조를 간단하게 하여 오작동의 문제를 해결하며 규격화를 할 수 있게 한 위조방지용 RFID 태그가 내장된 캡슐을 제공함에 있다. An object of the present invention is to fundamentally prevent counterfeiting of liquor by embedding an anti-counterfeiting RFID tag in a standardized capsule and installing the capsule in a bottle cap to destroy the RFID tag embedded in the capsule during the initial opening of the bottle cap. In addition, since the structure for destroying the RFID tag does not need to be separately designed on the bottle cap, the capsule containing the anti-counterfeiting RFID tag that simplifies the structure of the bottle cap and solves the problem of malfunction can be standardized. In providing.

Sealing tape

公开了一种用于固定密封材料的密封带。所述密封带包括：粘接表面，粘接剂被涂覆于粘接表面，RFID标签沿长度方向以与预设的一次应用长度相等的恒定间隔附接至粘接表面；以及非粘接表面，该非粘接表面是粘接表面的背面侧。RFID标签被附接在与预设的一次应用长度的起始端分隔开第一距离的位置处。RFID标签被附接的位置与第一距离之间的第二距离大于第一距离，使得密封带的预设的一次应用长度围绕包装的开口部的边缘缠绕并用粘接剂附接，同时当用密封带的预定的一次涂覆长度密封包装的开口部时，粘接表面的两端设置成紧密接触并且被粘接剂接合。RFID标签被构造成当与粘接表面分离时被破坏。

Method and apparatus for identification

Ic tag having function varying upon separation

An IC tag for enhancing security by preventing alteration of data. The IC tag is composed of three parts, i.e. two separable parts A1 and A2, and a nonseparable part B (tag main body). The parts A1, A2 and B are provided, respectively, with an IC1, IC2 and IC3, and an antenna 1, antenna 2 and antenna 3 as interfaces with the tag and the outside (a reader/writer for exchanging data with the tag). The IC1 (10) and the IC2 (20) are connected through a signal line L1 for transmitting signal between them, and the IC2 (20) and the IC3 (30) are connected through a signal line L2 for transmitting signal between them. The wiring is laid out such that the signal line L1 is disconnected when the A1 is separated from the tag main body, and the signal line L2 is disconnected in the same manner when the A2 is separated from the tag main body. Every time when the separable part is separated sequentially from A1 to A2, separation of A1 or A2 is detected and function of the tag is changed sequentially from first function through third function.

Rfid tag

본 발명은 간단한 구성으로 또한 확실하게 내부의 회로가 단선되는 RFID 태그를 제공하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 제1 시트와, 상기 제1 시트 상에 설치되며 적어도 일부가 통신용 안테나를 형성하는 도선 패턴과, 상기 도선 패턴에 의해 형성된 안테나에 전기적으로 접속되며 이 안테나를 통해 무선통신을 행하는 회로 칩과, 상기 도선 패턴 및 상기 회로 칩을 덮어 상기 제1 시트에 박리 가능한 상태로 접착되고 제1 시트로부터의 박리시에 상기 도선 패턴의 일부와 함께 박리되는 제2 시트와, 상기 제2 시트와 함께 박리되는 상기 도선 패턴의 일부와 상기 제1 시트 사이에 설치된 박리층을 구비한다. RFID 태그, 회로, 단선

Detection system and device

A detection system for use with an article, the system including a frangible fastener having a shaft structured to be attached to the article; and a radio frequency communication circuit formed on or in the fastener, the radio frequency communication circuit including an antenna formed on or in the article; and a resonator component formed on or in the fastener shaft and structured to be coupled to the antenna through inductance when the fastener is attached to the article and the antenna is energized, the resonator element further structured to fail to function when the fastener shaft is broken.

MOUNTING DEVICE FOR A SAFETY MODULE CONNECTOR

Crack-resistant counterfeit-proof label

Techniques for access control using wearable devices

Various embodiments are generally directed to techniques for using little or no electric power to monitor whether a wearable device continues to be worn by a person such that it may continue to be used to access a secured item. An apparatus may include a processor component; a storage to store an access credential; a presentation component to wirelessly transmit the access credential to an access device to enable a grant of access to a secured item; a power source; and a clasp coupled to a wearable portion to prevent removal of the wearable portion unless the clasp is operated to change state from a clasped state to an unclasped state, the clasp to cause loss of electric power from the power source to the processor component and the storage when in the unclasped state to nullify the access credential. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Tamper-resistant identification device

According to an embodiment of the invention, there is provided a tamper-resistant identification device (101) and a method thereof for identifying an item to facilitate a service, the device comprising an ID element (107) configured for storing identification data,- a control unit operative (103) to facilitate the service only in response to receiving said identification data; a housing comprising a first housing (201) section and a second housing section (205); and a coupling electro-magnetic circuit (119) for coupling at least the control unit and the ID element, said electro-magnetic circuit is designed to open in case the first or second housing section are displaced with respect to each other.

Integrated circuit

Anti-counterfeiting system

A method and apparatus for verifying the authenticity of, and detecting tampering with, an item is disclosed. An RFID transponder comprises an antenna resonant circuit which is coupled to an associated integrated circuit when the integrated circuit is positioned proximately to the antenna resonant circuit, thereby enabling the integrated circuit to re-ceive and respond to a radiofrequency query signal. The antenna resonant circuit can be integrated with a capsule or other form of removable pack-aging, such that it is destroyed upon removal of, or tampering with, the packaging.

Method and apparatus for providing identification

A method of providing identification of an individual including: maintaining a database of identification data specific to the appearance and/or condition of individuals; providing a unique description for each individual enabling access to the individuals identification data in the database, and providing identification means (10) adapted for portage with the individual and containing the unique description.

Identification band using shorting wire for enabling/disabling an RFID transponder contained thereon

An identification device formed from a band of material and a non-reusable tamper-resistant fastening arranged to join opposite end regions of the band. A radio frequency identification (RFID) transponder is disposed on the band. The transponder includes an RFID circuit, such as may be formed on an integrated circuit (IC) chip, and an antenna. First and second electrically conductive traces are coupled to different portions of the RFID transponder. The first and second traces are arranged such that the RFID transponder is disabled when the first and second electrically conductive traces come in contact with one another. Various arrangements of the conductive traces are described to achieve improved security and functionality over the prior art.

Anti-theft device for tamper-proof marking and identifying electronic cards

Anti-theft device for identification and indelible and tamper-proof marking of a surface, more particularly electronic cards. It consists of a very hard ceramic plate, on which is etched, with the aid of a laser, the name of the owner of the card as well as a unique serial number (3) per card (1). This insulating plate is bonded (4) directly onto the copper tracks (2) of the card (1). The layer of glue (4) has the effect of reacting with the layer of varnish (5) thus allowing perfect adhesion of the assembly. In the event of the plate being pulled off, the electronic card would be completely destroyed, on the one hand by the damage caused to the card (1) and the tracks (2) so as to get a grip on the plate, and, on the other hand, due to the fact that the tracks (2) tear off with the plate. This device is intended essentially to discourage theft of electronic cards and of electronic equipment in general, to inhibit the use of this material individually or its resale on the second-hand equipment market.

Method and structure for implementing secure multichip modules for encryption applications

A tamper resistant, integrated circuit (IC) module includes a ceramic-based chip carrier, one or more integrated circuit chips attached to the chip carrier, and a cap structure attached to the chip carrier, covering the one or more integrated circuit chips. A conductive grid structure is formed in the chip carrier and cap structure, the conductive structure having a plurality of meandering lines disposed in an x-direction, a y-direction, and a z-direction. The conductive grid structure is configured so as to detect an attempt to penetrate the IC module.

Semiconductor device, sensor element, use of a semiconductor device and methods for the defense against light attacks

Halbleiterbauelement mit:- einem Halbleitersubstrat (1),- zumindest einer im Halbleitersubstrat (1) ausgebildeten Halbleiterstruktur (2) und- zumindest einem Sensorelement (3), wobei:- die Halbleiterstruktur (2) zumindest eine Schaltungsanordnung (21, 22, 23, 24) aufweist,- das Sensorelement (3) eine PIN Diode ist und zwei Anschlüsse (61, 62) aufweist,- das Sensorelement (3) in einer Polysiliziumschicht auf einer Oberseite (11) des Halbleitersubstrats (1) angeordnet ist, wobei zwischen der Oberseite (11) des Halbleitersubstrats (1) und der Polysiliziumschicht mit dem Sensorelement (3) eine Isolationsschicht (5) angeordnet ist, wobei zwischen der Isolationsschicht (5) und der Polysiliziumschicht mit dem Sensorelement (3) eine zweite Polysiliziumschicht (7) gefolgt von einer zweiten Isolationsschicht (8) angeordnet ist und die zweite Polysiliziumschicht (7) zur Ansteuerung der Schaltungsanordnung (21, 22, 23, 24) ausgebildet ist; und- das Sensorelement (3) ausgebildet ist, bei Bestrahlung des Halbleiterbauelements mittels Licht ein an den Anschlüssen (61, 62) abgreifbares elektrisches Signal zu erzeugen. Semiconductor component comprising: - a semiconductor substrate (1), - at least one semiconductor structure (2) formed in the semiconductor substrate (1) and - at least one sensor element (3), wherein: - the semiconductor structure (2) comprises at least one circuit arrangement (21, 22, 23, 24), - the sensor element (3) is a PIN diode and has two terminals (61, 62), - the sensor element (3) is arranged in a polysilicon layer on an upper side (11) of the semiconductor substrate (1), wherein between the An insulating layer (5) is arranged between the insulating layer (5) and the polysilicon layer with the sensor element (3), followed by a second polysilicon layer (7) a second insulation layer (8) is arranged and the second polysilicon layer (7) for driving the circuit arrangement (21, 22, 23, 24) is formed; and - the sensor element (3) is formed, upon irradiation of the ...

ACTIVE SECURITY DEVICE WITH ELECTRONIC MEMORY

DOUBLE MODE ANTI-COUNTERFACON LABEL

L'invention est relative à un dispositif sans contact comprenant un circuit d'antenne (12, C1, C1s) accordé sur une fréquence nominale ; un microcircuit de commande (14) connecté pour être alimenté par le circuit d'antenne, et incluant des fonctions de transmission d'informations (CPU) et des fonctions cryptographiques (CCP) ; et une impédance sacrificielle (C1s) configurée pour contribuer à l'accord du circuit d'antenne sur la fréquence nominale, les paramètres d'accord du circuit d'antenne étant choisis pour que le court-circuit ou la suppression de l'impédance sacrificielle abaisse la puissance d'alimentation reçue par le microcircuit à un niveau insuffisant pour alimenter les fonctions cryptographiques, mais à un niveau encore suffisant pour alimenter les fonctions de transmission. The invention relates to a non-contact device comprising an antenna circuit (12, C1, C1s) tuned to a nominal frequency; a control microcircuit (14) connected to be powered by the antenna circuit, and including information transmission functions (CPU) and cryptographic functions (CCP); and a sacrificial impedance (C1s) configured to contribute to the tuning of the antenna circuit to the nominal frequency, the tuning parameters of the antenna circuit being chosen so that the short circuit or the suppression of the sacrificial impedance lowers the power supply received by the microcircuit to a level insufficient to supply the cryptographic functions, but at a level still sufficient to power the transmission functions.